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Abstract
This thesis examines the role of social safety nets in providing food security
and income stability in developing economies. The first two chapters study
the effectiveness of one of the world’s largest safety net program - India’s
Public Distribution System (PDS). The first chapter examines the impact
of the program on the labor market. The second analyzes the effect of the
program on food security. The third chapter asks whether households fully
smooth consumption in the face of fluctuations in income.
In the first chapter (co-authored with Kathy Baylis and Ben Crost), we
examine the effect of the PDS program on labor supply and wages. Our
empirical analysis exploits changes in the generosity of this in-kind trans-
fer brought about by India’s National Food Security Act in 2013. Using
detailed data on transfer eligibility, labor supply and wages, we find that
larger transfers led to lower labor supply and higher wages, and that these
effects particularly benefited the poor. The wage increases from the recent
expansion account for 30% of the total welfare gains for the poorest quintile.
Further, the effect on labor supply and wages is particularly strong in years
with bad productivity shocks. Our results suggest that social transfers can
have an additional poverty-reducing effect through the wage channel, and
can play an important role in preventing the vicious cycle of low wages and
high labor supply that afflicts poor households in bad years.
In the second chapter (co-authored with Kathy Baylis, Ben Crost and
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Prabhu Pingali), we examine the effect of the PDS program on household
consumption and nutrition. We find that increased PDS subsidies, that re-
sulted from the National Food Security Act in 2013, improved nutrition and
“crowded- in” the consumption of nutritious non-staple foods along with
increasing calories. Further, the subsidy supported food consumption as op-
posed to flowing to other goods. PDS beneficiaries consumed 84% of the
transfer value in the form of food, suggesting that the subsidy did not cause
them to substantially reduce their consumption of non-subsidized food. The
effect of PDS subsidies on food consumption is highest in households where
women have more control over the food budget, suggesting a role of intra-
household bargaining. Overall, our results suggest that in-kind staple food
subsidies can lead to large improvements in nutritional outcomes of poor
households.
In the third chapter, I study whether informal risk-sharing can provide
full consumption insurance in village economies. I propose a new test for
full risk sharing that accounts for heterogeneity in risk and time preferences,
and apply this method to Indian village data. While there is substantial
and significant heterogeneity in estimated risk and time preferences, full risk
sharing is rejected for both cases - with and without heterogeneity. Esti-
mated risk and time preferences are associated with wealth and household
characteristics, suggesting an incomplete separation between consumption
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INTRODUCTION
Agricultural households in village economies live in poor and high-risk envi-
ronments. Per-capita consumption and per-capita income is low and the risk
to income from drought, floods, crop failure and illness is high. Households
who fail to insure themselves against such income shocks may experience
consumption fluctuations with detrimental effects on household welfare. The
protection of households from such income shocks depends on the availability
and effectiveness of the existing risk-bearing institutions.
This thesis examines the effectiveness of two forms of risk-bearing insti-
tutions - social safety nets and risk pooling. Safety nets serve to provide
assistance to the poor and protect the vulnerable. About 2.5 billion people
world-wide are covered by safety nets, of which 36% of the very poor es-
caped extreme poverty. In addition to relying on safety nets, households use
many ex-post and ex-ante strategies to keep their consumption smooth in
the face of income risk. Storage, accumulation of assets and diversification
of crops may be some of the ex-ante means of reducing risk. There may also
be ex-post means of coping with risk through informal mutual agreements of
pooling income within a village. Such informal pooling of risk may poten-
tially provide complete insurance against income shocks. In order to fully
assess the vulnerabilities of households in village economies, where formal
credit markets are incomplete or non-existent, it is important to understand
how well households’ consumption is smoothed.
This thesis poses a simple question: How good or how bad are these in-
stitutions in providing food security, income stability and consumption in-
surance. In the first two chapters, I study whether social safety nets provide
food security and income stability. The third chapter analyzes consumption
smoothing and whether informal risk pooling can provide full consumption
insurance in the face of income risk.
The setting of this dissertation is in rural India. Among the developing
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countries, India presents a compelling case for studying safety nets, with the
highest number of poor people in the world as of 2015 and more spending
on safety nets than most developing countries. Further, a majority of the
population in Indian villages rely on agriculture as the basis of their livelihood
and are vulnerable to adverse risks from erratic monsoon. Various policy
issues turn on this level of risk and on the presence or absence of risk reduction
mechanisms. First, are the poor secure in food and nutrition? Second, can
the landless laborers break away from the vicious cycle of high labor supply
and low wages caused by adverse shocks? Third, does uninsured risk cause
fluctuations in consumption? In short, is there some scope for policy or
policy reform? In this dissertation, I present research on these critical policy
questions using detailed household and individual level data from ICRISAT’s
“Village Dynamics in South Asia” panel between 2010 and 2015.
In the first two chapters, I study the labor market and nutritional im-
pact of India’s largest social safety net - The Public Distribution System.
The PDS provides in-kind transfers of staple food to the poor at a highly
subsidized price. The program is by far India’s most important safety net,
providing assistance to over 800 million people and accounting for 60% of
the social assistance budget. With more than 530,000 fair price shops, that
cover around 85% of the villages in the country, the PDS is the most far
reaching social safety net in India. The efficacy of such a massive program in
addressing the persistent problem of malnutrition in India holds important
lessons for future food security and social welfare policy both in India and in
many other developing countries with similar programs.
More broadly, in-kind transfers - particularly of food - are an important
part of social safety nets around the world. Approximately 1.5 billion peo-
ple worldwide receive in-kind food transfers (Alderman et al., 2018), and
about 44% of individuals covered by social safety nets receive in-kind trans-
fers (World Bank, 2015). Despite their importance for developing country
safety nets, food transfers have received relatively little attention in the re-
cent economics literature, which has predominantly focused on cash transfers
and public works programs (Banerjee et al., 2017; Baird et al., 2018; Imbert
and Papp, 2015)
Our empirical strategy exploits changes in the PDS transfers that resulted
from the National Food Security Act (NFSA) of 2013. Before this legislation,
states had substantial discretion in setting the prices and quantities of PDS
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rations provided to program beneficiaries. This changed after the passage of
the NFSA, which imposed new generous national targets on all states. For
instance, states were mandated to provide 5 kg per capita of staple grains to
eligible households at prices no higher than 3 Rs/kg for rice and 2 Rs/kg for
wheat. States whose pre-NFSA prices or quantities fell short of those targets
had to expand their subsidies while states who were already in compliance
did not. We combine this policy variation with individual-level data from
ICRISAT’s VDSA panel between 2010 and 2015. Crucially for our study,
the ICRISAT panel contains data on a household’s size and the type of PDS
ration card it possesses. We combine these data with information on state-
level PDS entitlements to generate a precise measure of the value of the
PDS transfer a household is entitled to receive at every point in time. This
variation lends itself well to estimating the causal effect of the transfer, since
it was generated by a national rule and is therefore not likely correlated with
changes in local policies or economic conditions.
In Chapter 1, we focus on the labor market effects of PDS. We find that an
increase in PDS transfers led to a moderate decrease in labor supply and an
increase in the equilibrium wage. A 70 rupee per-capita per month increase
in the value of the transfer, equivalent to the average post-NFSA increase in
entitlements in the state of Bihar, causes labor supply to decrease by 1.5%
or 0.35 days per month. This reduction in labor supply causes daily wages
to increase by 4.4% or 10.15 Rs per day. Effects are strongest for non-farm
labor and wages, consistent with the notion that poor households use non-
farm labor as a coping mechanism. Furthermore, we show that total welfare
gains from the PDS are the highest for the poorest quintile, comprising about
13% of household consumption, of which the indirect gain from wage change
accounts for 30% of this total.
We further explore whether the labor market effect of the PDS program
can stabilize wages against bad productivity shocks. Previous studies have
found that poor households increase labor supply to buffer negative shocks,
so that wages deteriorate precisely at times when the poor are most depen-
dent on labor income (Kochar, 1999; Jayachandran, 2006; Ito and Kurosaki,
2009; Rose, 2001). By reducing the dependence of poor households on la-
bor income, PDS transfers might have particularly beneficial labor market
effects in years with bad economic shocks. Consistent with this intuition, we
find that the effect of PDS transfers on labor supply and wages is particu-
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larly large during years with late monsoon onset, a rainfall shock associated
with reduced agricultural production. This result suggests that in-kind food
transfers can play an important role in preventing the vicious cycle of low
wages and high labor supply that afflicts poor households in bad years.
In Chapter 2, we focus on the impact of PDS on household consump-
tion and nutrition. We find that increases in the PDS subsidy substantially
improve nutrition. In addition to increasing consumption of staple cereals,
PDS subsidies crowd-in consumption of diverse food types including pulses,
milk and milk products, oils, sugar, fruits and vegetables. Consequently, the
PDS subsidy increases overall calorie, protein and fat intake. A 100 rupee
(monthly) increase in subsidy, equivalent to the PDS increase in the state of
Karnataka in 2013, translates to around 17% increase in energy and protein
intake, 10% increase in fat intake. We find that PDS beneficiaries consume
83% of the subsidy value in the form of food, suggesting that the trans-
fer does not cause them to substitute away from non-subsidized food. The
main policy implication from this study is that food subsidies still remains
an effective tool in improving nutrition and can lead to large improvement
in nutritional outcomes of poor households.
In Chapter 3, I study whether informal risk-sharing can provide full con-
sumption insurance in village economies. Households in village economies
are generally not completely insured—income and consumption are typically
found to be positively correlated. Several explanations have been proposed
for the failure of full insurance, including moral hazard, limited commitment
and hidden income. An emerging strand of literature suggests that ignoring
heterogeneity in preferences may explain rejections of full risk sharing.
I propose a new test for full risk sharing that accounts for heterogeneity
in risk and time preferences, and apply this method to Indian village data.
While there is substantial and significant heterogeneity in estimated risk and
time preferences, full risk sharing is rejected for both cases - with and with-
out heterogeneity. Estimated risk and time preferences are associated with
wealth and household characteristics, suggesting an incomplete separation




LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF SOCIAL
SAFETY NETS : EVIDENCE FROM
INDIA’S PUBLIC DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM
1.1 Introduction
Developing countries have substantially increased their expenditure on so-
cial safety nets over the past two decades. Recent estimates suggest that
social safety nets, including cash transfers, public works programs and in-
kind transfers, cover over 2.5 billion people in developing countries and have
helped 36 percent of the poorest escape poverty (World Bank, 2015; Alder-
man et al., 2018).1 Despite their popularity and proven gains, the labor
market effects of safety nets - particularly social transfers - have long been a
central concern for policy makers and the public at large. Standard economic
theory suggests that social transfers reduce labor supply through an income
effect. Alternatively, social transfers may increase labor supply by helping
the poor overcome credit constraints or by improving their health productiv-
ity (Baird et al., 2018). As these programs expand in developing countries,
we need to understand their effect on their target population, including their
effect on labor supply and resulting welfare.
Even if safety nets affect labor supply, it is not clear how this change in
labor supply affects the poor. In the public debate, a reduction in labor
supply by the poor is often framed as undesirable, with references to safety
nets acting as “hammocks” for the “lazy poor” (Paul Ryan, quoted in the
Huffington Post (2012); Madras High Court, quoted in the Telegraph India
(2018)). However, the welfare effects of a reduction in the labor supply
of the poor are unclear. A reduction in labor supply could drive up low-
skilled wages, improving the welfare of net labor suppliers, who are typically
poorer than average. This type of redistributive wage effect can lead to
1Social safety nets provide assistance and protection for the poor and vulnerable people
and serve to reduce poverty and inequality. The terms “safety nets”, “social assistance”
and “social transfers” are used interchangeably hereafter.
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a substantial reduction in poverty as shown in the case of India’s work-
fare program (Imbert and Papp, 2015; Berg et al., 2012). Recent studies
suggest that the poverty-reducing effects of social assistance programs can
be substantially underestimated if these general equilibrium effects are not
taken into account (Cunha et al., 2011; Muralidharan et al., 2017).
In this study, we examine the labor supply and wage effects of one of the
world’s largest social safety nets - India’s Public Distribution System (PDS).
The PDS provides in-kind transfers of staple food to the poor at a highly
subsidized price. The program is by far India’s most important safety net,
providing assistance to over 800 million people and accounting for 60% of the
social assistance budget. More broadly, in-kind transfers - particularly of food
- are an important part of social safety nets around the world. Approximately
1.5 billion people worldwide receive in-kind food transfers (Alderman et al.,
2018), and about 44% of individuals covered by social safety nets receive in-
kind transfers (World Bank, 2015). Despite their importance for developing
country safety nets, food transfers have received relatively little attention
in the recent economics literature, which has predominantly focused on cash
transfers and public works programs (Banerjee et al., 2017; Baird et al., 2018;
Imbert and Papp, 2015)
Our empirical strategy exploits changes in the PDS transfers that resulted
from the National Food Security Act (NFSA) of 2013. Before this legislation,
states had substantial discretion in setting the prices and quantities of PDS
rations provided to program beneficiaries. This changed after the passage
of the NFSA, which imposed new generous national targets on all states.
For instance, states were mandated to provide 5 kg per capita of staple
grains to eligible households at prices no higher than 3 Rs/kg for rice and
2 Rs/kg for wheat. States whose pre-NFSA prices or quantities fell short of
those targets had to expand their subsidies while states who were already in
compliance did not.2 In addition, the NFSA mandated that states calculate
PDS rations on a per-capita basis, allocating 5 kg of subsidized grain per
eligible household member. Before the NFSA, some states had calculated
rations on a per-household level, allocating 20-25 kg of grain to each eligible
household, regardless of size. These states were forced to switch to a per-
2For instance, the state of Bihar reduced its prices for PDS rice from 7 to 3 Rs/kg to
comply with the NFSA mandate. In Jharkhand, where the price of PDS rice was already
at 1 Rs/kg and therefore in compliance with the mandate, the price remained unchanged.
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individual allocation, leading to more generous transfers for large household
relative to small ones.
We combine this policy variation with individual-level data from ICRISAT’s
“Village Dynamics in South Asia” panel between 2010 and 2015. Crucially
for our study, the ICRISAT panel contains data on a household’s size and
the type of PDS ration card it possesses. We combine these data with infor-
mation on state-level PDS entitlements to generate a precise measure of the
value of the PDS transfer a household is entitled to receive at every point
in time. To isolate the variation generated by the NFSA from discretionary
state-level changes to PDS entitlements, we implement an instrumental vari-
ables approach based on counterfactual entitlements that would have existed
if states had expanded PDS by the bare minimum needed to comply with the
NFSA mandate. This variation lends itself well to estimating the causal effect
of the transfer, since it was generated by a national rule and is therefore not
likely correlated with changes in local policies or economic conditions. The
fact that the changes to entitlements caused by the NFSA differed substan-
tially across households in the same village allows us to estimate the effect of
PDS transfers while controlling for a wide range of unobserved characteristics
through individual, time and village-by-time fixed effects.3
We find that an increase in PDS transfers led to a moderate decrease in
labor supply and an increase in the equilibrium wage. A 70 rupee per-capita
per month increase in the value of the transfer, equivalent to the average post-
NFSA increase in entitlements in the state of Bihar, causes labor supply to
decrease by 1.5% or 0.35 days per month. This reduction in labor supply
causes daily wages to increase by 4.4% or 10.15 Rs per day. These estimates
imply an elasticity of labor demand of 0.38, which is consistent with existing
evidence (Imbert and Papp, 2015; Evenson and Binswanger, 1980). Effects
are strongest for non-farm labor and wages, consistent with the notion that
poor households use non-farm labor as a coping mechanism.
We then analyze the distributional impacts of the wage increases caused by
expanded PDS transfers. We show that wage increases redistribute income
from richer households, who are net labor buyers, to poorer households, who
3For estimates that control for village-by-time fixed effects, identification is effectively
based on a triple-differences approach that uses households whose entitlements are unaf-
fected by NFSA, perhaps because they are not entitled to PDS transfers, as an internal
control group.
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are net labor suppliers. Our estimates suggest that the indirect welfare gains
from a 7% wage increase brought about by a 70 rupees increase in PDS
transfer value, is highest for the poorest quintile who gain about 118 rupees
per household, equivalent to 4% of total household consumption. In total,
the direct and indirect gains from the PDS program are again the highest
for the poorest quintile, comprising about 13% of household consumption, of
which the indirect gain from wage change accounts for 30% of this total.
We further explore whether the labor market effect of the PDS program
can stabilize wages against bad productivity shocks. Previous studies have
found that poor households increase labor supply to buffer negative shocks,
so that wages deteriorate precisely at times when the poor are most depen-
dent on labor income (Kochar, 1999; Jayachandran, 2006; Ito and Kurosaki,
2009; Rose, 2001). By reducing the dependence of poor households on la-
bor income, PDS transfers might have particularly beneficial labor market
effects in years with bad economic shocks. Consistent with this intuition, we
find that the effect of PDS transfers on labor supply and wages is particu-
larly large during years with late monsoon onset, a rainfall shock associated
with reduced agricultural production. This result suggests that in-kind food
transfers can play an important role in preventing the vicious cycle of low
wages and high labor supply that afflicts poor households in bad years.
Our estimates provide novel evidence for the labor market effect of so-
cial safety nets, based on plausibly exogenous, household-specific variation
in benefits. The most closely related previous evidence comes from Sahn
and Alderman (1996) who examine the labor supply effects of Sri Lanka’s
program of subsidized rice transfers using cross-sectional data and an instru-
mental variables approach that instruments subsidy levels with household
characteristics such as asset ownership and house size.
Our results differ from the literature on labor market effects of social trans-
fer programs in developed countries. Studies in this have generally found very
small if any work disincentives of the United States’ food stamp program
(Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2012; Currie, 2003; Fraker and Moffitt, 1988;
Hagstrom, 1996), Medicaid program (Gruber, 2000; Buchmueller et al., 2015)
and housing programs (Jacob and Ludwig, 2012; Collinson et al., 2015). Our
results suggest that this evidence does not necessarily generalize to a devel-
oping country context, where poor households are much closer to subsistence
levels and food makes up a large part of their total expenditure.
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At first glance, our results also contrast with recent evidence that cash
transfers have no consistent negative effects on labor supply in developing
countries (Banerjee et al., 2017; Jones and Marinescu, 2018; Salehi-Isfahani
and Mostafavi, 2016). However, our estimates suggest a very modest effect on
labor supply that cannot be ruled out by most studies of cash transfers. For
example, the 95% confidence interval of the effect of a cash transfer, worth
10% of household consumption, on hours worked, estimated by Banerjee
et al. (2017) includes a reduction of not more than 6%. Thus, our estimate
of about 2% labor supply reduction for a transfer of similar magnitude, is
well within their confidence interval. It is only because of inelastic labor
demand that we find that this small reduction in labor supply has a large
effect on local wages, and thus, local incomes. It is, of course, also possible
that cash and in-kind transfers may not be equivalent with respect to their
labor supply effects.4 While the issue of cash versus in-kind delivery of safety
nets has recently received considerable attention (Gentilini, 2016; Blattman
et al., 2017), it is beyond the scope of this paper, since the absence of a
cash-transfer program in India during our study period makes it impossible
for us to compare the two delivery modes.
Finally, our results suggest that the labor market effects of in-kind food
transfers are similar to those of public works programs, which have been
found to have considerable effects on labor supply in the private sector and
consequently on equilibrium wages (Imbert and Papp, 2015; Berg et al., 2012;
Muralidharan et al., 2017).
Our study also contributes to the literature on wage determination in rural
labor markets in developing countries (Kochar, 1999; Jayachandran, 2006;
Kaur, 2014). We show that large increases in the in-kind food transfers can
raise wages for casual low-skilled workers in the private sector. Transfers can
thus improve the welfare of the poor through a labor market effect in addition
4There are several reasons why labor supply effects of in-kind food may be different
than cash. First, labor supply will necessarily be lower under in-kind transfer, as com-
pared to cash, if the in-kind transfer is infra-marginal and if there is strong complemen-
tarity between the in-kind good and leisure (Gahvari, 1994; Munro, 1989; Leonesio, 1988).
Moreover, the stronger disincentive effect of in-kind transfer on labor supply holds, even
if leisure and the subsidized good are substitutes or if the two are independent (neither
complements nor substitutes), as long as the infra-marginal effect more than offsets the
substitution effect. Second, recent studies have shown that households do not treat food
as fungible due to role of intra-household bargaining (Breunig and Dasgupta, 2005) or
mental accounting (Hastings and Shapiro, 2018).
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to their direct effect on food consumption and nutrition. Our results also
highlight the importance of accounting for local general equilibrium effects
in program evaluation (Acemoglu, 2010). Ignoring the general equilibrium
effects on labor market would lead us to underestimate the impact of the
PDS program on the welfare of the poor.
Credible estimates of the benefits of the PDS program are particularly
valuable in light of the Indian policy debate around the effectiveness of the
program. Proponents have argued that PDS should be expanded as it im-
proves welfare of the poor by improving their food security. Critics have
objected on the grounds that the program is poorly targeted and may have
little impact on nutrition. Our results suggest that, despite its well-known
problems of high costs and leakage, PDS subsidies generate substantial in-
direct benefits for the poor through the labor market, which have so far
received little attention in this debate.
1.2 Public Distribution System of India
The Indian Public Distribution System (PDS) is the world’s largest in-kind
food transfer program. It is the largest social safety net program in India
and accounts for almost 1% of the GDP (approx. 10 billion $US in 2016
Government of India (2017)). The PDS has been in existence prior to India’s
independence. It was initially established as a rationing system by the British
Government during World War II to ensure workers in a few urban centers
received food (Nawani, 1994). In the early 1970s, the program evolved into
a welfare program with the primary objective of providing food security to
vulnerable households. Since then, the PDS has been the primary policy for
food security in India.
In 1997, the Indian central government reformed the PDS from a univer-
sal system to a targeted program that supported the poor, using a system of
household-level allocations based on ration cards. This system was expanded
in 2002 and further reformed by the National Food Security Act (NFSA) in
2013. The PDS is jointly implemented and jointly financed by center and
state governments in a way we describe in the next section. We begin by
describing the main features of the PDS system in the pre-NFSA period be-
tween 2002 and 2013, many of which remained in place after the NFSA. The
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subsequent section describes the major changes to the PDS system brought
about by the NFSA, which form the basis of our identification strategy.
1.2.1 PDS before the National Food Security Act
The PDS is based on a system of ration cards that the government issues
to households below the poverty line, which entitle them to receive a set
quantity of food grains at a fixed price below the market price. There are
two types of ration cards, Below Poverty Line (BPL) and Anthodaya Anna
Yojanaa (AAY).5 BPL cards are targeted to households below the poverty
line, while AAY cards are reserved for the poorest among the BPL population
who are disadvantaged in other ways, e.g. widows, disabled or elderly.
Ration cards are allocated through a two-step process involving central and
state governments. First, the central government determines the number
of BPL and AAY households to be covered under the PDS in each state,
based on census data. State governments then use proxy means tests to
allocate ration cards among their population. For example, during the pre-
NFSA period 2002-2013, the central government estimated that the state
of Bihar had 6.5 million households below the poverty line, out of which 2.5
million households were determined to be AAY. Accordingly, the state issued
4 million BPL cards and 2.5 million AAY cards based on a proxy means test
that consisted of a series of exclusion restrictions (for example, households
that owned more than five acres of land or an automobile were ineligible).6
Every year, the central government supplies state PDS systems with sub-
sidized grain through an agency called the Food Corporation of India (FCI),
which procures rice and wheat from farmers across the country and stores
it in government-operated warehouses. The FCI offers grain to states at a
uniform subsidized price called the central issue price, up to a maximum
quantity that depends on the number of eligible households in the state. In
the pre-NFSA period, the central issue price was 5.65 Rs./kg for rice and
5There is also a third type of ration card - Above poverty Line (APL) - for households
above the poverty line. APL card holders in general do not receive any food grains and
food allocation for APL households is on ad-hoc basis. We focus our attention on the
ration cards that are entitled to receive PDS rations - BPL and AAY.
6States had some flexibility in deciding the precise nature of the proxy means test used
to allocate ration cards. For a more detailed account of ration card identification and
allocation, see Saxena (2009)
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4.15 Rs/kg for wheat for BPL households. The maximum quantity offered to
a state was 35 kg of grain per month per household with a ration card.7 The
central issue price and quantity allocations from the center to state remained
constant during the pre-NFSA period, for both BPL and AAY card holders.
State governments choose how much grain to buy from the FCI, up to
the maximum offered quantity, and distribute it through a network of over
500,000 retail outlets known as fair price shops, each one serving a large
village or a cluster of villages. With a fair price shop in almost every village
in India, the PDS is the most far reaching of all social safety nets in the
country.8 At the fair price shop, beneficiaries with a ration card are allowed
to purchase up to a fixed quantity of food grains at a fixed price.
Before the NFSA, states had substantial discretion over the prices and
quantities they offered to ration-card holders at PDS shops. The pre-NFSA
variation in entitlements for BPL-card holders across states is presented in
Column A of Table (1.1).9 As shown there, a number of states chose to offer
PDS grains at prices below the central issue price.10 For instance, Jharkhand
offered rice to BPL households at a price of 1 rupee per kg. The cost of this
additional discount was borne by the state budget, since the revenues of the
fair price shops were smaller than the outlays to the FCI. Moreover, states
were also free to sell PDS grains at prices above the central issue price. For
instance, pre-NFSA, the state of Bihar offered PDS rice to BPL households
7For example, since Bihar had 4 million households with BPL cards and 2.5 million
with AAY cards, it was entitled to a monthly maximum of 87,500 metric tons of grain
for AAY households at a price of 3 Rs/kg for rice and 2 Rs/kg for wheat (2.5 million
AAY households * 35 kg), and 140,000 metric tons for BPL households at 5.65 Rs./kg
for rice and 4.15 Rs/kg for wheat (4 million BPL households * 35 kg). States were
also allowed to issue more ration cards and cover more beneficiaries than the number of
households determined to be eligible by the center, by procuring additional food grains
from sources other than the FCI. For instance, pre-NFSA, Andhra Pradesh issued 16.2
million BPL ration cards, compared to 4.1 million below poverty-line households identified
by the center. Furthermore, some states such as Maharashtra and Orissa use fair price
shops to provide food rations to households above the poverty line at a higher price, on
an ad-hoc basis, based on the availability of food grains.
8In 2011, there were 506,198 PDS ration shops Government of India (2011b) in 597,608
inhabited villages Government of India (2011a). This suggests that as many as 85% of
Indian villages were covered under the PDS. The coverage has since increased. In 2016,
there were 532,000 FPs Government of India (2016)
9Information on state-level PDS policies before and after NFSA comes from personal
fieldwork and government records.
10This was only true for BPL households. For AAY households, the central government
mandated that states had to sell the full allocation of 35 kg per household at a price no
higher than the central issue price.
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at a price of 7 Rupees per kg. Quantity entitlements of PDS grain also
varied across states. As show in Table (1.1), two states calculated entitle-
ments at the individual level (Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka), while the
rest calculated them at the household level. Furthermore, some states had
substantially more generous entitlements than others. For example, Jhark-
hand allocated 35kg of PDS grain to BPL households, while Gujarat only
allocated 18kg.
1.2.2 National Food Security Act
In 2013, the Indian central government, passed the National Food Security
Act (NFSA), which guaranteed a minimum quantity of food grains at af-
fordable prices to every eligible person in India (NFSA, 2013). The NFSA,
labelled as the biggest ever expansion of “right to food” in the world, con-
verted the food grains provided through the PDS into a “legal entitlement”
for beneficiaries. As a commitment towards the NFSA, the central gov-
ernment increased the outlays on food subsidy by as much as 25% (or 230
billion rupees) from the previous fiscal year (Government of India, 2014) and
substantially increased the generosity of PDS subsidies. The NFSA’s main
provision was to reduce the central issue price to 3 Rs/kg for rice and 2 Rs/kg
for wheat, and to increase the quantity offered to states to 5 kg per eligible
individual.
Crucially, the NFSA mandated the prices and quantities at which state
governments had to provide PDS rations to beneficiaries - 5kg of food grains
per person per month at a price not exceeding 3 Rs/kg for rice and 2 Rs/kg
for wheat. This mandate essentially forced states to pass through central
issue prices and quantities to beneficiaries; states that implemented NFSA no
longer had the option of providing smaller quantities or selling at higher prices
than the NFSA mandate. As a result, states whose pre-NFSA entitlements
were less generous than the NFSA mandate had to expand their entitlements.
States that found themselves already in compliance with the mandate, were
free to keep their entitlements unchanged. Our empirical strategy exploits
the variation generated by the forced compliance with the NFSA mandate.
Column B in Table (1.1) shows state-level PDS price and quantity en-
titlements for BPL card holders after the implementation of NFSA. One
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complication for our analysis is that the renewed political focus on food se-
curity, made a number of states expand their PDS entitlements beyond the
level necessary to comply with the mandate. These expansions were ini-
tiated during state-elections as part of election promises directed towards
gaining the support of the poor. For instance, the first executive decision
by the Chief Minister of Karnataka in 2013 was to introduce Karnataka’s
own PDS program “Anna Bhagya Yojana”, fulfilling an election promise of
reducing the price of PDS rice to Rs 1/kg (Deccan Herald, 2013b). Similarly,
the chief minister of Madhya Pradesh introduced the “Mukhyamantri Anna-
purna Scheme” as part of his election manifesto, and reduced the price for
PDS rice to Rs. 1/kg (Deccan Herald, 2013a)
One concern is that these voluntary expansions that occurred during states-
elections could bias our estimates by introducing correlation between PDS
entitlements and unobserved determinants of labor market behavior. To ad-
dress this concern, we use an instrumental variables approach that uses the
national NFSA mandate as an instrument for the state-level policies. In
particular, we construct counterfactual entitlements that would have existed
if every state had expanded PDS just enough to comply with NFSA man-
dates. Column C in Table (1.1) shows the counterfactual entitlements based
on minimum compliance with the mandate. In the following two sections, we
explain the variation generated by the NFSA price and quantity mandates,
and describe how we constructed counterfactual entitlements that isolate this
variation.
Variation generated by the NFSA price mandate
Figure 1.1 shows time-series of the PDS rice prices offered to BPL households
by the eight states in our data. Pre-NFSA, states had substantial discretion
over the prices offered to beneficiaries and a number of states offered prices
above the central issue price. Post-NFSA, the center reduced the central
issue price from 5.65 Rs./kg to 3 Rs/kg and mandated the states to offer
PDS rice at Rs. 3/kg. As a result, states that were out of compliance were
forced to bring down prices to comply with the NFSA mandate. For instance,
the states of Bihar and Maharashtra reduced their prices from 7 Rs/kg and
6 Rs/kg to the mandated price of 3 Rs/kg. The figure shows that the price
mandate was binding; by the beginning of 2014 all states had reduced their
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PDS rice prices to 3 Rs/kg or less.
Figure 1.1 also shows that most states that were already in compliance
with the mandate continued with their existing entitlements. For instance,
Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh, whose PDS rice price was already below
the new mandate at 1 Re/kg, left the price unchanged. An exception is the
state of Karnataka, whose pre-NFSA rice price was Rs. 3/kg and therefore in
compliance with the mandate. Nevertheless, Karnataka voluntarily reduced
its PDS rice price to 1 Re/kg. The figure further shows that some states
that were initially out of compliance with the mandate expanded their en-
titlements more than necessary to reach compliance. For instance, Madhya
Pradesh reduced its PDS rice price from 4.5 Rs./kg to 1 Re/kg., even though
a reduction to 3 Rs./kg would have sufficed to comply with the mandate.
As mentioned above, we are concerned that voluntary expansions of the
type observed in Karnataka and Madhya Pradesh might be correlated with
local economic shocks. To address this concern, we use an instrumental vari-
ables approach that uses the national NFSA mandate as an instrument for
the state-level policies. To isolate the variation generated by the price man-
date, we construct counterfactual price entitlements that would have existed
if every state had expanded PDS just enough to comply with the NFSA man-
date. For this counterfactual, we assume that states in compliance with the
price mandate, such as Jharkhand and Andhra Pradesh, made no changes
to PDS prices. We further assume that states that voluntarily lowered their
prices beyond NFSA targets, such as Madhya Pradesh and Karnataka, only
did the bare minimum to comply with the mandate. We also assume that all
states complied with the mandate in June 2013, when NFSA was officially
enacted, ignoring state-level variation in the timing of the reform’s imple-
mentation. Figure 1.2 shows actual PDS price entitlements (left) and the
counterfactual NFSA target price (right).
Variation generated by the NFSA quantity mandate
A second source of variation for our instrument comes from the NFSA’s man-
date that states provide at least 5kg of PDS grain per individual in eligible
households. As shown in Table (1.1) Column A: Pre-NFSA, states followed
different methods to calculate quantity entitlements. Some states, such as
Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka offered PDS rations on a per-individual ba-
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sis while imposing a maximum ceiling per household. Other states, such as
Bihar and Maharashtra offered PDS rations on a per-household basis, re-
gardless of size. To compare quantity entitlements across states, we express
them in per capita terms, using the state-specific average household size from
the census data. Figure 1.3 shows how per capita entitlements evolved over
time in the eight states in our sample.
As shown in Column A, five of the six states whose per capita quantity en-
titlement was initially below 5kg raised their entitlement to comply with the
NFSA mandate of 5kg/individual. The exception is Gujarat, which brought
its quantity entitlement in line with the NFSA mandate in 2016, after the end
of our period of observation. The two states, Jharkhand and Orissa, whose
quantity allocation already exceeded 5kg per capita, left their entitlements
unchanged.
As with the price mandate, several states expanded their entitlements be-
yond the level necessary to comply with the NFSA mandate, specifically Kar-
nataka and Andhra Pradesh. As before, we construct counterfactual PDS
entitlements that ignore these voluntary expansions beyond the NFSA man-
date. Thus we assume that states that voluntarily increased their quantity
entitlements beyond the NFSA target level, such as Karnataka and Andhra
Pradesh, instead did the bare minimum to reach compliance (Column B in
Table 1.1). To construct these counterfactuals, we assume that all states
whose pre-NFSA entitlements were below 5 kg per capita changed their enti-
tlement to 5 kg per individual. States whose entitlements were already above
5 kg are assumed to have left their entitlements unchanged.11 An additional
complication comes from the fact that the NFSA mandated 5 kg of grains per
individual, but let states decide how this total would be split between rice
and wheat. To calculate our counterfactual entitlements based on compli-
11It should be noted that the two states whose average per capita entitlements exceeded
5kg calculated the entitlement per household, regardless of size. These states therefore
did not comply with the 5 kg per individual mandate for every household. For example,
Jharkhand allocated 35 kg per household, so that an household of 8 would receive only
4.4 kg per individual. Nevertheless, the central government allowed these states to keep
their entitlements unchanged, effectively treating them as in-compliance with the NFSA
mandate, and our definition of the counterfactual entitlements reflects this. To test ro-
bustness to this definition of compliance with the mandate, we construct an alternative set
of counterfactual entitlements, for which we assume that all states changed their quantity
entitlements to 5 kg per individual. Estimates based on this counterfactual instrument
are reported in Appendix Table and are very similar to those of our baseline definition of
compliance.
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ance with the NFSA mandate, we assume that states kept their proportional
split between rice and wheat approximately constant as they expanded enti-
tlements. For instance, Bihar’s pre-NFSA entitlement was 15 kg/household
of rice and 10 kg/household of wheat. We therefore assume that Bihar com-
plied with the NFSA mandate by moving to a post-NFSA entitlement of 3
kg/individual of rice and 2 kg/individual of wheat. For details, see Table
1.1, which shows actual and counterfactual price and quantity entitlements
for all states in our sample.
1.3 Data
We use the new wave of ICRISAT’s panel study Village Dynamics in South
Asia (VDSA). These data contain information on 1300 households with 6000
individuals observed over 60 months from June 2010 to July 2015. The VDSA
data cover 30 villages spread across eight states in India: Andhra Pradesh12,
Bihar, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and
Orissa; with 4 villages in each state, except Madhya Pradesh with only 2
villages. The VDSA panel data are geographically divided into 18 villages
in the Semi-Arid Tropics (SAT) and 12 villages in the Eastern region of
India. The locations of the villages are shown in Appendix figure A4. All
the 30 villages have a PDS fair price shop.13 Households in each village are
randomly selected to represent households in four land-holding classes: large,
medium, small and landless.
To construct our main outcome variables, we use individual-level data on
labor supply and earnings collected every month and individual character-
istics such as age and gender collected annually. To identify beneficiary
households, we use the ration card status of each household at baseline in
2009. For our estimations, we also use household-level data on rice and wheat
consumption and village-level data on rice and wheat prices, collected on a
monthly basis.
12Two villages are in Telangana, a state formed in 2014. As our dataset begins before the
formation of the new state, and for the purpose of consistency, the 2 villages in Telangana
are considered as Andhra Pradesh
13The corresponding author of this study visited most of these SAT villages in person
and conducted extensive fieldwork. The operation of PDS ration shops in each village,
validation of ration card status and perception of PDS among beneficiaries were all docu-
mented.
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Summary statistics are presented in Table (1.2). We drop households with
less 48 months of data and households whose head lives outside the village.
The final sample consists of 1217 households.
Rainfall data are from the Indian Meteorological Department, defined at a
fine spatial resolution of a 0.25 x 0.25 grid cell size. Daily rainfall data for the
ICRISAT villages are obtained by mapping the village co-ordinates to each
grid cell polygon. No two villages fall within the same grid cell and hence our
rainfall measure varies by village. In this study, we consider monsoon onset
as a measure for rainfall shock. The first day of the monsoon is defined as
the first day after June 1st with more than 20 mm of rain, measured annually
for each village. Following Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), we measure
the timeliness of monsoon onset as the number of days between June 1st and
the first day of the monsoon.
1.4 Empirical Strategy
Following Kochar (2005) and Kaul (2018), we quantify the generosity of the
PDS transfer by calculating the product of quantity entitlement and price






















where Qpdshst and P
pds
hst are the PDS quantity and price entitlements for house-
hold h in state s in month t. As described in Section 2, these entitlements are
a function of the household’s state of residence, ration card status and house-
hold size. For each household, we calculate two versions of the transfer value
Thst: one based on actual state-level PDS policy at time t, the other based
on a counterfactual scenario that isolates the variation induced by the NFSA
reform. As described in Section 2, this counterfactual scenario assumes that
each state only expanded PDS entitlements by the minimum amount needed
14Measuring the generosity of PDS subsidies in terms of their implicit transfer value is
valid if the subsidized amount is infra-marginal, so that consumption of staple cereals is
more than what is provided by the PDS. Our data suggests that this is generally the case
for households in our sample. The average household in our data consumes 48kg of staple
cereals as compared to a maximum of 35kg of grains per household provided by the PDS.
None of the households get all their staple cereals from the PDS in a given month.
18
to comply with NFSA mandates, and that all states changed their PDS pol-
icy in June 2013, the month when NFSA was passed (see Figures 2 and 3 for
a description of actual and counterfactual PDS entitlements). The scenario
thus ignores voluntary state-level expansions of PDS and differences in the
timing of NFSA reforms, to address the concern that these factors may be
correlated with unobserved state-level shocks.
To further address the concern that household characteristics may be af-
fected by state-level PDS reforms or unobserved shocks, we calculate Qpdshst
and P pdshst using only household characteristics measured at baseline.
15 Fi-
nally, we define the market price, P
Market
s , as the average market price in
state s before 2013, to avoid endogeneity between market prices and NFSA
reforms. 16. We deflate the PDS transfer value to 2010 Indian rupees and
divide by the per-adult equivalent weight of household h.
Figure 1.4 compares our measures of Thst based on actual state policy (left
panel) and counterfactual NFSA target policy for a household of six people
with a Below Poverty Line ration card. For example, in Bihar before the
NFSA reform, this household received 15 kg of rice at 7 Rs./kg and 10kg of
wheat at 5 Rs./kg. Market prices were 23 Rs/kg for rice and 14 Rs/kg for
wheat, which yields a price discount of 16 Rs/kg for rice and 9 Rs/kg for
wheat and a transfer value of Rs.330 (Thst=15*16+10*9). After the NFSA,
the same household received 18kg of rice at 3 Rs./kg and 12kg of wheat at 2
Rs./kg, adding up to a transfer value of Rs.504 (Thst=18*20+12*12). Figure
3 shows that there is substantial variation in PDS transfers across states and
over time.
1.4.1 PDS transfers reach beneficiaries
We begin by validating that the mandates of the NFSA reform were im-
plemented by the states and that state-level PDS entitlements were in fact
available to households. The results of this exercise are presented in Table
(1.3). Panel A shows estimated effects of NFSA targets on actual PDS en-
titlements. Actual entitlements were calculated as described in the previous
15Household’s ration card status in 2009 and average household size in 2011-12.
16Previous studies have shown that food transfers can lower local consumer prices
(Cunha et al., 2011). It is therefore possible that an expansion of the PDS transfer leads
to a decrease in market prices, since PDS and non-PDS grains are close substitutes, which
would bias estimates based on post-expansion market prices
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section, by combining baseline household size and ration card status with
the current PDS policies of the household’s state of residence. NFSA target
values were calculated as described in Section 2.2, assuming that all states
expanded PDS entitlements just enough to comply with NFSA mandates.
The estimates in Panel A show that states largely implemented the NFSA’s
mandates. A 1 kg increase in the NFSA quantity target increases a house-
hold’s actual entitlement by 0.87 kg. Similarly, a 1 Rupee/kg decrease in the
NFSA target price reduces the household’s PDS price entitlement by 0.69
Rupee/kg. Taking together price and quantity entitlements as described in
the previous section, a 1 Rupee increase in the value of the NFSA target
increases the actual entitlement value by 0.78 Rupees. The relationship be-
tween NFSA target value and actual PDS entitlement is strong, with an
F-stat above 200, which allows us to use NFSA targets as an instrumental
variable for actual entitlements.
Panel B shows estimates of the effects of changes in PDS entitlements
on actual consumption of grains from PDS fair price shops, based on data
from the ICRISAT panel. The results show that changes in state-level PDS
policies were passed through to beneficiaries. A 1 kg increase in a household’s
PDS entitlement led to a 0.53 kg increase in consumption of PDS grains. A 1
Rupee/kg decrease in a household’s price entitlement reduced the household’s
purchase price of PDS grains by 0.7 Rupees/kg. Finally, a 1 Rupee increase
in the value of a household’s entitlement led to a 0.55 Rupees increase in the
value of the realized PDS transfer, calculated as the difference between the
cost of the household’s consumption of PDS grain and the value of the same
quantity of grain at current market prices.
Finally, Panel C shows the effect of NFSA targets on actual consumption
of PDS grain. As before, the results show that the NFSA targets reached
beneficiaries. A 1 kg increase in the NFSA target led to a 0.4 kg increase in
consumption of PDS grains. A 1 Rupee/kg decrease in the NFSA target price
reduced the household’s purchase price of PDS grains by 0.48 Rupees/kg. A 1
Rupee increase in the value of the NFSA target led to a 0.35 Rupees increase
in the value of the realized PDS transfer.
Overall, these results show that the NFSA mandates generated substantial
variation in state-level PDS policies, as well as household-level PDS entitle-




We examine the impact of PDS on labor supply and wages using the following
estimating equation:
Yihst = αi + λt + δst+ β1Thst + εihst (1.2)
Yihst is the outcome (labor supply or wages) for individual i in household
h, state s, and month t. Thst is the household’s PDS transfer value, αi and λt
are individual and month fixed effects, and δs are state-specific linear time-
trends. Standard errors are clustered at the village level. Labor supply is
measured as the number of days worked in a month, wages are measured
as daily deflated wages in rupees per day. The PDS transfer value Thst
is instrumented with its target value based on the NFSA mandates. The
PDS transfer value and the NFSA target value is in terms of real per-adult
equivalent value in 2010 rupees. We report the results for the full sample of
individuals reporting participation in the labor market, and also check that
results are robust to restricting the sample to adults aged 18-65.
Table (1.4) reports estimates of the effect of PDS transfers on market
labor supply for the full sample of individuals. The results show that a more
generous PDS transfer value decreases labor supply. Based on the co-efficient
estimates in Column (1), a 1 rupees per-adult increase in PDS transfer value
translates to a 0.0073 days per month decrease in individual labor supplied
to the market. Results are robust to controlling for village-specific linear
time-trends (Column 2), state-specific seasonal month fixed effects (Column
3), state-specific consecutive month fixed effects (Column 4), village-specific
consecutive month fixed effects (Column 5). Furthermore, results remain
similar with standard errors clustered at the state level (Column 6).
To interpret the significance of the estimate, we consider a policy experi-
ment of increasing the PDS transfer value by 70 rupees per adult-equivalent
per month - an amount equivalent to the PDS expansion in Bihar.17 Based
on the co-efficient estimates in column (1), 70 rupees increase in PDS transfer
value translates to 0.513 (=70*0.0073) days per month decrease in individ-
ual labor supplied to the market. In comparison to the sample mean of 18.9
17For a BPL household in our sample, on average, 70 Rupees per adult-equivalent is
about 10% of total expenditures and 15% of food expenditures per month
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days, the expansion of the PDS program decreases the total individual labor
supply by 2.8% (=0.513/18.9).
Table (1.5) reports estimates of the effect of PDS transfers on wages. The
results show that a more generous PDS transfer increases the equilibrium
wage. Based on the co-efficient estimates in Column (1), a 1 rupees per-
adult increase in PDS transfer increases daily market wages by 0.22 Rs/
day. Columns 2-5 show that the wage effect results are robust for more con-
strained specifications. For a PDS program expansion as in Bihar, the results
suggest that, a 70 rupees per-adult increase in PDS transfer value increases
daily market wages by approximately Rs 15 (=70*0.211). In comparison to
the sample mean, the expansion of PDS program increases daily wages by
7%. This is a large effect for an in-kind food-transfer program. A compari-
son to the market-wage effect of NREGS, India’s public work fare program,
shows that our estimate is slightly lower than the estimated 8.9% market-
wage increase from the roll-out of NREGS (Imbert and Papp, 2015) and
slightly higher than the estimated 6% market-wage increase from improving
the implementation of NREGS (Muralidharan et al., 2017).
Table (1.6) separately reports estimates of the effect of PDS transfers on la-
bor supply and wages in the farm and non-farm sectors. The results show that
the effect of PDS transfers is concentrated in the non-farm labor market. A
1 rupee increase in transfers increases non-farm labor by 0.0063 days/month,
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The estimated effect of PDS
transfers on farm labor is substantially smaller at 0.0015 days/month and not
statistically significant at conventional levels. We find a similar pattern for
wages. A 1 rupee increase in PDS transfers leads to a 0.18 Rs./day increase
in non-farm wages but only a 0.09 Rs/day increase in farm wages. The fact
that PDS transfers increase farm wages even though they do not affect labor
supply is most likely due to substitution across sectors. Farm and non-farm
labor markets are at least partially integrated, so that a decrease in supply
of one market leads to an increase in wages in the other.
Our results are consistent with existing evidence that poor households use
non-farm income as a coping strategy (Barrett et al., 2001; Ellis, 1998). Since
non-farm labor supply is typically the marginal residual labor supply, and
therefore more elastic than the supply of farm labor, we would expect that
an increase in social transfers will lead households to reduce the former more
than the latter.
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Our results are consistent with a labor demand elasticity toward the higher
end of the range of estimates found in the previous literature. Our estimates
above suggest that a 70 Rupees increase in PDS transfers program decreased
non-farm labor supply by 1.7% and increased wages by 4.4%. Hence, the
elasticity of labor demand is ε̃d =
1.7
4.4
≈ 0.38, which is only slightly higher
than the 0.31 estimated by Imbert and Papp (2015) and lies within the
range of 0.25 to 0.4 estimated by Evenson and Binswanger (1980). for farm
employment in India. Of course our estimates reflect the elasticity over the
relative short-run, since the period of observation ends two and a half years
after NFSA was passed. The long-run elasticity of labor demand is likely to
be higher, so that wage effects may be decrease over time.
1.5.1 Robustness Tests
Our empirical strategy is based on the identifying assumption that the labor
market outcomes of households whose PDS entitlements increased as a result
of NFSA were on parallel trends to the outcomes of households whose entitle-
ments decreased or remained unchanged. The assumption would be violated
if these groups of households were on systematically different time-trends,
or subject to systematic unobserved shocks that coincide with the imple-
mentation of NFSA. We conduct several robustness tests for the identifying
assumption.
First, we test for differential pre-existing trends by including a one-year
lead of the PDS transfer in our regression.18 The results, presented in Tables
(1.7) and 1.8) show that the coefficient associated with the lead is small
in magnitude and statistically insignificant. We thus find no evidence that
the labor market outcomes of households whose entitlements were differently
affected by NFSA followed different during the pre-NFSA period.
Next, we estimate regressions that control for state-by-time and village-
by-time fixed effects, to test whether our results are biased by geographically
clustered time-varying unobserved shocks. The most restrictive of these es-
timates are based on comparing the labor market outcomes of households
18As with the contemporaneous transfer value, we instrument the lead with a coun-
terfactual entitlement based on the NFSA target mandates. However, to instrument the
lead, we calculate entitlements based on a counterfactual in which the NFSA was passed
in June 2012, one year before it was actually passed.
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that were differently affected by NFSA reforms in the same village in the
same year. Local economic shocks, such as changes in labor demand, local
climate, or macroeconomic shocks to locally prevalent sectors are absorbed
by the fixed effects, as are changes to state-level policies. These regressions
are akin to a triple-differences approach, in which households whose entitle-
ments were unaffected by NFSA, perhaps because they do not own a PDS
ration card, serve as a within-village control group. The estimates, reported
in Table (1.9), are very similar to those of our baseline specifications, which
suggests that our results are not driven by unobserved time-varying shocks
that operate at the state or village level.
One concern about this triple-differences approach is that there may be
spillovers between PDS beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. For example, it is
possible that increased access to subsidized PDS grains drives down the price
of non-subsidized grain through market competition. This would also benefit
households without ration cards, who might therefore also reduce their labor
supply. Furthermore, a reduction in labor supply of PDS beneficiaries is likely
to lead to an increase in wages of non-beneficiaries who compete in the same
labor market. If this is the case, estimates from a triple-difference approach
that uses non-beneficiaries as an internal control would be biased downward.
To explore this concern, Table (1.10) presents regressions that restrict the
sample to PDS beneficiaries (households with either a BPL or an AAY card).
The estimates are very similar to those from the whole sample. While the
point estimate for labor supply is slightly larger for the beneficiaries-only
sample, the wider confidence interval does not allow us to rule out that the
effects are the same across samples, suggesting that spillovers are of limited
magnitude.
1.5.2 Wage Stability against Productivity Shocks
Wages in poor and underdeveloped regions, respond strongly to fluctuations
in agricultural productivity, caused for example by rainfall shocks. Bad rain-
fall may result in lower crop yield, reducing the demand for labor at harvest
time and thereby depressing wages, with severe welfare consequences for
the poor. The negative welfare effects of agricultural productivity shocks
are particularly strong for the poorest, who rely on wage labor as an income
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smoothing strategy. Previous studies have shown that the poor increase their
market labor supply in response to agricultural shocks, to make up for lost
income from agricultural production (Kochar, 1999). This increase in labor
supply causes wages to deteriorate, which further increases the poor’s need to
generate income, leading to a vicious cycle of high labor supply and low wages
(Jayachandran, 2006). A safety-net like the PDS could mitigate this vicious
cycle by reducing the need to generate income in response to productivity
shocks. In this case, we would expect the effect of PDS on labor supply and
wages to be particularly large in years with a negative productivity shock.
We test this proposition by considering rainfall as a measure of productivity
risk. The ICRISAT villages provide a unique setting to test this proposition,
where a majority of households are vulnerable to rainfall shocks (Gine, 2007;
Jacoby and Skoufias, 1997; Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993). Following
(Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993), we use the timing of monsoon onset
as a rainfall-based productivity shock. This timing is a crucial predictor
of agricultural profits, since the early monsoon provides the soil moisture
necessary for the initial stages of plant growth. Previous work has shown
that agricultural yields and profits are lower in years with a late monsoon
onset (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993).
We estimate whether the PDS has greater labor market effects during
negative shocks, by considering the interaction between PDS transfer and
monsoon onset:
Yihst = αi + λt + δst+ β1Rvy + β2Thst + β3RvyTvst + εivt (1.3)
Yihst is the outcome (labor supply or wages) for individual i in household
h, state s, and month t, Thst is the household’s PDS transfer value,Rvy is
the number of days that monsoon onset occurred after June 1 in village v in
crop-year y,19 αi and λt are individual and month fixed effects, and δs are
state-specific linear time-trends. The PDS transfer value Thst is instrumented
with its target value based on the NFSA mandates. Crop-year y is defined
19Following (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993), we define the date of monsoon onset
as the first day after June 1 with more than 20 mm of rain. In Appendix B, we show that
this measure of monsoon onset is highly correlated with alternative rainfall measures. We
also validate the use of monsoon onset as a proxy for productivity risk in our sample by
showing that it is strongly correlated with village crop yields, production, quantity sold
and price.
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from September to August, as the effect of monsoon (or harvest season) in
India commences from September.20 The co-efficient on the interaction term
β3 reflects the difference in the effect of PDS expansion between years with
more and less favorable rainfall. Standard errors are clustered at the village
level.
The results of this estimation, reported in Table (1.11), show that late
monsoon increases labor supply and decreases wages, while a more gener-
ous PDS transfer reduces labor supply and increases wages. The interaction
terms suggest that PDS transfers decrease labor supply and increase wages
more strongly in years with negative rainfall shocks. The wage estimates sug-
gest that a 1 rupee increase in PDS transfer when monsoon onset is delayed
by 10 days (or at the 25th percentile of monsoon shock) increases wages by
0.199 Rs/day (=0.193 + 0.006), whereas the wage increases by 0.24 Rs/day
(=0.193 + 0.05) when monsoon is delayed by 70 days (or at the 95th per-
centile of monsoon shock). For a PDS program expansion, as in Bihar, the
same estimates imply that, a 70 rupees per-adult increase in PDS transfer
value increases wages by 14 Rs/day (=0.199*70) when monsoon is delayed by
10 days, whereas the wage increases by 17 Rs/day (=0.24*70) when monsoon
is delayed by 70 days. These results suggest that PDS transfers help stabilize
labor markets against the vicious cycle of high labor supply and low wages
that occurs in years with negative productivity shocks.
We further explore the seasonality of this stabilizing effect by including
interactions with seasonal dummies. Results reported in Table 1.12) show
that the wage stability effect of PDS is concentrated in the lean season. This
is consistent with a mechanism in which poor households use market labor in
the lean season to make up for lower incomes during the agricultural season.
Since labor demand is lower in the lean season, this would have a particularly
large effect on wages. Our results suggest that the effect of PDS transfers on
wages is largest during the lean period, when poor households most rely on
market labor income.
Overall, our results imply that increases in the generosity of the PDS
transfers are effective in moderating the impact of negative economic shocks
on labor market outcomes. These results are consistent with the findings
in Jayachandran (2006), that productivity shocks cause larger changes to
20For instance, monsoon onset in 2013 would correspond to monthly labor supply from
September 2013 to August 2014.
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labor supply and wages if workers are closer to subsistence level because
such workers supply labor less elastically. A safety net like the PDS can
relax the subsistence constraint and thus make labor market outcomes less
sensitive to production shocks.
1.6 Distributional Impact
The previous analysis suggests that the expansion of PDS transfers after the
NFSA reforms led to an increase in wages, which benefits net labor sellers
and hurts net labor buyers. Since net labor sellers are likely to be poorer
than net labor buyers, this effect is likely to have pro-poor distributional
impacts. We estimate the distributional impact of the wage effect in terms
of household welfare for different consumption quintiles.
Following Imbert and Papp (2015), we calculate the welfare effect of an
equilibrium wage increase from the PDS program in terms of compensating
variation or the income needed to compensate households for a policy change




A step-by-step estimation of welfare gains for different consumption quintiles
are reported in Table 1.13. The first term on the right-hand side of eq.(3.5)
is estimated using the available data in the ICRISAT panel on total labor
earnings from the Employment Schedule and total labor payments to hired
laborers from the Cultivation Schedule. Estimates of total labor earnings and
total labor payments/costs by consumption quintile are reported in Rows
(3) and (5) in Table 2.6. Net labor earnings (Row 6) is calculated as the
difference between total labor earnings and total labor costs (Row 3 - Row
5). As households in the poorest quintile are net suppliers of labor, the net
labor earnings is the highest for the poorest quintile and decreases for higher
quintiles. The second term
dW/W
dT
in equation (3.5), which represents the
equilibrium wage change due to a change in PDS transfer value, is substituted
as 6.6%, based on the estimated 15 Rupees increase in wages brought about
by a 70 Rupees increase in PDS transfer value, as reported in Table 1.6. The
resulting net welfare gain from the wage change is 6.6% multiplied by net
labor earnings for each quintile.
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The direct gains from the PDS program is substituted as the actual PDS
transfer value received by the households at current prices (Row 9). As PDS
is a targeted program, the poorer quintiles receive larger benefits. Households
in the richest quintile also receive a modest amount from the PDS, probably
due to inclusion errors in targeting. The extent of inclusion and exclusion
errors in ration card allocation has been widely discussed and highlighted
(For example, see Dreze and Khera (2010) and Niehaus et al. (2013)). In
our data, about 35% of households in the richest quintile hold a BPL ration
card. Further, the state of Andhra Pradesh had a quasi-universal PDS,
wherein APL households also received the same benefits as BPL.
The total gain is computed as the sum of direct gains from the PDS pro-
gram and the indirect gains from the wage change (Row 8 + Row 9). Figure
1.5 depicts the numerical estimates of total welfare gains as a fraction of
household consumption, Rows 12-14 in Table 1.13. The figure shows that
the total gains from the PDS program for the poorest quintile is about 13%
of household consumption. The indirect gains through the wage channel are
highest for households in the poorest quintile, since these are the largest sell-
ers of labor. This indirect effect from the wage change increases the welfare
benefit for the poorest quintile by an additional 30% (Row 11). In contrast,
for households in the richest quintile who are net labor buyers, the increase
in labor costs result in a welfare loss. However, the welfare loss from the
program for the richest quintile, expressed as a fraction of total expenditure,
is only around 1 percent of total expenditures (Row 9).
Furthermore, the analysis in Section 6 suggests the equilibrium wage in-
crease due to an expansions in the PDS program is greater in years with
a negative monsoon shock. In order to measure the distribution of welfare
gains for different intensities of rainfall shocks, we simulate the effect of PDS
transfer value on equilibrium wages for different values of monsoon onset,
based on the coefficient estimates in Table 1.13. These predicted marginal
effects and the corresponding welfare gains at the 25th and 95th percentile
of rainfall shock are reported in Rows 15 and Row 17. The numerical es-
timates, also depicted in a bar graph in Figure 1.6, shows that the welfare
gains from the wage increase is not only highest for the poorest quintile,
also the gains are larger when households face a negative monsoon shock of
greater magnitude.
In summary, the distributional impact analysis suggests that the equilib-
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rium effects of the PDS program on the labor market are significantly welfare
improving for poor households, especially the poorest quintile. These results
are highly relevant for policy as they imply that the labor market effects
further strengthen the pro-poor targeted objective of the PDS program. In
addition, as these general equilibrium effects are stronger when households
face adverse productivity shocks, our results suggest that the PDS program
can play an important role in preventing the vicious cycle of high labor sup-
ply and low wages that afflicts poor households in bad years. Our results
also highlight the importance of accounting for local general equilibrium ef-
fects (Acemoglu, 2010). Ignoring these labor market effects would lead us to
underestimate the impact of PDS program on the welfare of the poor.
1.7 Conclusion
In this study, we estimate the effect of India’s food subsidy program, the
PDS, on labor supply and wages. Using state-level changes in the program
that occurred after the National Food security Act of 2013, we show that
increases in the generosity of the in-kind food subsidy led to lower labor
supply and higher wages. The disaggregated results suggest that the effect
of PDS was larger for the casual unskilled labor market, which in principle
is the desired population that PDS is targeted towards. Further, we find
that the effect was particularly strong in years with late monsoon onset, a
rainfall shock associated with reduced agricultural productivity. This buffer
effect was greater for women in farm labor. Our results suggest that in-
kind food subsidies can thus improve the welfare of the poor through a labor
market effect in addition to their direct effect on food consumption and
nutrition. Our results highlight the importance of accounting for local general
equilibrium effects; ignoring these effects would lead us to underestimate the
impact of PDS on the welfare of the poor.
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Figure 1.2: Actual PDS rice price vs NFSA rice price (instrument) for BPL
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Figure 1.4: Actual PDS subsidy value and NFSA value for BPL households
pre and post-NFSA
Figure 1.5: Indirect and Direct welfare gains as a fraction of total
expenditures
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Figure 1.6: Gains from wage change and monsoon shock
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Table 1.1: State-level PDS entitlements, pre and post NFSA
(A) (B) (C)
PRE-NFSA POST-NFSA NFSA Target (IV)
Item Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price
Andhra Pradesh†
Oct-14
Rice 4 kg/indv 1 Re/kg 6 kg/indv 1 Rs/kg 5 kg/indv 1 Rs/kg
(Max of 20kg/HH) (No ceiling)
Wheat No wheat ration
Bihar
NFSA - Feb-14
Rice 15 kg/hh 7 Rs/kg 3kg/indv 3 Rs/kg 3kg/indv 3 Rs/kg
Wheat 10 kg/hh 5 Rs/kg 2kg/indv 2 Rs/kg 2kg/indv 2 Rs/kg
Gujarat‡
Rice 5 kg/hh 3 Rs/kg No changes 1kg/indv 3 Rs/kg
Wheat 13 kg/hh 2 Rs/kg 4kg/indv 2 Rs/kg
Jharkhand
Rice 35 kg/hh 1 Re/kg No changes No changes
Wheat No wheat ration
Karnataka††
Anna Bhagya Yojana Jul-13
Rice 4 kg/indv 3 Rs/kg 30 kg/hh 1 Rs/kg 4kg/indv 3 Rs/kg




Rice 10 kg/hh 6 Rs/kg 2kg/indv 3 Rs/kg 2kg/indv 3 Rs/kg
Wheat 15 kg/hh 5 Rs/kg 3kg/indv 2 Rs/kg 3kg/indv 2 Rs/kg
Madha Pradesh‡‡
NFSA Apr 2014
Rice 2 kg/hh 4.5 Rs/kg 1kg/indv 1 Rs/kg 1kg/indv 3 Rs/kg
Wheat 18 kg/hh 3 Rs/kg 4kg/indv 1 Rs/kg 4kg/indv 2 Rs/kg
Orissa
Feb-13
Rice 25 kg/hh 2 Rs/kg 25kg/hh 1 Rs/kg No changes
Wheat No wheat ration
∗ NFSA Targets assume that all states complied with the mandate in June 2013, when NFSA was officially
enacted.
†Andhra Pradesh decreased Rice price to Re. 1/kg in Nov-11. AP split into two states in 2014, namely
Telangana and AP. In Oct 2014, Telangana increased rice quantity entitlement to 6kg/member and in April
2015 AP increased the quantity entitlement to 5kg/member.
‡ Gujarat enacted NFSA in 2016, which is not captured in our study time frame
†† Karnataka reduced wheat price to Re 1/kg in Oct-13 under the Anna Bhagya Yojana
‡‡ Madhya Pradesh introduced Mukhyamantri Annapurna Scheme in July 2013 and reduced Rice price to 2
Rs/kg and wheat price to Re 1/kg. In Feb 2014, MP further reduced Rice price to Re 1/kg.
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Table 1.2: Summary Stats
AAY BPL APL/NoCard Total
Number of HHs 105 579 533 1217
Number of members in the HH 4.706 4.724 5.040 4.861
(2.125) (2.238) (2.377) (2.296)
Nutrient and Calorie intake
Calorie intake (Kcals) 2115.7 2032.5 2009.1 2029.7
(740.9) (794.8) (746.3) (770.1)
Protein intake (gms) 56.61 52.06 54.04 53.31
(22.43) (21.92) (21.18) (21.69)
Fat intake (gms) 39.21 37.92 46.74 41.84
(19.53) (35.99) (25.96) (31.07)
Consumption Quantity (in Kgs)
Total Staple Cereals 12.82 11.46 10.43 11.13
(5.886) (5.546) (5.608) (5.648)
Quantity of pds grain consumed 7.259 5.400 1.183 3.742
(3.905) (3.883) (2.511) (4.067)
Pulses 1.066 1.035 0.964 1.007
(0.704) (0.811) (0.677) (0.748)
Expenditure and Income (in 2010 value)
Food expenditure 558.2 596.7 715.6 644.7
(236.4) (305.3) (359.1) (330.6)
Non-food expenditure 518.7 667.3 757.5 693.4
(1708.2) (3221.9) (3394.4) (3197.9)
Total expenditure 1077.3 1264.7 1475.6 1339.4
(1760.8) (3278.9) (3477.1) (3267.4)
Implict PDS Subsidy 198.9 127.1 10.54 83.05
(131.2) (69.42) (22.64) (91.77)
Income total 1567.4 2243.5 2680.4 2375.9
(4128.6) (16946.8) (13784.3) (14878.5)
Standard deviation in parentheses. All values, except number of HHs and household size, represent
the adult equivalent per household. Nutrient and Calorie intake is measured daily per-adult equiv-
alent. Consumption quantity, expenditure and income is measured monthly per-adult equivalent.
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Table 1.3: Validation of NFSA implementation
Panel A: Effect of NFSA Target on Entitlement
Entitlement
Quantity Price Transfer value
(kg) (Rs/kg) (in 2010 Rs)
NFSA Target 0.870*** 0.694*** 0.781***
(0.017) (0.010) (0.047)
F-stat 270.59
Observations 68622 70410 69148
Panel B : Effect of Entitlement on Consumption
Actual consumption
Quantity Price Transfer value
(kg) (Rs/kg) (in 2010 Rs)
PDS entitlement 0.531*** 0.704*** 0.550***
(0.042) (0.040) (0.041)
Observations 68622 70410 69148
Panel C : Effect of NFSA Target on Consumption
Actual consumption
Quantity Price Transfer value
(kg) (Rs/kg) (in 2010 Rs)
NFSA Target 0.402*** 0.484*** 0.353***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.073)
Observations 68622 70410 69148
Standard errors clustered at the village level in paranthesis. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 ***
p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from a separate regression with column heading as
outcome variable and row heading as the regressor variable. Each regression is estimtated
with household and time fixed effects. PDS entitlement refers to actual household level
entitlements calculated based on the current year’s state-level PDS policies baseline house-
hold size and ration card status, as described in Section 4. NFSA target value refers to
the counterfactual entitlements assuming that all states expanded PDS entitlements just
enough to comply with the NFSA mandates, as described in Section 2.2
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Table 1.4: Effect of PDS transfer on Market Labor Supply
Market Labor Supply (Mean = 18.92 days/month)
PDS Subsidy value -0.00733** -0.00768** -0.00839*** -0.00810*
(IV NFSA value) (0.00306) (0.00276) (0.00252) (0.00360)
Individual FE X X X X
Month FE X X X X
State trends X
Village trends X X X
State-seasonal month FE X X
SE clustered at State-level X
F-stat on excluded instrument 30.6 22.3 16.9 8.3
Observations 292215 292215 292215 292215
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Table 1.5: Effect of PDS Transfer on Market Wages
Market Wages (Mean = 227 Rs/day)
PDS Subsidy value 0.21897*** 0.16314** 0.17011*** 0.16350**
(IV NFSA value) (0.07638) (0.05025) (0.04801) (0.04754)
Individual FE X X X X
Month FE X X X X
State trends X
Village trends X X X
State-seasonal month FE X X
SE clustered at State-level X
F-stat on excluded instrument 30.6 22.3 16.9 8.3
Observations 104040 104040 104040 104040
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.6: Effect of PDS Subsidy on labor market
Market Labor Supply Wages
Total market labor Non-farm labor Farm labor Market wage Non-farm wage Farm wage
OLS
PDS Subsidy value -0.00062 -0.00138 0.00077 0.02231 0.04193 0.00414
(0.00110) (0.00096) (0.00048) (0.03359) (0.04211) (0.01294)
IV (Instrument: NFSA value)
NFSA value -0.00768** -0.00630* -0.00150 0.16314** 0.18185** 0.09002***
(0.00276) (0.00269) (0.00104) (0.05025) (0.06665) (0.02561)
Individual FE X X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X X
Village Trend X X X X X X
F-stat on excluded instrument 12.845 12.847 12.868 45.569 47.257 11.225
Mean 18.92 14.03 4.39 226.93 269.3 150.5
Observations 292215 292536 290818 104040 69780 37330
The table reports the effect of PDS subsidy on labor market outcomes - labor supply and wages, for the full sample of individuals. Unit
of observation is individual-month. Each column is a separate regression with PDS subsidy value as the regressor variable with individual
and month fixed effects and village trends. Column headings describe the outcome variables. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered
at the village level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Table 1.7: Robustness tests for parallel trends in labor supply
Market Labor Supply (Mean = 18.92 days/month)
Reduced-form with Instrument
NFSA target value -0.00168** -0.00185** -0.00184*** -0.00194*** -0.00171*** -0.00191**
(0.00065) (0.00073) (0.00064) (0.00065) (0.00057) (0.00082)
Lead of NFSA target value -0.00066 -0.00054 -0.00040 -0.00041 -0.00043
(0.00061) (0.00055) (0.00054) (0.00067) (0.00048)
Individual FE X X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X X
Village trends X X X X X X
State-seasonal month FE X
State-month FE X X
Village-month FE X
Year FE # Baseline HH characterics X
Observations 293308 23552 23552 23552 23552 232043
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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Table 1.8: Robustness tests for parallel trends in wages
Market Wages (Mean = 227 Rs/day)
Reduced-form with Instrument
NFSA target value 0.05149** 0.03946* 0.04177** 0.04170** 0.03389**
(0.02484) (0.01992) (0.01586) (0.01570) (0.01605)
Lead of NFSA target value -0.00924 -0.01247 -0.01176 -0.02319
(0.02554) (0.02633) (0.02664) (0.02825)
Individual FE X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X
Village trends X X X X X
State-seasonal month FE X
State-month FE X X
Year FE # Baseline HH characterics X
Observations 104040 83765 83765 83765 83587
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Table 1.9: Robustness to state-time fixed effects
Market Labor Supply (Mean = 18.92 days/month) Market Wages (Mean = 227 Rs/day)
PDS Subsidy value -0.00768** -0.00839*** -0.00840*** -0.00810*** 0.16314** 0.17011*** 0.17108***
(IV NFSA value) (0.00276) (0.00252) (0.00250) (0.00251) (0.05025) (0.04801) (0.04901)
Individual FE X X X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X X X
Village trends X X X X X X X
State-seasonal month FE X X
State-month FE X X
Village-month FE X
F-stat on excluded instrument 22.3 16.9 16.9 16.9 22.3 16.9 16.9
Observations 292215 292215 292215 292215 104040 104040 104040
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Table 1.10: Robustness to spillovers
Market Labor Supply Wages
Full sample Age 18-65 PDS Benefeciaires Full sample Age 18-65 PDS Benefeciaires
IV (Instrument: NFSA value)
PDS Subsidy Value -0.00768** -0.00730** -0.01155* 0.16314** 0.19669*** 0.16833*
(0.00276) (0.00273) (0.00513) (0.05025) (0.05239) (0.07299)
Individual FE X X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X X
Village Trend X X X X X X
Observations 292215 216625 183853 104040 96761 77053
* p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
39
Table 1.11: Labor market effects with monsoon shock interaction
Panel A : Total market Panel B : Non-farm Panel C : Farm
Labor supply Wages Labor supply Wages Labor supply Wages
PDS transfer -0.00555* 0.19333** -0.00448* 0.24100** -0.00105 0.09525*
(IV - NFSA value) (0.00321) (0.08101) (0.00232) (0.10633) (0.00196) (0.04972)
Monsoon shock 0.01124 -0.34060* 0.00566 -0.37871* 0.00534 -0.21962
(0.00681) (0.19157) (0.00448) (0.20147) (0.00367) (0.17492)
Interaction -0.00003** 0.00066** -0.00002 0.00058* -0.00001** 0.00052
(0.00001) (0.00032) (0.00001) (0.00033) (0.00001) (0.00035)
Individual FE X X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X X
State Trend X X X X X X
Observations 292215 104040 292536 69780 290818 37330
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. The table reports the effect of PDS transfers
on the labor market, interacted with monsoon shock. Unit of observation is individual-month.The results are
for the full sample of individuals. Each column is a separate regression with PDS transfer value (instrumented
with NFSA target value), monsoon onset and thier interaction as the regressor variables with individual and
year fixed effects and state trends. Column headings describe the outcome variables.
Table 1.12: Seasonality in labor market effects
Total market labor Market wage
IV (Instrument: NFSA target value)
NFSA value x Lean -0.00746** -0.00736** -0.00695** 0.22454*** 0.22123*** 0.20026**
(0.00313) (0.00317) (0.00299) (0.07678) (0.07630) (0.07385)
NFSA value x Peak -0.00722** -0.00714** -0.00702** 0.21542*** 0.21339*** 0.20588***
(0.00302) (0.00308) (0.00314) (0.07577) (0.07592) (0.07394)
Rainfall
Monsoon onset x Lean 0.00277 0.00861 -0.10166 -0.39159**
(0.00493) (0.00680) (0.10602) (0.17889)
Monsoon onset x Peak 0.00393 0.00655 -0.18565 -0.26689
(0.00429) (0.00386) (0.11862) (0.16580)
Buffer effect
Interaction x Lean -0.00002 0.00079**
(0.00001) (0.00032)
Interaction x Peak -0.00001 0.00026
(0.00001) (0.00026)
Individual FE X X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X X
State Trend X X X X X X
Mean 18.92 18.92 18.92 226.93 226.93 226.93
Observations 292215 292215 292215 104040 104040 104040
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. The table reports the effect of PDS transfers on the labor
market, interacted with monsoon shock. Unit of observation is individual-month.The results are for the full sample of individuals.
Each column is a separate regression with PDS transfer value (instrumented with NFSA target value), monsoon onset and their
interaction as the regressor variables with individual and year fixed effects and state trends. Column headings describe the
outcome variables. Dry is a dummy variable equal to one for January to June. Rainy is a dummy variable for July to Dec.
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Table 1.13: Welfare Gains by expenditure quintile
Expenditure quintile
Full sample Remarks
Poorest Second Third Fourth Richest
Household expenditures and income
1) Monthly HH consumption per capita 657 953 1205 1556 2139 1491 Sum stat
2) Total monthly consumption 3071 4210 4812 5734 9241 5418 Sum stat
3) Total earnings permonth for adults doing casual labor 2063 786 417 371 196 766 Sum stat
4) Casual earning as a fraction of household consumption 0.67 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.02 0.14 (3) / (2)
Gains in household welfare from wage increase
5) Estimated monthly labor costs per household 198 322 503 675 1594 694 Cultivation Schedule
6) Net labor earnings per month 1865 464 -86 -304 -1398 72 (3) - (5)
7) Wage change 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% Estimated from average effects
8) Net income gain from wage change 117.5 29.2 -5.4 -19.2 -88.1 4.5 (6) * (7)
Direct Gains from PDS transfer
9) Actual monthly PDS transfer valure received at cur-
rent prices per household
274 234 208 196 123 216 Sum stat
Total gains
10) Total gain from PDS transfer and wage change 391.1 263.5 202.6 176.8 34.9 220.3 (9) + (8)
Welfare gains from wage change
11) As a fraction of total gains 30% 11% - - - 2% (8) / (10)
Welfare gains as a fraction of total expenditure
12) Indirect gains from wage change 3.8% 0.7% -0.1% -0.3% -1.0% 0.1% (8) / (2)
13) Direct gains from PDS transfer 8.9% 5.6% 4.3% 3.4% 1.3% 4.0% (9) / (2)
14) Total gain as a fraction of total expenditures 12.7% 6.3% 4.2% 3.1% 0.4% 4.1% (10) / (2)
Welfare gains and monsoon shock
15) Wage increase at 25th percentile of monsoon shock 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6% Estimated from buffer effects
16) Net income gain from wage change at 25th percentile 104.4 26.0 -4.8 -17.0 -78.3 4.0 (10) * (6)
17) Wage increase at 95th percentile of monsoon shock 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% 8.2% Estimated from buffer effects
18) Net income gain from wage change at 95th percentile 152.9 38.0 -7.1 -24.9 -114.6 5.9 (12) * (6)
19) Total gains at 25th percentile of monsoon shock 378.0 260.3 203.2 178.9 44.7 219.8 (11) + (10)




DO STAPLE FOOD SUBSIDIES IMPROVE
NUTRITION?
2.1 Introduction
Food subsidies are a widely used tool for improving the food security of
the poor. About 1.5 billion people worldwide receive in-kind food subsidies
(Alderman et al., 2018), which provide a rationed quantity of subsidized food,
typically consisting of staples such as rice, wheat or bread. For example, the
Raskin program in Indonesia provides rice to 62 million people, the Public
Distribution System (PDS) in India provides rice and wheat to 800 million
people and Tamween program in Egypt provides Baladi bread and wheat
flour to 82 million people. While emerging-market governments increasingly
debate moving from in-kind subsidies to cash transfers (Blattman et al.,
2017), in-kind transfers still remain the predominant form of assistance in
low and middle income countries. For example, in-kind programs in India and
Egypt are the largest form of social assistance in both countries, accounting
for 53% and 60% of their social assistance budget (Alderman et al., 2018).
Among the many justifications for in-kind food subsidies, perhaps the most
cited is improved nutrition.1 Proponents argue that providing subsidized
staple food will increase consumption of the staple while decreasing expendi-
ture, thereby allowing recipients to spend more of their budgets on nutritious
higher value foods. However, opponents contend that subsidizing staple food
primarily encourages staple cereal consumption, and thus may crowd-out
more nutritious food items and potentially reduce dietary diversity.
Theoretically, the effect of an in-kind staple food subsidy on overall food
consumption depends on a number of factors, including whether the subsidy
is infra-marginal or extra-marginal2, whether food is a normal or inferior
1See Currie and Gahvari (2008) for a review on the justifications for in-kind transfers
2An in-kind subsidy is considered to be infra-marginal if the quantity of subsidized food
is smaller than the quantity the household would have consumed without the subsidy, and
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good, and whether the household is subject to liquidity constraints or intra-
household bargaining dynamics. In the simplest case of an infra-marginal
subsidy in a unitary household without liquidity constraints, the subsidy has
a pure income effect and may increase or decrease staple food consumption,
depending on whether food is a normal or inferior good. In the case of an
extra-marginal subsidy, the effect on consumption would also depend on the
magnitude of the price elasticity of food. Previous research has shown that
staple foods can exhibit Giffen behavior, so that food subsidies may decrease
consumption (Jensen and Miller, 2011).
In this paper, we examine the impact of India’s food subsidy program
- the PDS - on food consumption and nutrition. The PDS is the world’s
largest in-kind food subsidy program, and is targeted towards the poor, with
a primary objective to provide food security. The PDS supplies a ration of
staple food (mainly rice and wheat) at highly subsidized prices through a
network of retail outlets known as fair price shops. With more than 530,000
fair price shops, that cover around 85% of the villages in the country, the PDS
is the most far reaching social safety net in India. The Indian government’s
spending on food subsidies (US $18.9 billion in 2015) is about three times
the size of NREGA - the next-largest social assistance program (Government
of India, 2017). The efficacy of such a massive program in addressing the
persistent problem of malnutrition in India holds important lessons for future
food security and social welfare policy both in India and in many other
developing countries with similar programs.
To estimate the effect of food subsidies, we exploit state-level changes in
PDS subsidies that resulted from the National Food Security Act (NFSA) of
2013. As one of its central provisions, the NFSA mandated generous national
targets for quantities and prices at which state governments had to provide
PDS rations. For instance, the minimum monthly PDS entitlements for the
poor were expanded from varying state levels to 2kg at 3 Rs/kg for rice and 3
kg at 2 Rs/kg for wheat. To comply with these new national targets, states
whose PDS programs were less generous before the NFSA were forced to
expand subsidies more than states who were already in compliance.3 The
extra-marginal if the subsidized quantity is larger.
3For instance, the state of Bihar reduced its prices for PDS rice from 7 to 3 Rs/kg. In
Jharkhand, where the price of PDS rice was already below the new target at 1 Rs/kg, the
price remained unchanged.
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resulting policy variation lends itself well to estimating the causal effect of
food subsidies since it came from a national rule and was therefore unlikely
to be correlated with changes in local policies or economic conditions.
We combine the policy variation generated by the NFSA with household-
level data on food consumption from ICRISAT’s “Village Dynamics in South
Asia” panel between 2010 and 2015. Crucially, for our study, the ICRISAT
data contains information on the type of PDS ration card a household pos-
sesses. We combine this information with data on state level PDS policies
to generate a precise measure of the value of the PDS subsidy a household is
entitled to receive at every point in time.4 These data allows us to estimate
the effect of the PDS subsidy on household consumption in a difference-in-
differences type regression that controls for household, state and time fixed
effects. Our results are robust to including household-specific time-trends,
and to a triple-difference approach that controls for a state-by-month fixed
effects.
We find that increases in the PDS subsidy substantially improve nutri-
tion. In addition to increasing consumption of staple cereals, PDS subsidies
“crowd-in” consumption of diverse food types including pulses, milk and milk
products, oils, sugar, fruits and vegetables. Consequently, the PDS subsidy
increases overall calorie, protein and fat intake. A 100 rupee (monthly) in-
crease in subsidy, equivalent to the PDS increase in the state of Karnataka in
2013, translates to an increased daily intake of 449kcal in intake, 10.9 grams
increase in protein and 8.5 grams in fat intake per-adult. These nutritional
improvements correspond to around 17% increase in energy and protein in-
take, 10% increase in fat intake and are large relative to those found by pre-
vious studies of the PDS system and other kinds of food subsidies (Kochar,
2005; Kaushal and Muchomba, 2015; Tarozzi, 2005; Kaul, 2018; Jensen and
Miller, 2011). We find that PDS beneficiaries consume 83% of the subsidy
value in the form of food,5 suggesting that the transfer does not cause them
to substitute away from non-subsidized food.
We further explore mechanisms that may explain these large effects of food
4Information on the PDS policy changes comes from personal fieldwork and government
records, which we combine to document 11 policy changes to the price and quantity of
rice and wheat that beneficiary households are mandated to receive from the PDS.
5We follow the literature in calculating the implicit value of the PDS subsidy as the
product of the subsidized quantity and the price discount (difference between the average
market and specific PDS price)
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subsidies on nutrition. Several researchers have proposed intra-household
bargaining as an important factor in determining how food subsidies translate
to food consumption (Senauer and Young, 1986; Orazem, 1999; Breunig and
Dasgupta, 2005). For example, in some societies women have more control
over the food budget whereas men control non-food expenditures (Armand
et al., 2016; Angelucci and Attanasio, 2009; Attanasio et al., 2011; Schady
and Rosero, 2008), so that resources are not treated as completely fungible
across the two budget domains. In this scenario, an in-kind subsidy may
increase the effective budget share controlled by women and have a larger
effect on food consumption, as compared to non-food consumption (Breunig
and Dasgupta, 2005).6
To this end, we use the ICRISAT’s panel data on the role of gender in
household decisions to generate proxies for bargaining power over the food
budget. Our results suggest that households where women have more control
over the food budget spend a significantly larger fractions of the implicit PDS
transfer on food and a smaller fraction on temptation goods such as alcohol
and cigarettes. These results are consistent with a model in which some
households have atleast partially separate food and non-food budgets. As a
result, households in which women control the food budget spend the PDS
transfer predominantly in the form of food and other items preferred by
women.
This study adds important new evidence to the literature on nutritional
effects of food subsidies. The previous evidence on this topic is mixed, with
many studies that find small or even negative effects of food subsidies on
food consumption (e.g. Kochar (2005), Jensen and Miller (2011), Kaushal
and Muchomba (2015)). Kochar (2005) and Kaushal and Muchomba (2015)
estimated the effect of nationwide increases in the generosity of PDS subsidies
on food consumption of poor households, using non-poor households as a
control group. Kochar (2005) found that an initial increase in generosity of
the PDS subsidy in the late 1990s only led to a marginal increase in the
caloric intake of the poor. Similarly, Kaushal and Muchomba (2015) found
that a later increase in PDS subsidies in 2002 had no effect on nutritional
6Another justification of in-kind food transfers, in the context of intra-household allo-
cation, is that food is spent equitably within the household, while cash can be cornered
by certain individuals (Dreze, 2011). Although a few studies find that food is distributed
equally within the household (Pitt et al., 1990; Senauer et al., 1988), the empirical evidence
on whether cash may be unequally distributed within the household is scarce.
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status. Kaul (2018) used variation in district-level market prices of non-
subsidized food to estimate the effect of PDS subsidies and found that they
had a small but statistically significant positive effect on food consumption.
Tarozzi (2005) studied the effect of an increase in the price of PDS food
in a single state, Andhra Pradesh, and found that it had no effect on child
anthropometric measures.7
Outside of India, the literature on food subsidies and nutrition is more
mixed. Results from a randomized control trial in Mexico showed that in-kind
food transfers increased nutritional outcomes of poor households in Mexico,
but not more so than a cash transfer of equal value (Cunha, 2014; Skoufias
et al., 2013; Leroy et al., 2010).8 Also using a randomized control trial in
China, Jensen and Miller (2011) found that rice subsidies had either no effect
or a negative effect on nutrition.
There are several reasons why our estimates of nutritional effects of PDS
subsidies are larger than those of previous studies. First, we base our analysis
on plausibly exogenous state-level changes to the generosity of the PDS sub-
sidy. Previous studies considered either nationwide changes to PDS subsidies
(Kochar, 2005; Kaushal and Muchomba, 2015), changes from a single state
(Tarozzi, 2005), or variation in non-PDS prices (Kaul, 2018). Our empirical
approach allows us to control for a wide range of unobserved variables and
address concerns about the endogeneity of non-PDS prices to changes in the
PDS subsidy. In addition, the combination of detailed state-level information
on PDS policies with household-level data on ration-card status allows us to
generate a more accurate measure of PDS entitlement at the household level.
Most previous studies of the PDS have relied on repeated rounds of cross-
7A different literature examines universalization or reforms of the PDS program (Kr-
ishnamurthy et al., 2017; Rahman, 2016; Kishore and Chakrabarti, 2015). For instance,
Krishnamurthy et al. (2017) examine the effect of a bundle of policy interventions in Chat-
tisgarh, related to improving the effectiveness of the PDS program, such as technological
interventions to improve the grievance redressal system, reducing leakages by increasing
the commission for ration shop owners, verification of bogus ration cards and improving
supply chain efficiency by increasing the number of ration shops and the amount of rice
procured from in-state farmers for PDS distribution. Similarly Kishore and Chakrabarti
(2015) examine a bundle of PDS reforms in five states including universalization and sev-
eral administrative reforms to improve the effectiveness of PDS. In contrast, we examine
the effect of a specific policy change - expansion in PDS entitlements.
8The program examined by these studies, Mexico’s Programa de Apoyo Alimentario or
PAL, differs from the PDS in that its food transfer component was conditional on attending
monthly classes in health, hygiene and nutrition. This makes it difficult to compare the
program’s effect to that of the PDS and other unconditional in-kind subsidies.
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sectional data from the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO), which
does not contain consistent information on whether a household is entitled to
PDS subsidies. This makes it difficult to precisely measure household-level
access to food subsidies, and may lead to attenuation bias.
Our results offer important implications for the Indian policy debate around
the effectiveness of the PDS program. The PDS has been criticized on the
grounds that the program is poorly targeted, does not reach the intended
beneficiaries and hence may have little impact on nutrition. Furthermore,
critics contend that PDS encourages only “empty” staple cereal consump-
tion, and thus may crowd-out more nutritious food items and not improve
dietary diversity (Desai and Vanneman, 2015; Gulati et al., 2012). Our re-
sults suggest that these criticisms do not hold.
Lastly, our study sheds light on the debate concerning the replacement
of PDS with cash transfers in India (Svedberg, 2012; Kotwal et al., 2011;
Khera, 2014; Saini et al., 2017; Narayanan, 2011; Gentilini, 2017) and the
larger discussion on replacing in-kind subsidies with cash transfers (Gentilini,
2016; Blattman et al., 2017). Our results show that the NFSA and state-level
PDS initiatives effectively reached the intended beneficiaries and lead to large
improvements in household nutrition. In light of the broader skepticism of
in-kind form of assistance, our results imply that in-kind food subsidies are
an effective tool in addressing nutrition.
2.2 Public Distribution System of India
The Indian PDS is the world’s largest in-kind food subsidy program that
supplies food ration to more than 800 million people. With more than 532,000
fair price shops spread across the country, the PDS supply chain operates at
a massive scale, covering 85% of villages in India, rendering PDS as the most
far reaching of all social safety nets in the country.9 It is the largest social
assistance program in India that accounts for almost 1% of the GDP (approx.
10 billion $US in 2016 (Government of India, 2017)).
The PDS has been in existence prior to India’s independence. It was ini-
9In 2011, there were 506,198 PDS ration shops (Government of India, 2011b) in 597,608
inhabited villages (Government of India, 2011a). This suggests that as many as 85% of
Indian villages were covered under the PDS. The coverage has since increased. In 2016,
there were 532,000 FPS (Government of India, 2016)
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tially established as a rationing system by the British Government during
World War II to ensure workers in a few urban centers received food sup-
plies (Nawani, 1994). The program later evolved in the early 1970s, as a
welfare program with a primary objective to provide food security to vulner-
able households, with the advent of green revolution and growth of domestic
supply. Since its development as a welfare program, the PDS has been the
primary policy to address food security in India.
The PDS supply chain is organized around the Food Corporation of India
(FCI), a central government agency that procures food grains directly from
farmers and stores them in government operated warehouses. The FCI then
sells grain stocks to state governments who distribute them to retail outlets
known as fair price shops. The fair price shops sell the grain to holders of
ration cards. There are three broad classes of ration cards that are allocated
based on a state’s poverty line : Above Poverty Line (APL), Below Poverty
Line (BPL), and Anthodaya Anna Yojana (AAY). The Anthodaya Anna
Yojanaa (AAY) is a central government scheme started in 2000 that identi-
fies the poorest of the poor households from amongst the BPL population.
Extremely vulnerable households headed by widows, disabled, or destitute
households with no assured means of subsistence are identified as AAY.
The value of PDS benefits are targeted towards the poor and hence is the
lowest for APL households and highest for AAY households, where the central
government assures AAY households a minimum PDS quota of 35kg of rice
and/or wheat. The PDS benefits for AAY households has been constant
and uniform across all states since its introduction in 2002. The benefits
for BPL households, which form the majority of the population receiving
PDS, differ across states and have increased over time. The PDS subsidy
for BPL households differ by state as the fiscal expenditures towards the
PDS are borne both by the central and state governments The difference
between FCI’s cost of procuring food grains from farmers and the price at
which the supplies are sold to the states, also called as the central issue price,
is subsidized by the central government. The state governments can further
boost the subsidy by providing an additional discount over the central issue
price or by increasing the central issued quota. Not all states provide an
additional subsidy. The final subsidy is therefore the sum of central and
state’s outlays on PDS and differs across states as it depends on the state’s
outlays on PDS.
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In the pursuit of food security, the Indian central government substantially
increased the outlays on the PDS program under the National Food Security
Act in 2013. The Act mandated that the food grains under the PDS be
converted to a legal “entitlement” for beneficiaries (or the “right to food”)
(NFSA, 2013) and the onus was on the State governments to enforce and
provide the food entitlements. The NFSA prescribed a national standardized
minimum entitlement of 2kg rice and 3kg of wheat per individual at Rs 3/kg
and Rs 2/kg respectively. The adoption of NFSA by states, however, was
not uniform, as NFSA permitted states to continue their state-specific PDS
programs (Gulati and Saini, 2013)). Therefore, since 2013, due to renewed
political interest, several state governments significantly expanded their PDS
programs either under NFSA or through their own state-level PDS programs
such as Karnataka, Maharashtra and Bihar, whereas other states such as
Gujarat did not expand. These expansions in the PDS program, were either
through increase in PDS quota or a decrease in PDS price, hereafter jointly
referred to as PDS entitlements.
2.2.1 Expansion in PDS Entitlements
During our time frame, certain states expanded their PDS entitlements for
the BPL population, either by increasing the rationed quantity of grain or
by reducing the subsidized price. In total, there are 11 policy changes in the
PDS entitlements that correspond to the eight states in the ICRISAT data.
Appendix Table A1 cleanly organizes and documents these changes.
Figures 1 and 2 show that several states substantially increased PDS grain
quota entitlements and decreased PDS grain prices shortly after NFSA was
passed. Among the eight states, the NFSA was first implemented in Ma-
harashtra and Bihar in February 2014 and later in Madhya Pradesh from
April 2014. In addition to the phased rollout of the NFSA, Karnataka ex-
panded its PDS subsidy by initiating its own state-level PDS programs. In
June 2013, the chief minister of Karnataka introduced the “Anna Bhagya
Scheme”, essentially doubling the PDS entitlements. Similarly, the chief min-
ister of Madhya Pradesh introduced the “Mukhyamantri Annapurna Scheme”
in June 2013, thereby reducing the PDS price entitlements to Re 1/kg for
wheat.
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Among all the eight states, Jharkhand had the most generous entitlement
of 35 kg of rice per household at Re. 1/kg. whereas Gujarat had the least
entitlement of 17 kg of rice and wheat per household. Also, these states did
not implement any changes in the PDS policy rules. In contrast, Karnataka
had the most significant increase in PDS entitlements in June 2013 with the
introduction of Anna Bhaghya Scheme, followed by Maharashtra and Bihar
in Feb 2014 with the introduction of NFSA.
In Appendix B, we show that these policy changes were actually imple-
mented and the intended beneficiaries received a significant portion of their
entitlement.
2.3 Theory
In the most common form, the PDS Subsidy is offered to beneficiary house-
holds through a fixed quantity of staple cereals (Q0) at a subsidized price
cp(where p is the market price of staples and c < 1).10 In this scenario,
according to the canonical model of consumer choice Southworth (1945), as
shown in Figure 1, the original budget line AB reflects the trade-off between
staple and non-staple consumption and is shifted out by the amount of the
subsidy (Q0) leading to the kinked budget constraint ACB. The slope of AC
depends on the extent of price discount, that is, if staples are provided for
free, as in a take it or leave it program, then AC would be flat. The budget
line would shift to ECD for an equal valued cash transfer. Lastly, if staple
cereals can be resold in the market, the budget line would be FCD and would
depend on the resale price of PDS cereals.
Household I is better off under the in-kind subsidy as the PDS rationed
quantity is unconstrained or infra-marginal, that is, staple cereal consump-
tion is more than what is provided by the PDS. However, household II is
weakly worse off under in-kind subsidy than under the equivalent cash trans-
fer, as it prefers non-staples relative to staples, and would be constrained to
choosing point C (the kink) if resale is unavailable and segment FC if resale
is costly, while it would have chosen segment EC under the cash transfer.
10PDS price subsidy is a fixed price that is independent of the market price and is not
a percentage subsidy.
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2.3.1 Expected Effect on Dietary Diversity
If the PDS subsidy is extra-marginal and binding, then the subsidy would
have no effect on non-staple consumption. For example, suppose the extra-
marginal household II does not desire staples at all and consumes at the
extreme pt. A in the original budget line, then with the PDS subsidy and
no resale, household II would be “force-fed” staple cereals and staple cereal
consumption would increase one-to-one with PDS grains.
If the PDS subsidy is infra-marginal, then the transfer is a pure income
effect and as a result the consumption outcomes would depend on the income
elasticity of the PDS staple cereals. In Figure 1, the infra-marginal household
I can choose either of the four points W, X, Y and Z on the smooth part of the
budget line CD, depending on the income elasticity of staple cereals. Point
Z would be preferred if staple cereals are extremely income elastic (η  1).
In this highly improbable case, PDS subsidy will lead to an increase in PDS
consumption only and no change in non-staple consumption. In contrast,
if staple cereals are extremely income inelastic (η ≈ 0) then point X would
be desired. In this case, PDS Subsidy will lead to an increase in non-staple
consumption and the beneficiary would simply reduce market (or out-of-
pocket) purchase of staple cereals one-to-one with the amount of subsidy.
Another case could be if staple cereals are inferior goods. In this paradoxical
case, point W would be chosen and PDS subsidy would lead to a decrease in
staple cereal consumption. Lastly, point Y would be desired if staple cereals
have a non-negative income elasticity (0 < η < 1). In this case, PDS Subsidy
would increase both staple and non-staple consumption.
Based on this simple model, there can be two probable cases wherein
the PDS Subsidy would lead to an increase in staple consumption only, or
“crowd-out” consumption of nutritious food items, as argued by certain crit-
ics. Either staple cereals are highly income elastic (Pt. Z) or households are
extremely constrained or extra-marginal.
Another pertinent case is when PDS grains can be resold in the market. As
PDS subsidy is non-binding, beneficiaries have an incentive to sell or trade it
away, especially when they strictly prefer higher quality grains over PDS.11
11During our field visits in ICRISAT villages, we observed that a few large farmers in
Andhra Pradesh, who were also producers of high quality rice, resold all their PDS rice
to the market. They complained about the inferior quality of PDS rice and preferred
to consume from their own production. In this case, even though the transfer of PDS
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Under this scenario, if resale is costless, then PDS subsidy is the same as a
cash transfer; consequently, consumption outcomes would depend on their
respective income elasticities.
2.3.2 In-kind transfers and intra-household bargaining
The canonical Southworth (1945) model, as illustrated in Figure 1, predicts
that an infra-marginal household is indifferent between transfer type. In
other words, the marginal propensity to consume from in-kind and cash
should be equal for infra-marginal households. But this hypothesis has been
consistently rejected empirically in the context of the US food stamp pro-
gram. Virtually every study finds that the marginal propensity to consume
food out of food subsidy income is four to ten times higher than cash in-
come (Fraker, 1990). In what follows, we argue that this empirical regularity
is consistent with intra-household bargaining and heterogeneous preferences
within the household.
The simple model described above is derived under the assumption that
decisions are taken by a unitary household. However, if the consumption
patterns are related to the interactions of more than one decision maker, then
a unitary model may not be accurate. To deal with these issues, collective
models are proposed (Browning and Chiappori, 1998), wherein a household
maximizes the weighted average of utility functions of all household functions.
Under this scenario, suppose women control food and men control non-food,
then an infra-marginal in-kind transfer is akin to an implicit income transfer
directed towards women. Such a targeted transfer might shift the weights in
favor of women and therefore change the nature of the demand system, and
consequently the propensity to consume food from the in-kind transfer may
be greater than a similar valued cash transfer. This proposition has been
conjectured by several researchers for the case of US food stamps, such as
Senauer and Young (1986), Orazem (1999) and worked out in detail Breunig
and Dasgupta (2005)
rice is less than their rice consumption, the subsidy may not be “infra-marginal” in the
traditional sense. In contrast to large rice farmers, landless laborers and teachers in the
same village consumed all their allotted PDS rice and had no complaints about the quality.
They regularly cleaned and washed the PDS rice before consumption. In this study, we
are unable to empirically examine resale or the role of the quality attributes of PDS grains,
as these aspects are not recorded in the data.
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2.4 Data
We use the new wave of ICRISAT’s Village Dynamics in South Asia (VDSA)
panel data of 1300 households observed over 60 months from June 2010 to
July 2015.12 The VDSA data cover 30 villages spread across eight states in
India: Andhra Pradesh13, Bihar, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya
Pradesh, Maharashtra and Orissa. The geographical locations of the villages
are shown in Appendix figure A1. Similar to the old VLS, households in each
village are randomly selected to represent households in four land-holding
classes: large, medium, small and landless.
The VDSA panel data are geographically divided into 18 villages in the
Semi-Arid Tropics (SAT) and 12 villages in the Eastern region of India. The
data follows the agricultural cycle in India from June to July. Endowment
and household characteristics such as household size and landholding size
are collected annually at the beginning of every panel year in June. Transac-
tions, sales, market price, food and non-food expenditure data are collected
every month. Market price data for commodities including rice and wheat
are documented in the Monthly Price Schedule. Food expenditures are col-
lected under the Transaction Module and are recorded item-wise along with
information about the source of each food item, whether from home con-
sumption or market purchase or from gifts. PDS rice and wheat are recorded
as separate food items in the consumption module and are collected every
month. Food consumption quantities and expenditures are converted into
their nutrient content (calorie, protein and fat) using the nutrient value of
Indian food items, based on (Gopalan et al., 1991).
12ICRISAT’s Village level studies (VLS) are longitudinal surveys collected between 1975
to 1985 in six villages in the semi-arid tropics of India. Data collection was restarted from
2001 in the same six villages, tagged as the second generation of VLS (VLS2). However,
the frequency of household surveys from 2001 to 2004 was limited to annual observations
based on the availability of funds, and was increased to monthly data in 2005-06. It
was only after 2009, with the funding from the Gates foundation, the VLS was expanded
significantly and was renamed as the Village Dynamics in South Asia (VDSA). In 2009,
12 villages in the semi-arid tropics, in addition to the 6 old VLS villages, and 10 more
villages from east India were included; summing to a total of 30 villages across India. The
data for panel year 2009, however, has many gaps, especially in the consumption module,
and is inconsistent with the subsequent panel years. Accordingly, this paper uses data
beginning from panel year 2010 until 2014.
13Two villages are in Telangana, a state formed in 2014. As our dataset begins before the
formation of the new state, and for the purpose of consistency, the 2 villages in Telangana
are considered as Andhra Pradesh
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Households’ ration card status is collected differently depending on geo-
graphical region. In East India, ration card status is reported in the General
Endowment Schedule (GES), and is collected at the beginning of every panel
year in June. In the Semi-Arid Tropics, ration card status is collected during
two periods - the beginning of panel year in 2009 and during a Household
Census Survey (HCS) in 2014. Comparison of the ration card status between
the two-time periods, show that few households change their ration card sta-
tus over the period of observation. We therefore use a time-independent
ration card status of households in 2009 for SAT villages and 2010 for East
India villages, over the entire sample period. All the 30 villages have a fair
price shop. The corresponding author of this study visited most of these SAT
villages in person and conducted extensive fieldwork. The operation of PDS
ration shops in each village, validation of ration card status and perception
of PDS among beneficiaries were documented.
Table 1 shows the summary statistics. We drop households with less 48
months of data and households whose head lives outside the village. The
final sample consists of 1217 households.
A few caveats are in order regarding the ICRISAT data. First, the data
is not representative at the national level, state or district level. However,
the summary statistics from the ICRISAT are consistent with the nationally
representative sample from NSSO. For instance, based on most recent round
of NSSO in 2011-12, the national average per capita per day calorie con-
sumption was 2233 Kcal, protein intake was 60.7gms and fat intake was 46
gms (NSSO, 2014), which are comparable with the summary stats reported
in Table 1. Second, the data sample is primarily focused on small holder
farmers in rural and impoverished regions and may not cover all types of
households. For instance, migrant households or households in remote areas
who find it more difficult to access the PDS; or female-headed households for
whom PDS may have larger effects.
54
2.5 Methodology
2.5.1 PDS transfer value
Following Kochar (2005), Kaushal and Muchomba (2015) and Kaul (2018),
we quantify the increases in the generosity of the PDS subsidy by considering
the transfer value,14 calculated as the product of the quantity and the price






















where Qpdshst is the statutory PDS quota set by state s for household h in
month t, P
Market
t is the average market price over the sample period in state
s and P pdshst is the statutory PDS price set by state s for household h in month
t. The market price data comes from the Price Schedule in the ICRISAT data
and corresponds to a comparable variety of PDS rice and wheat.
We use the state-level average market price to avoid endogeneity of market
prices to the PDS subsidy. For instance, it is possible that an expansion of the
PDS subsidy leads to a decrease in market prices, since PDS and non-PDS
grains are close substitutes. Our measure of PDS entitlement is a function
of only three sets of variables: household ration card status, household size,
and state-level statutory entitlements . This ensures that any variation in
the subsidy measure is derived solely from changes in the PDS program pa-
rameters (or “entitlements”), not changes in market conditions, or household
consumption.
Figure 3 shows the changes in the PDS subsidy value in each state. The
figures 1, 2 and 3 together show that there is tremendous variation, both
temporally and spatially, in the PDS program parameters.
14Measuring the generosity of PDS subsidies in terms of their implicit transfer value is
valid if the subsidized amount is infra-marginal, so that consumption of staple cereals is
more than what is provided by the PDS. Our data suggests that this is generally the case
for households in our sample. The average household in our data consumes 48kg of staple
cereals as compared to a maximum of 35kg of grains per household provided by the PDS.
None of the households get all their staple cereals from the PDS in a given month.
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2.5.2 Regression Framework
The effect of PDS on nutrition is estimated using fixed effects:
Yhst = αh + λt + δht+ β1Subshst + εist (2.2)
where Yhst is the outcome variable (such as staple cereal consumption, con-
sumption of other food items, calorie and nutrient consumption etc.) for
household h, in state s and month t and Subshst is the implicit subsidy value
defined in (3.1). Variables αh and λt are the household and time fixed effects
and δh is the household-specific time trend. Standard errors are clustered at
the village level. The consecutive month fixed effects λt absorb any aggregate
time shocks that affect consumption, including any price effects or changes
in the government procurement pricing policies.
The model exploits both cross-sectional and temporal variation in the PDS
program. The temporal variation comes from the 11 policy changes in the
PDS entitlements during the study period. The cross-sectional variation
comes from the difference in PDS entitlements across states and the differen-
tial expansion in the PDS entitlements for BPL households. The above fixed
effects specification is akin to a triple difference methodology, wherein the
first difference is between households who were exposed to a more generous
and a less generous PDS expansion the second difference is between house-
holds before and after the PDS expansion and the third difference is between
beneficiary (BPL) and non-beneficiary households (APL or No card).
2.6 Results
2.6.1 Effect on nutrition
We estimate the direct effect of PDS on staple cereals consumption and the
indirect effect on non-subsidized food items, both in terms of quantity and
value. Table 2.2 presents the coefficient estimates on the PDS subsidy value
β1 . Each co-efficient estimate comes from a separate estimation of equation
(3.2) with different food types as outcome variables. Standard errors are
clustered at the village level. To interpret the significance of the estimates,
we hereafter consider a policy experiment of increasing the PDS subsidy value
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by 100 rupees per adult-equivalent per month - an amount equivalent to the
PDS expansion in Karnataka in June 2013.
As shown in Table 2.2, we further segregate total consumption of staple
cereals based on the source of supply; whether from home production or
purchased from market or the PDS shop or a combination thereof. The
results for total consumption quantities clearly show that a more generous
PDS subsidy increases total staple cereal consumption: 100 rupees in PDS
subsidy value translates to 2.9 kg increase in staple cereal consumption (2kg
rice and 0.8kg wheat), all measured in all measured in monthly per-adult
equivalent scale. As one might expect, this increase in total staple cereal
consumption is primarily a result of increased consumption of grains from
the PDS: A 100 rupees increase in PDS subsidy value translates to 3.2 kg
increase in PDS rice and wheat consumption (2.3kg rice and 0.9kg of wheat).
Consistent with the prediction that PDS subsidy decreases out-of-pocket
expenditure on staples, we find that the quantity of staples sourced from the
market decreases: 100 rupees increase in PDS subsidy translates to 0.4kg
decrease in staple cereal quantity purchased from market, all measured in
monthly per-adult equivalent. Results for expenditure values are consistent
with quantities. Expenditure on staple cereal consumption decreases, with
greater decline in market purchase.
Table 2.2 also presents the indirect effects of PDS on the consumption of
food items other than staple cereals, both in terms of quantity and value.
Here, only consumption from all sources (Purchase + Home + Gifts) is con-
sidered. For vegetables and fruits only expenditure values are considered
as data on quantities are not available for the first three panel years in the
ICRISAT data. The results for consumption quantities show that a more
generous PDS subsidy increases total consumption of pulses, milk and milk
products, sugar and oils: 100 rupees increase in PDS subsidy translates to
an increase of 205gms in total pulse consumption, 779gms in milk and milk
products and 185gms in sugar and 200gms in oils consumption. The results
for expenditure values shows that PDS increases expenditure on pulses, milk
and milk products, fruits, vegetables, sugar and spice, other food items (that
include beverages, bread, biscuits and savories) and meals consumed outside.
Altogether, PDS significantly improves total food consumption, especially
through purchases from market.
Table 2.3 presents the main results of this paper on the overall nutritional
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impact of PDS, in terms of calorie, protein and fat intake. We separately
examine the energy and macronutrient intake sourced from all food types,
from staple cereals (further segregated into those sourced from PDS versus
the market) and from non-staple food types. Not surprisingly, the most
significant amount of calories are derived from the PDS ration shop: A 100
rupees monthly increase in PDS subsidy translates to 374kcal daily per adult
equivalent increase in energy intake. These results are consistent with the
increases in consumption quantities reported in Table 2.2.15 Consumption
of calories and macronutrients from staple food other than PDS decrease,
and this decrease is compensated in greater magnitude by an increase in
calorie and nutrient intake from other food types. A negligible 0.4kcal drop
in calories from non-PDS staple cereals is substituted by 2.3kcal increase in
calorie intake sourced from other food items including 0.2kcal each in pulses,
milk and milk products, oils, sugar and 0.1kcal from fruits. As a result,
consumption of more nutritious foods purchased from the savings from the
PDS subsidy significantly increases intake of overall calorie, proteins and
fats: A monthly increase of 100 rupees in PDS subsidy translates to 449kcal
increase in energy intake, 10.9 grams increase in protein intake and 8.5 grams
increase in fat intake, all measured in daily per adult equivalent.
Overall the results in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 suggest that PDS substantially
improves nutrition and dietary diversity. In addition to an increase in staple
cereals, consumption of diverse food types including pulses, milk and milk
products, oils, vegetables, fruits and sugar increases. Consequently, the over-
all calorie, protein and fat intake increases. Hence, the results clearly show
that PDS “crowds-in” consumption of nutritious foods.
These results also throw light on the channels through which PDS may
affect household consumption and spending patterns. An important con-
sumption pattern, implied by an increasing trend on the proportion of staple
15The disaggregated results for rice and wheat, reported in Appendix Table 3 imply that
a monthly increase of 100 rupees in PDS subsidy value translates to a 2.3kg increase in
PDS rice and 0.9 kg increase in PDS wheat monthly consumption per adult-equivalent. In
the NSSO nutrition chart NSSO (2014), based on the nutrition values provided in Gopalan
et al. (1991), the daily calorie equivalent of 1 kg of rice and wheat is 3460 Kcal and 3410
Kcal respectively. Therefore, assuming 30 days in a month, 2.3kg monthly increase in PDS
rice is equivalent to 265Kcal per day (=3460*2.3/30) and 0.9kg monthly increase in PDS
wheat is equivalent to 102Kcal per day (=3410*0.9/30). Hence the total increase in daily
calorie intake from a monthly increase of 100 rupees in PDS subsidy value approximately
equal to 367Kcal.
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cereal consumption from PDS, is that households cash-out part of the in-kind
PDS subsidy by reducing their market purchases. As a result, PDS provides
significant savings to intended beneficiaries. In addition to the amount saved
from buying from the PDS ration shop instead of the market, reductions
in purchases from the market further add to their savings. These savings
from PDS may unbind liquidity constraints and subsequently increase pur-
chases of other food items and non-food items. Hence, in this manner, PDS
provides more flexibility in consumption patterns for beneficiary households,
who benefit not only from the provision of subsidized cereals but also in
terms of overall food and nutrient intake.
2.6.2 Elasticities and marginal propensity to consume with
respect to PDS subsidy value
We assess the magnitude and significance of our results on the nutritional
impact of PDS, by comparing our estimates with past research on food sub-
sidies and with respect to fungible income sources observed in our dataset.
We follow the standard procedure in the food subsidy literature and compute
elasticities and MPC with respect to both PDS subsidy value and total ex-
penditure or cash income. While the estimations on cash income in this study
are not experimentally identified, there are several reasons that validate this
approach. First, the literature on US food stamps extensively use house-
hold income as a proxy for cash income (Hoynes and Schanzenbach, 2009;
Beatty and Tuttle, 2015; Fraker, 1990). Second, expenditure elasticity of
calorie intake and MPC food out of total expenditure are widely studied and
estimated parameters (Deaton and Muellbauer, 1980; Strauss and Thomas,
1995; Subramanian and Deaton, 1996). Nonetheless, we are cautious in in-
terpreting the estimations as causal for total expenditures and income. The
idea of this exposition is to determine whether the nutritional improvements
from PDS found in this study is larger than previous estimates or alternative
sources of fungible income.
Specifically, we estimate MPC food and non-food expenditures and elas-
ticities of calorie, proteins and fats; all with respect to PDS Subsidy and
total expenditure value. Lastly, we compute elasticities with respect to ben-
efits received from other government schemes such as middaymeals, pensions,
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scholarships, NREGA and also with respect to different sources of income.
Table 3.4 shows the MPC food and non-food expenditures with respect
to PDS Subsidy value in Panel A and total expenditure in Panel B. Dis-
aggregated results by food type are reported in Appendix Table A3. The
results suggest that a significant proportion of PDS Subsidy income is spent
on food expenditures, whereas only a small proportion of total expenditure
is spent on food. An increase of 100 rupees in PDS subsidy translates to 84
rupees increase in food expenditure, out of which 36 rupees is spent on mar-
ket purchases, all measured in monthly per-adult equivalent scale. In other
words, 84% of the PDS Subsidy income is spent on food. Conversely, only
12% of total expenditure is spent on food and 84.5% is spent on non-food.16
Therefore, the results imply that the MPC food from PDS Subsidy is about
6.5 times MPC food from total expenditures. These results are consistent
with the empirical findings on the US food stamp program, that the MPC
of food from food stamp income is four to ten times that of cash income.
We also estimated MPC calories, proteins and fats with respect to total
expenditure value. Results are reported in Appendix table A4. The MPC
nutrients out of PDS Subsidy (shown in Table 5) is considerably greater than
the MPC nutrients out of expenditure: about 15 times greater for calorie
intake, about 13 times greater for total protein and about 8 times greater for
fat intake.
To compute elasticities, we estimate equation (3.2) in the log-log form and
thereby limit the sample to BPL households with a non-zero PDS subsidy
value in all the estimations.17 Table 2.5 lays side-by-side the estimates of
subsidy elasticities in Panel A and expenditure elasticities in Panel B; we
separately examine the intake of calories, proteins and fat sourced from all
food types, segregated into staple cereals and from non-staple food types.
The results for disaggregated food types are reported in Appendix table A5.
All the elasticity estimates in both Panels A and B are positive and signif-
16Our estimate of MPC food out of total expenditure (0.12) is within the estimates
found in previous studies ranging from 0.03 to 0.17 (Fraker 1990, Deaton and Muelbauer
1980; S. Souleses 1999; Blanciforti and Green 1983). We are however, not able to compare
our estimates with more rigorous randomized controlled experiments, as most of these
studies report the treatment effects of the program, rather than the dollar value on food
expenditures (Attanasio, Battisin, Mesnard 2011; Cunha 2014)
17To ensure comparability, we do not consider the entire sample size in estimating ex-
penditure elasticities. Although, the expenditure elasticities are similar over the entire
sample of households and for PDS beneficiary HHs.
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icant. The subsidy elasticities of calories, proteins and fat intake from total
food consumption are comparable to expenditure elasticities. Not surpris-
ingly, the magnitude of the subsidy elasticities is greater for staple foods and
smaller for non-staples; although, it is important to note that the magnitudes
on non-staple consumption are positive and large. The estimated elasticity
of the overall calorie intake with respect to the value of the PDS subsidy in
this study is 0.285 and is significantly larger than previous estimates: 0.144
in Kaul (2018), 0.06 in Kochar (2005), -0.003 and statistically insignificant
in Kaushal and Muchomba (2015).18 One of the possible reasons for a higher
estimate in this study could be the inclusion of non-marginal expansions in
the PDS program, post-NFSA. Hence, the results suggest that the percentage
change in the overall calorie and protein intake in response to a one percent
change in total expenditure value is at best equivalent if not better than a
one percent increase in the PDS subsidy value and the response on staple
cereal consumption is markedly greater with PDS subsidy value.
To further investigate the significance of the PDS subsidy elasticities, we
compute elasticities with respect to benefits received from other government
schemes and different income sources.19 Table 8 presents the elasticity esti-
mates for total food consumption. The elasticity estimates for middaymeals
are the highest, followed by pensions, in comparison to all other government
benefit programs. These results are consistent with previous studies that
show positive nutritional impact of midday meals (Afridi, 2010). Among the
different sources of income, elasticities with respect to farm wage income,
followed by income from credit, are greater.
Overall, our results suggest that elasticities with respect to PDS subsidy
value are comparable to expenditure elasticities and are substantially larger
than previous estimates. In addition, we show that most of the PDS subsidy
income (84%) is spent on food, against non-food. Although, comparing the
elasticity and MPC estimates from PDS subsidy and cash income are fairly
speculative, the results provide suggestive evidence that the effect of PDS on
18However, the estimated expenditure elasticity in this study (0.235) is slightly less than
previous estimates: 0.34 in Subramanian and Deaton (1996), 0.3 in Strauss and Thomas
(1995), 0.24 in Kochar (2005).
19Benefit values for middaymeals, pensions and scholarships in the ICRISAT data are
collected on a monthly basis in the Transaction Schedule only for 18 villages in the SAT
region. Furthermore, it is important to note that the value of pensions is reported by
households and the value of middaymeal is imputed by the ICRISAT field investigators.
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nutrition may be greater than predicted by an assumption of fungible income
sources.
2.6.3 Robustness Tests
We test the robustness of our main results on energy and nutrient intake
to specifications that control for a more constrained set of fixed effects and
trends. Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 report the robustness test results for calorie,
protein and fat intake respectively. We further limit the data sample to
BPL households and perform the same robustness tests. Results for the full
sample are reported in Panel A and for BPL households in Panel B.
As shown in Panel A in Table 2.7, the effect of PDS subsidy on calorie
intake is robust to a series of constrained specifications. The significance
of the estimates remain the same even if the standard errors are clustered
at the state-level. The results are robust to including state or village-by-
month fixed effects that control for any state or village-level factors that
may potentially influence both PDS subsidy and household consumption,
and to a more constrained specification of controlling for state or household-
specific trends. Lastly, we test the parallel-trends assumption, by including
a one-year lead of the PDS subsidy value in the fixed-effects estimation. The
coefficient estimate on the lead subsidy is insignificant, and thus validates
our difference-in-difference strategy. Similarly, the results for protein and fat
intake reported in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 and those for BPL households in Panel
B are robust to the same specification tests.
Table 2.10 presents a series of further robustness checks. To address con-
cerns of possible endogeneity of market price or household size, we fix the
state-average market price and household size to pre-2013 levels. The results
reported in Table 8 show that the results are qualitatively similar to the main
results, though using a nominal subsidy value makes the estimates appear
smaller.
Finally, to address concerns of any confounding effects of the PDS with
other government welfare programs, we utilize the available data in the
ICRISAT on government benefits received by each household. We estimate
the effect of PDS subsidy value on government benefit values received in a
regression that controls for household and time fixed effects, similar to equa-
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tion (2). Results, reported in Table 2.11 suggest that expansions in the PDS
program had no effect on the receipt of benefits from other welfare schemes
such as Midday meals, NREGA, Pensions and Scholarships and relied loans.
Furthermore, we specifically test for confounding effects of the PDS with
NREGA and test whether our main results on calorie and nutrient intake
are robust after controlling for state-level NREGA policy changes, such as
fiscal allocations and implementation. Specifically, we estimate equation (2)
controlling for an interaction term of state-level NREGA control interacted
with ration card status of the household. Results from this specification, re-
ported in Table 2.12, suggest that the co-efficient estimates are qualitatively
similar to our base specification.
2.7 Role of Intra-Household Bargaining
According to the theoretical implications of a collective model, discussed
in section 3.2, the expected effect of PDS on food consumption would be
greater in households where women have greater control over the food budget.
To test this proposition requires variation in the level of bargaining power
specific to the food budget.
We utilize the available information in the ICRISAT data on the role of
gender in decision-making, as a measure of intra-household bargaining. The
questionnaire on role of gender in decision-making covers important deci-
sions related to utilization of households resources such as assets, inputs,
outputs and other miscellaneous resources; and whether the decision is taken
by men, women or both. Summary statistics of decision variables for BPL
households are reported in Table 2.13. The statistics are arranged by gender,
the columns represent the percentage of households that fall in each category
of decision making and the rows represent the type of household resources.
The proportion of households where women take decisions is minimal for
most of the household resources, except for household maintenance. This
suggests that, in the ICRISAT data, most of the resource allocations are
either jointly decided by both genders or are decided by men only.
In this study, based on the information in the ICRISAT data, we con-
sider gender control of “household maintenance” decisions as the most ap-
propriate proxy for bargaining power over food-related decisions. Although
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household maintenance may include resources in addition to food, it is the
best possible measure of intra-household bargaining over food available in
our dataset. Furthermore, we are unable to test the proposition that PDS
may have larger effects on female-headed households, as the proportion of
female-headed households in our dataset is less than 10%.
We conduct a weak-test on whether intra-household bargaining can pro-
mote food consumption out of PDS Subsidy, as compared to non-food con-
sumption, by considering the interaction between PDS Subsidy value and
intra-household bargaining measures,
Yhst = αh + λt + δht+ β1IBht + β2Subshst + β3IBhtSubshst + εhst (2.3)
where αh and λt are household and time fixed effects respectively, δh is the
household-specific time trend. IBht is a categorical variable that measures
intra-household bargaining, where IBht = 1 if female decides, IBht = −1
if male decides and IBht = 0 if both decide. As the marginal effect of
PDS Subsidy when female decides household allocations is β1 + β3, the co-
efficient β3 can be interpreted as the extent to which intra-household bar-
gaining assists the impact of PDS on nutrition and hence is the coefficient
of interest. β3 > 0 for food consumption outcomes and β3 < 0 for ill-favored
non-food consumption outcomes, imply that intra-household bargaining fa-
cilitates food consumption from PDS Subsidy. In addition to using household
maintenance, we estimate (3.3) using the other decision variables on assets,
inputs and outputs as a robustness test to show that the effect of PDS on
food is specific to women’s control over food-related decisions and may not
be generalized to “women’s empowerment”.
The results from estimating equation (3.3) are provided in Table 2.14. As
proxies for intra-household bargaining, relevant for consumption outcomes,
we consider the role of gender in decision making related to household main-
tenance, crop production, sale and use and credit management. Panel A,
B and C report the three measures of intra-household bargaining. The in-
teraction terms on nutrient intake are positive for all three intra-household
bargaining measures, which imply that intra-household bargaining plays a
facilitating role in improving nutrition through the PDS. Results on expen-
ditures are consistent. As shown in Panel A, households where women decide
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on household maintenance spend 94% (= 0.78+0.16) of the PDS income on
food expenditures, as against 62% (=0.78-0.16) when men decide. More im-
portantly, expenditures decrease on temptation goods such as alcohol and
cigarettes and other non-essentials like cell phone use. On the other hand,
expenditures on energy and children’s education increases.
Overall, the results are consistent with a model in which some households
treat resources as not completely fungible across food and non-food budgets.
As a result, households in which women control the food budget spend the
PDS transfer predominantly in the form of food and other items preferred
by women.
2.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine whether the world’s largest in-kind food sub-
sidy program - India’s PDS - improves household nutrition. Using state-
level changes in the program that occurred after the National Food Security
Act of 2013, we show that increases in the generosity of in-kind staple food
transfers substantially improved nutrition In particular, staple food subsidies
“crowded-in” consumption of diverse food items, and consequently increased
food consumption in terms of quantities and total calorie, protein and fat
intake. Our results suggest that households reduce market purchase of sta-
ple cereals and use the extra saving to purchase more nutritious food such as
pulses, milk and milk products, fruits and vegetables. These results imply
that PDS provides more flexibility in consumption patterns for beneficiary
households, who benefit not only from the provision of subsidized cereal but
also in terms of overall food intake.
Furthermore, we find that PDS beneficiaries consume 84% of the subsidy’s
transfer value in the form of food, suggesting that the transfer does not cause
them to substantially reduce their expenditures on non-subsidized food. We
argue that intra-household bargaining may explain these results, as we find
that households where women decide on resource allocations spend greater
proportion of their PDS income on food expenditures.
Our results have important implications for the Indian policy debate around
the effectiveness of the NFSA and the PDS program. The PDS has been crit-
icized on the grounds that the program is poorly targeted, does not reach the
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intended beneficiaries and hence may have little impact on nutrition. Fur-
thermore, critics contend that PDS encourages only “empty calories”, and
thus may crowd-out more nutritious food items and not improve dietary di-
versity(Desai and Vanneman, 2015; Gulati et al., 2012). Our results suggest
that these criticisms are not generally valid. Given the constraints of our
study area, our results show that the NFSA and state-level PDS initiatives
effectively reached the intended beneficiaries and had a positive impact on
household nutrition.
As an alternative to PDS, many policy makers have suggested a replace-
ment of PDS with cash transfers. Although in theory, cash transfers are more
efficient, the PDS has an intricate political economy in reform that garners
huge political support and is often featured in election manifestos. As a con-
sequence, many state governments have focused on improving the efficiency
of the PDS program and have refrained from any form of replacement and
no state government in India has showed interest in replacing PDS with cash
transfers. Only three union territories, administered by the central govern-
ment, implemented direct benefit transfer program on a pilot basis starting
in September 2015. However, preliminary assessments suggest that imple-
mentation quality remains an issue (only 65-67% of beneficiaries reported
received cash benefits) and that it costs beneficiaries more to collect their
cash benefits than collecting food rations (Muralidharan et al., 2017).
Therefore, in light of the debate over the effectiveness of PDS, our results
suggest that PDS is an effective tool in addressing household nutrition in In-
dia and any replacement of the PDS program demands careful consideration.
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Figure 2.3: PDS implicit subsidy entitlement for BPL households from 2012
to 2015
Figure 2.4: In-kind staple food vs Non-staple consumption
68
Table 2.1: Summary Stats
AAY BPL APL/NoCard Total
Number of HHs 105 579 533 1217
Number of members in the HH 4.706 4.724 5.040 4.861
(2.125) (2.238) (2.377) (2.296)
Nutrient and Calorie intake
Calorie intake (Kcals) 2115.7 2032.5 2009.1 2029.7
(740.9) (794.8) (746.3) (770.1)
Protein intake (gms) 56.61 52.06 54.04 53.31
(22.43) (21.92) (21.18) (21.69)
Fat intake (gms) 39.21 37.92 46.74 41.84
(19.53) (35.99) (25.96) (31.07)
Consumption Quantity (in Kgs)
Total Staple Cereals 12.82 11.46 10.43 11.13
(5.886) (5.546) (5.608) (5.648)
Quantity of pds grain consumed 7.259 5.400 1.183 3.742
(3.905) (3.883) (2.511) (4.067)
Pulses 1.066 1.035 0.964 1.007
(0.704) (0.811) (0.677) (0.748)
Expenditure and Income (in 2010 value)
Food expenditure 558.2 596.7 715.6 644.7
(236.4) (305.3) (359.1) (330.6)
Non-food expenditure 518.7 667.3 757.5 693.4
(1708.2) (3221.9) (3394.4) (3197.9)
Total expenditure 1077.3 1264.7 1475.6 1339.4
(1760.8) (3278.9) (3477.1) (3267.4)
Implict PDS Subsidy 198.9 127.1 10.54 83.05
(131.2) (69.42) (22.64) (91.77)
Income total 1567.4 2243.5 2680.4 2375.9
(4128.6) (16946.8) (13784.3) (14878.5)
Standard deviation in parentheses. All values, except number of HHs and household size, represent
the adult equivalent per household. Nutrient and Calorie intake is measured daily per-adult equiv-
alent. Consumption quantity, expenditure and income is measured monthly per-adult equivalent.
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Table 2.2: Impact of PDS subsidy on food consumption (N=69,846)
Quantity Value
(in grams) (in 2010 Rs)
Staple Cereals (Rice and Wheat)
All sources (Market +PDS+Home) 29.658*** -0.021
(3.063) (0.039)
Purchase from PDS only 32.891*** 0.001
(3.176) (0.023)
Without PDS (Market + Home) -3.208 -0.050
(2.863) (0.033)
Purchase from market only -4.068*** -0.096***
(1.408) (0.034)





Coarse cereal 2.284 0.002
(1.915) (0.029)


















Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. *
p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from a
separate regression with PDS subsidy value as the regressor and dif-
ferent food categories as outcome variables.
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Total Food 4.488*** 109.343*** 85.646***
(0.605) (15.802) (17.725)
Non-staple food 2.289*** 50.799*** 100.634***
(0.491) (11.860) (21.005)
Staples (Rice and wheat) 3.409*** 87.725*** 8.474***
(0.353) (9.874) (1.293)
Staples from PDS 3.784*** 96.886*** 9.280***
(0.364) (10.846) (1.555)
Staples except PDS -0.369 -9.025 -0.797
(0.328) (9.166) (1.054)
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. *
p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from
a separate regression with PDS subsidy value as the regressor
variable. Column heading represents consumption outcomes and
row heading represents the source of consumption outcomes.
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Food total (Home+Purchase+gifts) 0.840*** 0.121***
(0.172) (0.012)
Food total (without PDS and Midday meal) 0.865*** 0.144***
(0.213) (0.015)
Food from purchase (with PDS) 0.419*** 0.075***
(0.147) (0.010)
Food from purchase (without PDS) 0.364** 0.075***
(0.138) (0.010)
Food from home production 0.122 0.033***
(0.089) (0.005)
Non-Food expenditure
Non-food total 0.116 0.845***
(0.527) (0.016)
Grinding and Milling expenditure 0.014** 0.001***
(0.005) (0.000)








Energy expenditure (LPG, kerosene) 0.013 0.004*
(0.013) (0.002)
Drugs (Alcohol, Toddy, Tobacco) 0.026 0.017***
(0.051) (0.002)




Ceremonies, marriage expenses 0.413 0.211***
(0.455) (0.015)
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. * p<0.10
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from a separate regres-
sion with PDS subsidy value as the regressor and different food categories as
outcome variables.
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Table 2.5: Elasticities of energy and nutrient intake with respect to PDS
subsidy value and expenditure (N=36,894)
Panel A : PDS Subsidy Panel B : Total Expenditure
Energy Protein Fat Energy Protein Fat
(Kcal) (mg) (mg) (Kcal) (mg) (mg)
Total Food 0.285*** 0.273*** 0.222*** 0.211*** 0.225*** 0.271***
(0.034) (0.032) (0.040) (0.023) (0.024) (0.031)
Staple food (Rice and wheat) 0.317*** 0.303*** 0.284*** 0.173*** 0.179*** 0.191***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.055) (0.022) (0.024) (0.029)
Non-staple food 0.220*** 0.204*** 0.215*** 0.350*** 0.384*** 0.355***
(0.044) (0.045) (0.048) (0.034) (0.037) (0.031)
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each
coefficient estimate is from a separate regression with PDS subsidy value as the regressor and different food
catogories as outcome variables.
73
Table 2.6: Elasticities of calories, proteins and fats with respect to other
Income sources
Kcal Protein Fat N
Other Government benefits
Middaymeals 0.114*** 0.103*** 0.087*** 7961
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Pensions 0.096*** 0.098*** 0.124*** 5561
(0.025) (0.024) (0.028)
Scholarships and Relief -0.001 0.000 -0.004 684
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009)
All benefits, expect PDS 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.016*** 15381
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Income sources
Farm wage Income 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.015** 15184
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Non-Farm wage Income -0.007 -0.002 0.012 24218
(0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
NREGA wages income -0.003 -0.007 -0.007 1643
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Credit (formal and informal) 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.015*** 4765
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Loans (formal and informal) 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.007*** 13314
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Income from Crop and livestock 0.004 0.004* 0.008** 27656
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Total Income 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.011*** 29003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. * p<0.10
** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from a separate regression
with row headings representing regressor variables in natural logarithm and




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































PDS Subsidy 0.002 0.016 0.015 -0.028
(0.008) (0.051) (0.059) (0.049)
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. *
p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from a sep-
arate regression with PDS subsidy value as the regressor variable and
column heading as the outcome variable. All variables are measured
in 2010 rupees.
Table 2.12: Robustness tests after contolling for state-level NREGA policy
changes
NREGA controls interacted with ration card status











Energy (Kcal) 3.665*** 4.283*** 4.267*** 4.334*** 4.322***
(0.462) (0.540) (0.539) (0.554) (0.552)
Protein (mg) 90.461*** 105.749*** 105.212*** 106.984*** 106.695***
(13.127) (15.253) (15.230) (15.802) (15.661)
Fat (mg) 53.594*** 67.465*** 66.717*** 69.140*** 69.072***
(15.078) (16.258) (16.234) (16.481) (16.509)
HH FE X X X X X
Month FE X X X X X
Observations 69846 69846 69846 69846 69846
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at village level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is
from a separate regression with row headings representing outcome variables and PDS subsidy value as the regressor variable
and column headings representing the state-level NREGA controls interacted with ration card-status. Data on NREGA budget
allocation and implementation comes from Ministry of Rural Development, Government of India and the Statistical year book,
published by the Ministry of Statistics and Program Implementation.
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Table 2.13: Household resource allocation decisions by gender
Frequency tabulations (in percentages)
Male only Both Female only
Assets
Land 45 49 6
Credit 47 47 6
Livestock 32 59 8
Inputs
Labor 22 65 13
Fertiliser 57 39 3
Outputs
Production 39 58 4
Sale Quantity 40 55 5
Fodder 36 60 4
Others
HH maintenance 13 59 27
Child’s education 22 71 7
Migration 41 52 6
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Table 2.14: Intra-household bargaining as a facilitator of nutrition through
PDS (N=34941)
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Household Maintainence Crop production, sale and use Credit management
PDS Subsidy IH Bargaining Interaction PDS Subsidy IH Bargaining Interaction PDS Subsidy IH Bargaining Interaction
Nutrient intake
Total Calorie intake (in kcals) 3.840*** -58.250* 0.473* 4.368*** -66.076** 0.751*** 3.892*** 25.219 0.179
(0.595) (34.527) (0.275) (0.763) (31.835) (0.279) (0.655) (37.406) (0.360)
Total Protein intake (in milli gms) 95.313*** -1579.460* 11.280 108.957*** -2042.303** 19.561** 97.801*** 380.026 4.864
(15.081) (905.332) (7.314) (19.720) (899.156) (7.648) (16.603) (1056.374) (10.132)
Total Fat intake (in milli gms) 58.633*** -922.014 9.440 70.022*** -1718.503* 14.847* 56.932*** 1031.574 -5.516
(15.512) (835.111) (6.358) (18.841) (900.366) (8.021) (16.733) (917.194) (8.424)
Expenditures
Food expenditures total 0.781*** -24.737** 0.161* 0.897*** -16.332 0.171 0.820*** 6.238 0.050
(0.200) (11.860) (0.093) (0.250) (14.832) (0.115) (0.213) (14.326) (0.128)
Spending on non-essentials
Cell and land line phone bill 0.025* 3.459** -0.028*** 0.031 -1.069 0.002 0.035** -2.518 0.015
(0.015) (1.439) (0.011) (0.019) (2.226) (0.015) (0.016) (1.809) (0.013)
Drugs expenditure (Alcohol, Tobacco) 0.029 1.172 -0.064** -0.047 2.429 -0.026 -0.002 1.488 -0.019
(0.047) (2.820) (0.025) (0.061) (4.656) (0.037) (0.056) (4.161) (0.036)
Spending on essentials
Energy expenditure (Charcoal, Kerosene) 0.022*** -0.453 0.011** 0.020*** -0.343 -0.003 0.012** -0.303 -0.002
(0.006) (0.489) (0.005) (0.007) (0.521) (0.005) (0.005) (0.437) (0.004)
Medical domestic & hospital expenditure 0.328 6.057 -0.094 0.279 3.172 0.011 0.309 -5.103 -0.024
(0.313) (28.788) (0.190) (0.324) (25.545) (0.165) (0.301) (31.981) (0.174)
Education (Fees, books) -0.051** -8.269 0.035 0.017 -17.423** 0.127*** -0.027 -10.003* 0.079**
(0.024) (5.773) (0.031) (0.038) (6.820) (0.041) (0.028) (5.527) (0.033)
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from a separate regression with row headings
representing regressor variables and column heading representing dependent variables.
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CHAPTER 3
RISK SHARING AND HETEROGENEITY
3.1 Introduction
People in village economies face a large number of income shocks such as
drought, floods, crop or business failure, unemployment, sickness, prices fluc-
tuate, etc. Households who fail to insure themselves against such income
shocks may experience consumption fluctuations with detrimental effects on
household welfare (Gertler and Gruber, 2002; De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006).
The protection of households from such income shocks depends on the avail-
ability and effectiveness of the existing risk bearing institutions. Storage,
accumulation of assets and diversification of crops may be some of the ex-
ante means of reducing risk. There may also be ex-post means of coping
with risk through informal mutual agreements. That is, households within
a village may share risk by pooling their income, as it were, into a common
village pot to eliminate their individual income risk. Such informal pooling of
risk may potentially provide complete insurance against income shocks (Dia-
mond, 1967; Wilson, 1968). Thus, in order to fully assess the vulnerabilities
of households in village economies, where formal credit markets are incom-
plete or non-existent, it is important for policymakers to understand how
well risk sharing groups provide consumption insurance in village economies.
Many households in developing countries are engaged in inter-household
insurance arrangements involving state-contingent transfers, as documented
by Scott (1977), (Platteau, 1995, 1997), Udry (1990) and others. However,
households are generally not completely insured-income and consumption
are typically found to be positively correlated. Rejection of full insurance
is documented by Rosenzweig (1988), Townsend (1994), Townsend (1995),
Udry (1994) and others. Several explanations have been proposed for the
failure of full insurance, including moral hazard, limited commitment and
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hidden income Kinnan (2017). An emerging strand of literature suggests
that ignoring heterogeneity in preferences may explain rejections of full risk
sharing(Schulhofer-Wohl, 2011; Mazzocco and Saini, 2012; Chiappori et al.,
2014).
This study examines whether households share risk efficiently with other
households in a village, using ICRISAT’s new wave of village data from 2010-
2015. In this paper, we derive an alternative method to estimate preferences
of households using a full-risk sharing model. Our method of estimating
risk-preferences is based on the intuition that a pareto-efficient allocation
puts more risk on those who are more risk tolerant, so a household whose
consumption strongly co-moves with village consumption must be relatively
more risk tolerant.
Our results show that there is substantial and significant heterogeneity in
estimated risk preferences. Further, we find that estimated risk tolerance
is significantly correlated with wealth and household’s characteristics such
as number of adult males, household head’s education and gender. House-
holds with more migrants are associated with a lower pareto weight in the
village-risk sharing, consistent with migrant income as a substitute to infor-
mal village risk sharing. Next, we incorporate the estimated risk preferences
and test for full risk sharing allowing for this heterogeneity. We reject the
null of full risk sharing, irrespective of whether we allow for heterogeneity.
In this paper, we propose a methodological contribution of accounting
for heterogeneity in risk sharing tests. Our goal is not to identify the spe-
cific mechanisms that support risk sharing or make causal interpretations of
the determinants of risk sharing, but we conjecture that risk sharing may in-
clude transfers and gifts between households as well as pre-cautionary savings
within households. This paper contributes to the new strand of literature on
tests of full risk sharing with heterogeneous preferences (Schulhofer-Wohl,
2011; Mazzocco and Saini, 2012; Chiappori et al., 2014). The novelty in
our method is that we use a more straighforward method to estimate risk
preferences in a simple linear regression. The testing methods developed
by Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) and Mazzocco and Saini (2012) require complex
non-parametric techniques or large number of households.
This paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review studies that de-
rive tests for risk sharing with the inclusion of heterogeneous preferences and
bring to light the most important theoretical assumption of aggregate risk
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sharing based on preferences. We provide a critique of this new strand of
risk sharing literature and contend that there may frictions that may limit
households in village economies to share aggregate risk based on preferences;
a more clear description of the institutional framework that facilitates shar-
ing of aggregate shocks in village economies seems necessary. This study
raises new questions on the motives for sharing risk under aggregate shocks
in the hope to improve the theory and construct new models that incorporate
salient features of village economies. In Section 3, we derive the standard
full risk sharing model and modify the omnibus specification to allow for het-
erogeneous preferences. In particular, we first derive an alternative method
to estimate risk preferences and also present a simple test for bias due to
heterogeneous preferences. Next, we test for full risk sharing that allows
for heterogeneity, by incorporating the risk and time preference estimates.
Finally, we examine the relationship of the estimated parameters with demo-
graphic characteristics of the household. In Section 4, we describe the Indian
village data. Section 5 presents the empirical results.
3.2 Literature Review
The literature on risk sharing begins with Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968),
who laid the theoretical underpinnings for Pareto optimal risk sharing under
uncertainty. Diamond presents a general equilibrium model with uncertainty
and shows that consumers (or firms trading in the stock market) are able to
raise their expected utility levels, by dividing up claims equally before pro-
duction (assuming that the stock market permits sharing of risk) and by
means of trading among persons of differing degrees of risk aversion. In
addition, this firm behavior results in a competitive economy achieving a
constrained Pareto optimum. Similarly, Wilson provides an analysis of the
decision process of a syndicate - a group of individual decision makers who
make a common decision under uncertainty - when the members have di-
verse risk tolerances. This group decision problem is based on a sharing
rule and the criterion for choosing a sharing rule is that it must be Pareto
Optimal. The author proves that the syndicate risk tolerance is the sum of
the members’ risk tolerances. This means that a compensating risk premium
for an infinitesimal risk is distributed among the members in proportion to
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the variance each undertakes to absorb. Thus, a member’s incremental shar-
ing proportion is given by his proportion of the syndicate risk tolerance. In
summary, the hypothesis for efficient risk sharing - that a Pareto optimal
allocation under uncertainty depends only on aggregate risk and not on id-
iosyncratic risk, with more risk-tolerant members bearing a larger share of
the aggregate risk - follows from Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968)’s work.
A number of studies have empirically tested for efficient risk sharing in
different settings. All studies unanimously reject efficient risk sharing us-
ing data from developed countries (Cochrane, 1991; Mace, 1991; Attanasio
and Davis, 1996; Hayashi et al., 1996; Blundell et al., 2008) and developing
countries (Deaton, 1990; Townsend, 1994; Ravallion and Chaudhuri, 1997;
Dercon and Krishnan, 2000; Ogaki and Zhang, 2001). For instance, Mace
(1991) uses Consumer Expenditure Survey(CES) US data for 1980-83 and re-
jects full insurance for food consumption. Attanasio and Davis (1996) reject
between-group consumption insurance among birth cohorts and education
groups in US during the 1980s. Hayashi et al. (1996) use Panel Study of In-
come Dynamics and reject risk sharing across and within American families.
Townsend (1994)’s seminal paper, one of the first to test for efficient risk
sharing in the context of village economies, rejects full insurance at the vil-
lage level. Similarly, results from nuclear households from Ethiopia (Dercon
and Krishnan, 2000), Thailand (Townsend, 1995) and Cote d’Ivoire (Deaton,
1990) suggest the failure of complete intra-village consumption insurance.
Hence, a consensus emerged from this research on risk sharing in village
economies, which is that, full risk sharing is not taking place at the village
level.
Several explanations have been proposed for the failure of full insurance.
One is moral hazard, that one households actions are not observable to oth-
ers, so shirking is possible (Rogerson, 1985; Golosov et al., 2003). Another
is limited commitment, that households receiving high income draws may
leave the insurance arrangement instead of contributing to the insurance pool
(Kimball, 1988; Coate and Ravallion, 1993; Ligon et al., 2002; Laczó, 2015).
A third possibility is hidden income, that households income realizations are
unobservable, so that it is possible to claim lower income (Townsend, 1982).
Kinnan (2017) cleanly documents all the three possibilities and supports the
predictions of hidden income, but rejects limited commitment and moral
hazard using panel data from rural Thailand. A fourth possibility is that,
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villages may not be an appropriate unit of pooling risk in village economies
and risk sharing may take place within subgroups in a village (Ellsworth,
1988; Platteau, 1997; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003; Goldstein et al., 2005;
De Weerdt and Dercon, 2006); factors such as size and social characteristics
of risk sharing groups may be important aspects in determining the amount
of risk-sharing that occurs.
An emerging strand of literature suggests that ignoring heterogeneity in
preferences may explain rejections of full risk sharing. Schulhofer-Wohl
(2011) and Mazzocco and Saini (2012) show that standard risk sharing tests
may spuriously reject full insurance, as they assume homogeneous prefer-
ences. If households have heterogeneous preferences, then those with more
risk tolerance would bear more aggregate risk. As a result, the income coef-
ficient in the full insurance test specification would be biased upwards and
may lead to spurious rejections of full insurance.
3.2.1 Risk sharing with heterogeneous preferences
The literature on risk sharing tests with heterogeneous preferences is nascent
and mainly comprises three prominent studies by Schulhofer-Wohl (2011),
Mazzocco and Saini (2012) and Chiappori et al. (2014); each study proposes
a different testing approach. Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) and Chiappori et al.
(2014) conduct a parametric test by estimating the benchmark risk shar-
ing specification derived from the first order condition that household con-
sumption depends only on aggregate shocks and not on idiosyncratic shocks.
Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) first provides empirical evidence consistent with the
hypothesis that incomes are more strongly correlated with aggregate shocks
for more risk tolerant agents. Using panel data from Health and Retire-
ment Survey from 1923-47, the author shows that risk tolerant workers hold
jobs in which earnings carry more aggregate risk. In deriving the economet-
ric methods to test for full risk sharing, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) treats risk
preferences as nuisance parameters that must be eliminated from the full
risk sharing equation. The author uses quasi-fixed effects that controls for
household specific trends and household specific effects of aggregate shocks,
thereby removing any heterogeneity in preferences.
While Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) avoids estimating preferences, Chiappori
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et al. (2014) measure each households preferences upto a scale by examining
how much its consumption co-moves with aggregate consumption. The intu-
ition is that, if two householdss consumptions are strongly correlated, they
must both have consumption that moves strongly with aggregate shocks; they
must both be relatively risk tolerant. Similarly, if two householdss consump-
tion is not strongly correlated, atleast one must have consumption that does
not move strongly with aggregate shocks; at least one must be risk verse.
The authors use this intuition to impute risk preferences of each household
by considering their pair-wise correlation of consumption. The estimated
risk preferences for each household are then substituted in the omnibus full
insurance specification to control for preference heterogeneity.
Mazzocco and Saini (2012), on the other hand, use a non-parametric test
that allows for a general class of utility functions. Efficient risk sharing is
tested for household pairs. Instead of relying on the first order conditions, the
authors use a household risk sharing function which is basically household
expenditure as a function of aggregate resources (sum of expenditures for
the household pair). The efficiency test for a household pair comprises of
whether a households expenditure is monotonically increasing with the sum
of expenditures for the pair. The test is repeated for all the possible household
pairs in a group and the hypothesis of full risk sharing for the group is
rejected if one of the pairs in the group fails to share risk efficiently. The use
of risk sharing functions incorporates heterogeneity in risk preferences and
non-separability between consumption and leisure.
Actually, Townsend (1994) in part tests for full insurance that allows for
heterogeneous preferences. Townsend runs separate time-series regressions
for each household and tests whether the coefficient on the idiosyncratic
income is equal to zero and if the aggregate consumption (or the village
leave-out mean) is equal to one for each household. Kurosaki (2001) follows
a similar procedure, using the same ICRISAT data, and estimates household
by household regression with the inclusion of a time trend to account for
heterogeneity in time preferences. But the power of these tests is very weak,
given the short time dimension of panel data on consumption, only 10 peri-
ods for each household in a village. Furthermore, Dubois (2001) tests for full
insurance allowing risk aversion to vary with observed household character-
istics, but rules out unobserved heterogeneity.
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3.2.2 Critique of the literature
The basic premise for including heterogeneous preferences in testing for ef-
ficiency is that omitted variable bias in standard tests under homogeneous
preferences drives the income coefficient upwards, leading to spurious rejec-
tions of full insurance (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2011; Mazzocco and Saini, 2012).
The motivation to include heterogeneous preferences, more than controlling
for the econometric bias, points toward accounting for the theoretical impli-
cation of aggregate risk sharing based on preferences which has been ignored
in the literature. Mazzocco and Saini (2012) explain risk sharing as a two-
step process, characterized by two types of shocks idiosyncratic and aggre-
gate. The first step involves idiosyncratic risk sharing wherein households
pool their individual resources and hence eliminate the idiosyncratic risk they
face. The second step consists of aggregate risk sharing wherein households
with heterogeneous preferences insure each other against aggregate risk by
allocating pooled resources according to their individual preferences; more
risk tolerant households bear a larger share of aggregate risk. The need to
account for heterogeneous preferences stems from the second step, which is
mostly ignored in the literature.
In theory, a Pareto-efficient consumption allocation puts more aggregate
consumption risk on those who are less risk averse. This theoretical im-
plication holds true under complete markets, supported by an institutional
structure with a complete set of state contingent claims (or Arrow-Debreu
securities) and infinite agents who can trade these securities to hedge against
aggregate risk (Diamond, 1967; Wilson, 1968). However, village economies
are characterized by incomplete markets with frictions and a lack of insti-
tutional framework to facilitate sharing of aggregate risk. It is important
to examine the motive for risk sharing for aggregate shocks; whether there
are informal enforcement mechanisms that create incentives for households
with different risk preferences to share aggregate risk, keeping in mind the
features of village economies. Households in a village may have different risk
preferences. But, the presence of heterogeneous risk preferences may not
directly translate to sharing of aggregate shocks based on preferences.
It may be probable for a risk neutral agent in a village - e.g., a bank or a rich
individual - to insure risk averse individuals subject to aggregate shocks. This
kind of protection against aggregate shocks that a rich individual provides to
88
poorer individuals, often called as patron-client relationships, is explored in
the sociological and anthropological literature (Scott, 1977; Platteau, 1995).
But, such arrangements have practically disappeared from village economies
(Bardhan and Rudra, 1980) and is reported to be absent in ICRISAT villages
(Walker and Ryan, 1990).
Contrary to the assumption that aggregate shocks is a significant com-
ponent of efficient risk sharing in village economies, several studies indicate
that risk sharing breaks down under aggregate shocks, especially for poor
households, since everyone is affected (Ray, 1998; Dercon, 2005; Pan, 2009;
Gunther and Harttgen, 2009; Bhattamishra and Barrett, 2010; Binswanger-
Mkize, 2013). For instance, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) use the
same ICRISAT data and find that food consumption declines with village
level weather shocks but not for idiosyncratic shocks such as illness or acci-
dents, suggesting that informal mechanisms may not insure aggregate risk.
Pan (2009) indicate that inter-household transfers from informal risk shar-
ing networks can only insure idiosyncratic but not covariate shocks in rural
Ethiopian villages. Reardon et al. (1988) find that intra-village transfers
accounted for only two and one percent of losses suffered by the poorest
households in the Sahalian and Sudanian villages of Burkina Faso, after a
drought in 1987. Similarly, Kazianga and Udry (2006) use village panel data
in Burkina Faso and report that transfers during drought between 1981 to
1985 were too small to play any significant role in consumption smoothing.
Shoji (2008) uses a panel dataset of 126 villages in Bangladesh and shows
that quasi-credit within villages was not available during severe floods in
1998.
And even if one accounts for sharing of aggregate risk, there is little scope
to share the aggregate component of income risk as the idiosyncratic com-
ponent of income risk is more dominant in village economies (Udry, 1990;
Townsend, 1995; Deaton, 1997; Lybbert et al., 2004; Morduch, 2005; Gunther
and Harttgen, 2009). For instance, Morduch (2005) uses the same ICRISAT
village data and reports that idiosyncratic risk (inclusive of measurement
error) accounts for 75-96% of the total variance in income within these vil-
lages. Similar magnitudes are reported using data from Nigeria (Udry, 1990),
Thailand (Townsend, 1995) and Cote d’Ivoire (Deaton, 1997).
Furthermore, while methods that account for heterogeneous preferences
correct for econometric bias, it is important to understand the need to ac-
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count for heterogeneous preferences and assess the relative significance of cor-
recting the bias. Does the implication of full risk sharing (or a failure) under
homogeneous preferences substantially differ after correcting for the bias due
to heterogeneous preferences? Shrinivas and Fafchamps (2018) show that
the standard tests do not yield results that are markedly different from those
provided by the heterogeneity-robust tests in Mazzocco and Saini (2012).
Chiappori et al. (2014) note that the hypothesis of full risk sharing is not
rejected for Thai village data under homogeneous and heterogeneous pref-
erences. Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) derives econometric tests of full insurance
that account for both time and risk preferences using two methods - factor
models and GMM; wherein GMM further allows non-separability between
consumption and leisure. Using PSID data, Schulhofer-Wohl (2011) rejects
full insurance for both homogeneous and heterogeneous cases from the factor
method estimates and from GMM (for risk preferences only) under the as-
sumption of separability. Allowing for non-separability and time preferences
reduces the coefficient on income, more so for time preferences which reduces
the income coefficient to a negative value and statistically indistinguishable
from zero. As a result, insurance is not rejected, under the case when both
time preferences and non-separability are allowed. Also in Townsend (1994),
empirical results from the time-series regressions are largely similar to the
pooled-panel regressions, that a significant degree of idiosyncratic shocks are
smoothed.
In summary, a major implication from the three major studies that test for
risk sharing with heterogeneous preferences is that the results for tests under
homogeneous preferences are largely similar with those that allow heteroge-
neous preferences. Moreover, there is convincing evidence that risk sharing
breaks down under aggregate shocks and there is little scope to share aggre-
gate shocks in village economies. Hence, before employing new risk sharing
tests with heterogeneous risk preferences, a motivation for heterogeneity in
terms of policy implications and a more clear description of the institutional




In this section, we derive the standard full insurance specification, based on
Diamond (1967) and Wilson (1968) and modify the omnibus specification to
allow for heterogeneous risk and time preferences.
Assume a closed exchange economy. Imagine a village with N households
each with variable income yjt that depends on the state of nature s. Suppose
that s represents a complete depiction of the state of nature - i.e. for individ-
ual j in household i as well as all other N − 1 households in the village. Let
consumption of individual j at time period t be denoted as cjt, consumption
of household i be denoted as cit and suppose consumption and leisure are
separable. Individuals live infinitely and discount the future with common









where Prob(srt) denotes the probability of state of the world sr at time t.
The set of Pareto optimal consumption allocations is found by maximizing





















ηj = 1. Let the Lagrange multiplier associated with each feasi-





j(cjt(srt))− λ(srt) = 0 (3.4)
where, ηj is the Pareto weight of individual j which remains unchanged
over time, and λ(srt) is the same for all households in each state of the
world. λ(srt) can also be interpreted as a measure of the aggregate resource
constraint faced by all N households in the village in period t. To simplify






(cjt) = λt (3.5)
The most important implication of the above first-order condition is that,
individual consumption cjt is contingent on λt. Now, since the Lagrange
multiplier λt depends on aggregate income
∑
j
yjt or aggregate consumption∑
j
cjt, it follows that, under efficient risk sharing, individual consumption
cjt varies only with aggregate consumption. In other words, conditional on
aggregate consumption, idiosyncratic variables such as individual income yjt
do not affect consumption at all. In contrast, under autarky or no risk-
sharing, individual consumption cjt would closely track individual income yjt.
This is the basis for the exclusion restriction test of risk sharing efficiency.
In order to construct a formal statistical test and bring the above implica-







where γi is the coefficient of risk aversion of household i. Substituting the
first differential of the above equation in equation 3.5, we get:
ηjρ
t
j exp[−γic∗jt] = λt











Now, suppose we assign common weights ηj to all individuals j in house-











(− log λt) (3.6)
Equation (3.6) says that aggregate shocks λt have a larger effect on house-
holds that have smaller co-efficients of risk aversion γi and that consump-
tion rises faster for households with larger rates of time preferences ρi or
larger elasticities of intertemporal substitution 1/γi. However, estimation
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of equation (3.6) to test the full-risk sharing implicaiton is non-trivial as
the aggregate resource constraint logλt is unobservable. Under the null of
full risk sharing equation (3.6) holds for all the households in the village
(i = 1, 2...N). Therefore, one simple solution is to aggregate equation (3.6)
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cit = ct as the
average village consumption and consumption is measured with an additive















































































































 t+ εit (3.7)
93
A reduced form of the above equation gives the standard full risk sharing
specification:
cit = αi + βict + θit (3.8)
Equation (3.8) says that a pareto-optimal consumption allocation, under
the null of full risk sharing, depends only on aggregate shocks and not idiosyn-
cratic shocks. In other words, any idiosyncratic variables such as household
income yit do not enter equation (3.8), once aggregate shocks ct are controlled.
Hence, by adding household income yit into (3.8), we get:
cit = µi + βict + θit+ ξityit (3.9)
The test for efficient risk sharing constitutes testing the hypothesis that
ξit = 0.
3.3.1 Heterogeneity bias in risk-sharing tests
Most studies on efficient risk sharing do not estimate (3.7). Rather, a com-
mon co-efficient of risk aversion γi = γ and a common discont factor ρi = ρ
i.e homogeneous risk and time preferences for all households in the village













+ ξityit + ε
equal
it (3.10)
which is much simpler than equation (3.7) because the first and second
terms in the R.H.S of equation (3.10) are just time and household dummies.
Cochrane (1991), Mace (1991) and Townsend (1994) assume homogeneous
preferences and test for efficient risk sharing using a specification similar to
equation (3.10).
The basic point of including heterogeneous preferences is that omitted vari-
able bias drives the income coefficient in (3.10) upwards leading to spurious
rejections (Schulhofer-Wohl, 2011; Mazzocco and Saini, 2012). If the true
model is (3.7) but a researcher mistakenly estimates (3.10), the error term










The least-square estimate ξ in equation (3.10) is unbiased if Cov(yit, ε
equal
it ) =
0, and biased upwards if Cov(yit, ε
equal
it ) > 0. Suppose household income
is decomposed into aggregate and idiosyncratic components, that is, let
yit = eiat + uit where at is the common shock, ei elasticity of household
i to the common shock and uit is the idiosyncratic shock. Assuming that ei
is stationary and uit and εit are i.i.d, then,
Cov(yit, ε
equal















Aggregate shock at and aggregate consumption ct are most likely to be
positively correlated, that is Cov(at, ct) > 0. Hence, Cov(yit, ε
equal




) > 0. That is, income coefficient in (3.11) is biased upwards if
the elasticity of income to aggregate shocks is greater for less risk averse
households. Similarly, it can be shown that income coefficient would be
biased upward if households have heterogeneous time preferences. These
results are formally proved in Proposition 1 in Mazzocco and Saini (2012).
3.3.2 Estimation of risk and time preferences and pareto
weights
In this section, we derive an alternative method to estimate risk preferences,
time preferences and pareto weights of households, identified upto a scale,
using the full risk sharing model. It is important to note that our method is
valid under the maintained assumption that households share risk efficiently
in the village.
First, we normalize risk preferences upto a village-specific scale.1 In other








then the full-risk sharing specification in (3.7) reduces to :
1Chiappori et al. (2014) also assume a mean risk tolerance equal to unity and identify
risk preferences upto a scale. The intution is based on Wilson (1968), that doubling every


















































































Under the null of full risk sharing, equation (3.12) is valid for each house-
hold i. Hence, household specific coefficients β̂i, α̂i and θ̂i can be estimated by
employing household-by-household time series regressions, similar to Townsend
(1994) and Kurosaki (2001). However, it is important to consider a few
caveats in estimating (3.12). First, the dependent variable in (3.12) is mea-
sured with errors. We asssume that the errors are independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d) for a given household, which delivers an i.i.d term
in the time-series regression. And, in the right hand side, village average
consumption is approximated by the sample average ct, by the law of large
numbers. However, the sample average is still an approximation. Thus, in-
stead of full mean, we use the sample leave-out mean (village mean without
including the household under consideration). In Appendix A, we show that
leave-out mean is superior than full mean, especially when there is measure-
ment error. Thus, we substitute the leave-out instead of full-mean, as follows:
cit = βic−t + αi + θit (3.13)
where c−t represents the leave-out village mean consumption. The coefficient
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on village consumption βi has a definite interpretation - it represents the risk




Σβi = 1), households with βi > 1 can be interpreted as more risk
tolerant as they bear more aggregate risk or consume more from the average
village pool c−t. Similarly, households with βi < 1 can be interpreted as less
risk tolerant.
But, unlike βi, it is difficult to directly interpret the coefficients αi and
θi. Using αi and θi, we can however recover household parameters log ηi
and log ρi, which have a more amenable interpretation - log ηi represents
the pareto weight of household i in the risk sharing arrangement and log ρi
represents a combination of pure time preferences and life-cycle motives.















where, α, β and θ represent the village average αi, βi and θi. Appendix C.1
shows the algebra.
The estimation procedure is as follows. First, we obtain household spe-
cific coefficients β̂i α̂i and θ̂i by estimating (3.13) for each household and
then plugin these estimates in equations (3.13A) and (3.13B) to obtain ˆlog ηi
and ˆlog ρi. Hence, our estimation method is simple and straightforward; by
running household-by-household time series regressions, we obtain estimates
of household i’s risk tolerance β̂i, time preference ˆlog ρi and pareto weight
ˆlog ηi, upto a village-specific scale.
3.3.3 Test for heterogeneity bias
Risk tolerance estimates, obtained using our simple method, permits a di-
rect test of the hypothesis that incomes are more correlated with aggregate




in (3.11). This hypothesis is the central point of allowing for heterogeneous
preferences in risk sharing tests. The relationship between household income
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and aggregate shocks for more risk tolerant vs less risk tolerant households








where β̂i is the risk tolerance estimate obtained from (??). The test for bias
due to heterogeneous preferences constitutes whether the coefficient on the
interaction term is positive (ψ3it > 0). In other words, whether the elasticity
of income to aggregate shocks ei in (3.11) is greater for more risk tolerant
households. If the hypothesis ψ3it = 0 is not rejected, then heterogeneous
preferences do not bias the standard test of full risk sharing in (3.10). How-
ever, if the hypothesis ψ3it = 0 is rejected and the alternative ψ
3
it > 0 is
accepted, then it implies that the standard test of full risk sharing may be
biased due to heterogeneity in the data. As shown in (3.11), heterogeneity
matters only for those risk sharing groups with a positive bias. Once the
risk sharing groups with a heterogeneity bias are identified, new risk sharing
tests that allow for heterogeneity need to be employed.
3.3.4 Test of risk sharing with heterogeneity
In this section, we derive an alternative method to test for full risk sharing
that eliminates the bias from heterogeneous risk and time preferences. It
is important to note that our method eliminates the bias derived only from
heterogeneous preferences and does not control for any other source of bias.
First, we obtain estimates of risk tolerance β̂i by estimating time series
regressions, as in (??), for each household. Next, we substitute the risk
tolerance estimates in the full risk sharing test (3.12) :
cit = β̂ict + αi + θit+ ξityit
cit − β̂ict = αi + θit+ ξityit
∆(cit − β̂ict) = θi + ξit∆yit (3.15)
where ∆ is the first difference operator and yit is household income. The test
of efficient risk sharing constitutes testing the hypothesis that ξit = 0. Note
that (3.15) is similar to the pooled-panel regression employed by Townsend
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(1994), except that Townsend (1994) assumes homogeneous preferences and
sets the coefficient β̂i = 1. As β̂i appears only in the dependent variable,
we do not need to correct the point estimates or standard errors in (3.15) to
account for the estimation of β̂i in the previous step. Furthermore, biased
estimates of β̂i do not affect our test as long as the bias is common across all
households in the village.
In principle, we can also estimate θi and obtain each household’s time
preferences ρi. However, unlike βi, it is difficult to interpret the coefficients
θi and ρi, as it represents a combination of pure time preferences and life-
cycle motives. We can however, remove any heterogeneity in time preferences
by double differencing:
∆2 (cit − β̂i ct) = ξit ∆2yit (3.16)
where ∆2 is the double difference operator. First difference eliminates the
household specific intercept αi; second difference eliminates household spe-
cific discount factos θi and any unobserved household specific characteristics
that have a constant time trend. Hence, our full risk sharing test specification
in (3.16) controls for heterogeneity in both risk and time preferences.
3.4 Data
We use the new wave of ICRISAT’s VDSA panel data2 of 1300 households
observed over 60 months from June 2010 to July 2015. The VDSA data cover
30 villages spread across eight states in India with four villages in each state,
except Madhya Pradesh which has only two. The states covered are Andhra
Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maha-
2ICRISAT’s Village level studies (VLS) are longitudinal surveys collected between 1975
to 1985 in six villages in the semi-arid tropics of India. Data collection was restarted from
2001 in the same six villages, tagged as the second generation of VLS (VLS2). However,
the frequency of household surveys from 2001 to 2004 was limited to annual observations
based on the availability of funds, and was increased to monthly data in 2005-06. It
was only after 2009, with the funding from the Gates foundation, the VLS was expanded
significantly and was renamed as the Village Dynamics in South Asia (VDSA). In 2009,
12 villages in the semi-arid tropics, in addition to the 6 old VLS villages, and 10 more
villages from east India were included; summing to a total of 30 villages across India. The
data for panel year 2009, however, has many gaps, especially in the consumption module,
and is inconsistent with the subsequent panel years. Accordingly, this paper uses data
beginning from panel year 2010 until 2014.
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rashtra and Orissa; with 4 villages in each state, except Madhya Pradesh
that has only 2 villages.
The VDSA panel data are geographically divided into 18 villages in the
Semi-Arid Tropics (SAT) and 12 villages in the Eastern region of India.
Similar to the old VLS, households in each village are randomly selected
to represent households in four land-holding classes: large, medium, small
and landless. The data follows the agricultural cycle in India from June to
July. Endowment and household characteristics such as household size and
landholding size are collected annually at the beginning of every panel year
in June. Monthly data on food and nonfood expenditures, sale of crop and
livestock, selling and buying of assets, credit are recorded in the Transactions
module.
Total household expenditure is calcuted using Transactions module, de-
fined as sum of expenditures on food and non-food items. Monthly income
is calculated from plot cultivation, employment and transactions modules.
Income constructed as revenue minus costs; where revenue includes crop and
livestock revenue and income from formal and informal credit and cost in-
cludes value of inputs for crop cultivations and own labor hours supplied by
men, women and children. Consumption and income data are expressed in
real values, deflated to 2010 rupees.
3.5 Results
We first present results from estimating household-by-household regressions,
as in (3.13). Table 1 reports the summary of results, how the number of
rejections of standard risk sharing at the village-level changes for difference
model specifcations. Results are not adjusted for multiple hypothesis testing.
In Panel A, we examine whether results are sensitive to the specification of
aggregate shock measure/village consumption. For the sake of comparison,
the first column shows results when we include time dummies (similar to
Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997)) instead of village consumption. Full mean
in column (2) represents the village average of weighted consumptions (what
Townsend uses) as against weighted average of household consumptions in
column (3). We do not find any signficant difference in the results with full
mean vs weighted average. Although, the number of rejections marginally
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increases with leave-out mean.
In Panel B, we examine whether results are sensitive to whether risk or time
preferences, or both are included. Standard test are results from standard
test under homogeneous preferences with village leave out mean to control
for aggregate shocks (similar to Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997)). With
Risk Pref, is only accounting for risk preferences, that is by substituting the
risk tolerance estimate from time series regression. With Time pref, is only
controlling for time preference, that is by double differencing. Results show
that the number of rejections decreases when both risk and time preferences
are included.
In Panel C, we examine the results from household-by-household time se-
ries regressions. First, we conduct LR test whether all the household-specific
βs (risk tolerance) are equal in a village. This is essentially a test of pref-
erence homogeneity. Homogeneity in preferences is rejected signficantly for
the majority of villages. Second, we test the implication full risk sharing
model, that coefficient on village consumption β = 1 and coefficient on the
income ξ = 0. In other words, we test whether the village mean of the esti-
mated Σβi = 1. Note that Townsend tests if β = 1 for each household (and
only 10 annual observations for 10 years) and we test if the village mean
Σβi = 1(Number of HHs range from 28 to 88). If there is heterogeneity,
the right way to test the complete markets hypothesis with these time series
results is not if β = 1 for each household, but whether the village average
of the estimated Σβi = 1. But, this test is weak anyway and measurement
errors on consumption would make it unreliable.
In Tables 2 and 3 provide the detailed results. Table 2 reports the average
values and standard deviaitions across households of the coeffcient estimates
βi on village leave-out consumption (also interpreted as the village mean
of risk tolerances), and ξit on household income. Risk tolerance estimates
range from 0.509 to 1.096 and income cofficients’s averages are from 0.007 to
0.315. Null of homogeneous risk preferences (common coefficient of β within
villages) is rejected at 5% level for 25 out of 30 villages. The null of full risk
sharing, a joint test of βi = 1&ξit = 0 is rejected for the full risk sharing
hypothesis, for 16 villages at the 5% signficance level and 11 villages at 1%
signficance level.
Table 3 compares the results from standard test and heterogeneity robust
test. The first column presents results from standard tests under homoge-
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neous preferences. The second column presents the heterogeniety bias test
results, as explained in Section 3.3. That is, the coefficient estimate on the
interaction term in (3.14). And the third column reports the esimates from
heterogeneity robust tests.
Results imply that there is heterogeneity bias in a few villages (9 out of
30). Correction for this bias, does reduce the magnitude of the coefficient on
income, especially for the case of risk preferences. The direction of bias for
tIme preferences seems erratic.
Overall, the results imply that results from standard test and the hetero-
geniety robust tests are similar. Hence, these results raise questions on the
need to account for heterogeneous preferences and the relative significance
of correcting the bias.
3.5.1 Association with Demographics
Table 3.4 shows the relationship between estimated household parameters -
risk tolerance β̂i, time preference ˆlog ρi and pareto weight ˆlog ηi - and observed
demographic characteristics of the households at the beginning of the 2010
panel year. Even though the estimates are noisy measures, the results are
intuitive and in agreement with earlier studies. We find more statistically
significant results on risk tolerance, compared to time preferences and pareto
weights. Risk tolerance is negatively associated with number of men and
children in the household and positively associated with education and gender
of household head and expenditure quintile of the household. These results
are consistent with previous studies that show that, in general, higher levels of
risk tolerance is associated with higher levels of education, older males, male
headed households and wealth. Time preferences are negatively associated
with number of children in the household and the expenditure quintile of
the household. Lastly, pareto weight is negatively associated with number of
members outside in the household. This result is consistent with the implicit
risk sharing contracts - households with migrants are given a lower pareto
weight in the risk sharing arrangement.
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3.6 Conclusion
This paper proposes a methodological contribution of testing for full risk
sharing with heterogeneous risk and time preferences. We reject the null of
homogeneity in preferences and show that there is substantial heterogeneity
in preferences. However, we reject full risk sharing for both cases - with and
without heterogeneity. Therefore, risk sharing implications are similar for
tests that allow for heterogeneity with tests that assume homogeneity. Our
method uses a long panel data from India, treating villages as the risk-sharing
unit. Estimated risk and time preferences are associated with wealth and
other household characteristics, suggesting an incomplete separation between
consumption and production, a characteristic of incomplete markets.
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3.7 Figures and Tables
Table 3.1: Summary of risk sharing test results
Using each test, how often is risk sharing rejected at the 1% level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A Month dummies Full mean Leave-out Weighted Average Wt. Avg Leave out
Weighted Avg and Leave out 13/30 12/30 14/30 11/30 12/30
Panel B Standard test With Risk pref With Time pref. Risk and Time
Does Heterogeneity matter? 14/30 11/30 12/30 8/30
Panel C Equal βs within vill Avg vill β = 1 Avg vill ξ = 0 β = 1&ξ = 0
Tests on time series results 23/30 12/30 3/30 11/30












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.3: Heterogeneity Bias test and Heterogeniety Robust Test
Bias test Heterogeneity robust
State num Village Std Test Interaction Risk Time Risk &Time
OR1 Ainlatunga 0.030** 0.684 0.028* 0.030** 0.028*
(0.015) (0.493) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
BH1 Arap 0.015** 0.610 0.015** 0.016** 0.015**
(0.007) (0.882) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
AP1 Aurepalle 0.009*** 1.374*** 0.007** 0.011*** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.501) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
GJ1 Babrol 0.008* 1.813** 0.005 0.008* 0.006
(0.005) (0.916) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
KN1 Belladamadugu 0.011*** 0.439 0.011*** 0.011** 0.011**
(0.004) (1.064) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
BH2 Bhagakole 0.002 4.197*** 0.001 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (1.464) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
OR2 Bilaikani 0.016* 1.233** 0.010 0.016* 0.008
(0.009) (0.602) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
OR3 Chandrasekharpur -0.010 0.137 -0.010 -0.005 -0.006
(0.007) (0.344) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
GJ2 Chatha 0.002 -0.225 0.004 -0.003 0.000
(0.008) (0.368) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
AP2 Dokur 0.006 -0.172 0.006 0.008* 0.008*
(0.005) (0.978) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
JH1 Dubaliya 0.021* 0.510 0.020* 0.022 0.019
(0.011) (0.903) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
JH2 Dumariya 0.036*** -0.183 0.036*** 0.033*** 0.033***
(0.011) (0.697) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
JH3 Durgapur 0.004 0.726* 0.002 0.004 0.002
(0.003) (0.388) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
JH4 Hesapiri 0.079*** 0.674** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.063***
(0.029) (0.296) (0.024) (0.027) (0.024)
BH3 Inai 0.043*** 1.090* 0.037*** 0.045*** 0.040***
(0.016) (0.625) (0.014) (0.016) (0.014)
AP3 JCAgraharam 0.005** 0.214 0.005** 0.005** 0.005**
(0.002) (1.275) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
MH1 Kalman 0.003 -0.774 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.003) (0.736) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
MH2 Kanzara 0.008*** 1.119 0.008*** 0.007** 0.006**
(0.003) (1.318) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
KN2 Kapanimbargi 0.018*** 1.821** 0.015*** 0.021*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.760) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GJ3 Karamdichingariya 0.003*** 4.493 0.003** 0.003*** 0.003**
(0.001) (2.803) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
MH3 Kinkhed 0.019*** 0.021 0.019*** 0.021*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.780) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
GJ4 Makhiyala -0.001 0.098 -0.001 -0.004** -0.004**
(0.002) (1.271) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
KN3 Markabbinahalli 0.010*** 0.332 0.009*** 0.010*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.626) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
AP4 Pamidipadu 0.009** 1.567* 0.008* 0.008* 0.006
(0.004) (0.947) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
MP1 Papda 0.013*** -0.932 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.792) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
MP2 RampurKalan 0.017*** -0.850 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.016***
(0.004) (1.320) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
MH4 Shirapur 0.002 0.027 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.353) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
OR4 Sogar 0.014*** 0.844 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.012**
(0.005) (0.724) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BH4 Susari 0.004 0.477 0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.011) (0.345) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008)
KN4 Tharati 0.011*** 1.103 0.010** 0.012*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.985) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Pooled 0.009*** 0.674*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.169) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 3.4: Association between demographics and estimated HH
parameters (N=1261)
Risk Tolerance Time preference Pareto Weight
β̂i ˆlog ηi ˆlog ρi
Household Composition
Number of Adult Male -0.085*** -2.549 672.873
(0.028) (1.918) (400.386)
Number of Adult Female -0.005 0.327 -62.525
(0.026) (1.285) (218.799)
Number of Children (< 12 yrs) -0.043*** -1.907*** 33.811
(0.015) (0.567) (90.531)
Number of Elders (> 60 yrs) -0.036 0.645 306.158
(0.030) (2.062) (255.200)
Number of members outside the HH -0.010 0.421 -294.475**
(0.013) (0.827) (137.353)
Household head characteristics
Education (in yrs) 0.010* -0.260 59.277
(0.005) (0.507) (50.086)
Gender (male=1) 0.166** 1.707 679.077
(0.070) (5.119) (792.431)
Age 0.001 -0.024 10.698
(0.002) (0.125) (13.970)
Wealth proxy
Total land area holding 0.008 0.610 -80.667
(0.006) (0.544) (59.814)
Expenditure Quintile (1=Poorest) 0.169*** -2.945*** -221.450
(0.021) (1.048) (146.493)
Constant 0.256** -4.224 710.607
(0.117) (7.614) (845.706)
The table reports the association between demographic variables and household’s estimated
tolerance, time preference and pareto weights. Unit of observation is household. Village fixed
effects are included in each estiamtion. Standard errors in paranthesis are clustered at village
level. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
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CONCLUSION
This thesis examines the role of social safety nets in providing food security
and income stability in developing economies. The first chapter examines
the impact of a large safety net program on the labor market. The second
chapter analyzes the effect of the safety net program on food security. The
third chapter asks whether households fully smooth consumption in the face
of fluctuations in income.
The first two chapters examine the effectiveness of one of the world’s largest
safety net program - India’s Public Distribution System (PDS). The PDS
is by far India’s most important safety net, providing assistance to over
800 million people and accounting for 60% of the social assistance budget.
The empirical analysis exploits changes in the generosity of this transfer
brought about by India’s National Food Security Act (NFSA) in 2013. This
policy variation is combined with household and individual-level data from
ICRISAT’s VDSA panel between 2010 and 2015.
In the first chapter, we show that increased PDS transfers led to lower
labor supply and higher wages, and that these general equilibrium effects are
significantly welfare improving for poor households, especially the poorest
quintile. These results are highly relevant for policy as they imply that the
labor market effects further strengthen the pro-poor targeted objective of the
PDS program. In addition, as these general equilibrium effects are stronger
when households face adverse productivity shocks, our results suggest that
the PDS program can play an important role in preventing the vicious cycle of
high labor supply and low wages that afflicts poor households in bad years.
Our results also highlight the importance of accounting for local general
equilibrium effects. Ignoring these labor market effects would lead us to
underestimate the impact of PDS program on the welfare of the poor.
In the second chapter, we show that increased PDS subsidies substantially
improved nutrition. In particular, PDS subsidies “crowded- in” consumption
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of diverse food items, and consequently increased food consumption in terms
of quantities and total calorie, protein and fat intake. Our results suggest that
households reduce market purchase of staple cereals and use the extra saving
to purchase more nutritious food such as pulses, milk and milk products,
fruits and vegetables. These results imply that PDS provides more flexibility
in consumption patterns for beneficiary households, who benefit not only
from the provision of subsidized cereal but also in terms of overall food intake.
Furthermore, we find that PDS beneficiaries consume 84% of the subsidy’s
transfer value in the form of food, suggesting that the transfer does not cause
them to substantially reduce their expenditures on non-subsidized food. We
argue that intra-household bargaining may explain these results, as we find
that households where women decide on resource allocations spend greater
proportion of their PDS transfer value on food expenditures.
These results have important implications for the Indian policy debate
around the effectiveness of the NFSA and the PDS program. The PDS has
been criticized on the grounds that the program is poorly targeted, does
not reach the intended beneficiaries and hence may have little impact on
nutrition. Furthermore, critics contend that PDS encourages only “empty
calories”, and thus may crowd-out more nutritious food items and not im-
prove dietary diversity (Desai and Vanneman, 2015; Gulati et al., 2012).
Our results suggest that these criticisms are not generally valid. Given the
constraints of our study area, our results show that the NFSA and state-
level PDS initiatives effectively reached the intended beneficiaries and had a
positive impact on household nutrition. Morever, the PDS has also been crit-
icized on the grounds that the program makes beneficiaries “lazy” (Madras
High Court, quoted in the Telegraph India (2018)). However, we show that
increased PDS transfers led to only a moderate decrease in labor supply and
an increase in the equilibrium wage. More importantly, this wage increase
particularly benefited the poor, as they are the largest sellers of labor.
As an alternative to PDS, many policy makers have suggested a replace-
ment of PDS with cash transfers. Although in theory, cash transfers are more
efficient, the PDS has an intricate political economy in reform that garners
huge political support and is often featured in election manifestos. As a con-
sequence, many state governments have focused on improving the efficiency
of the PDS program and have refrained from any form of replacement and
no state government in India has showed interest in replacing PDS with cash
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transfers. Only three union territories, administered by the central govern-
ment, implemented direct benefit transfer program on a pilot basis starting
in September 2015. However, preliminary assessments suggest that imple-
mentation quality remains an issue (only 65-67% of beneficiaries reported
received cash benefits) and that it costs beneficiaries more to collect their
cash benefits than collecting food rations (Muralidharan et al., 2017).
In light of the debate over the effectiveness of PDS, our results suggest
that, PDS can lead to large improvements in welfare for poor households.
The general equilibrium effects on the labor market further strengthen the
pro-poor targeted objective of the PDS program. Therefore, despite its inef-
ficiencies, PDS is an effective tool in addressing household nutrition in India
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Figure A.1: Location of ICRISAT VDSA villages - 30 villages across 8
states
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Monsoon Onset -3.521*** -4.181*** -0.005*** -0.012***
(1.152) (0.923) (0.002) (0.003)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Rainfall index is percentage deviation
from long term average levels in the main rainy season relevant for consumption data (ratio of current
year rainfall over long-run mean). Rainfall Shock (as defined in Jayachandran (2006)) =1 if RF > 80th
percentile and =-1 if RF< 20th percentile
Table A.2: Effect of Monsoon Onset on Yield and Production
N=70410
Yield Production Qty Sold Qty Market price N
Rice -0.840 -1.748* -4.272** 0.024* 69719
(0.899) (0.870) (1.830) (0.013)
Wheat -1.599*** -7.308** -1.858 0.006 69719
(0.579) (3.301) (1.861) (0.005)
Staple Cereal -2.182** -4.068** -6.602*** 0.015* 69719
(0.989) (1.906) (2.343) (0.008)
Pigeonpea -0.239 -1.618 -1.160 -0.013 63245
(0.758) (1.190) (0.712) (0.034)
Pulses -0.272 -0.526 -1.630 0.009 67087
(0.579) (0.339) (2.069) (0.030)
Coarse -0.686 2.664 0.227 -0.019** 49491
(0.616) (1.933) (1.522) (0.007)
Food -0.832 -0.405 2.177
(0.584) (0.370) (1.632)
Cash 32.021 -5.756 -3.396
(23.009) (3.641) (2.021)
Crop total 16.171 -7.276 -2.171
(14.155) (4.454) (1.659)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coeffcient
estimate is from a separate regression with monsoon onset as the regressor and
village-average production shocks as outcome variables. In calculating village av-
erage yield, production and sold quantity, households with 100% irrigation are left
out
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Table A.3: Average effects of PDS subsidy and monsoon onset on














Total Labor Supply -0.023** 0.021* -0.011** 0.021* -0.034*** 0.041**
(Own +Market) (0.009) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019)
Segregated results:
Market Labor supply total -0.022** 0.009 -0.010** 0.015 -0.032** 0.024
(Farm+Non-farm) (0.010) (0.010) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017)
Farm -0.004 0.002 -0.008*** 0.005 -0.011* 0.009
(0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012)
Non-farm -0.018*** 0.007 -0.002 0.009 -0.020** 0.016
(0.006) (0.009) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008) (0.015)
Own Labor supply total -0.005 0.022** -0.002 0.013* -0.008 0.035**
(0.004) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.014)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each set of coefficient estimates is
from a separate regression with PDS subsidy value, monsoon onset and their interaction as the regressor
variables, row and column headings together describe the outcome variables.















Total Wage rate 0.3453 -0.0132 0.3250 -0.0279 0.3429 0.0193
(0.2623) (0.1378) (0.1970) (0.1431) (0.2702) (0.1182)
Farm 0.2763 -0.0189 0.3398* -0.0578 0.2898 -0.0399
(0.1926) (0.1128) (0.1845) (0.1407) (0.1785) (0.1264)
Non-farm 0.4242 -0.1394 0.4250 0.2726 0.2121 -0.0208
(0.5855) (0.1636) (0.2618) (0.2316) (0.2995) (0.1863)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each set of coefficient
estimates is from a separate regression with PDS subsidy value, monsoon onset and their
interaction as the regressor variables, row and column headings together describe the
outcome variables.The estimations on Non-farm wages of women have 56223 observations.
113
A.2 Variation in monsoon onset
The ICRISAT data has substantial variation in both rainfall and PDS trans-
fer value, meeting the critical data requirements to identify the buffer effect
of PDS.
Figure A2 and A3 show graphs of deviations in annual monsoon onset for
all the 30 villages during the study period 2010-15. In figure A3, all the 30
villages are marked on the X-axis, with SAT villages on the left and East
India villages on the right. As shown in Figure A2, in a particular village,
the monsoon onset is more delayed in certain years (temporal variation).
Most villages experienced a delayed monsoon during 2012 and 2014, and an
early monsoon in 2013. For instance, in Bhagakole village in Bihar (BH-3 in
Figure A3), monsoon arrived ahead by 22 days in 2013, but was delayed by
12 days in 2012 and 2014, relative to their local average. Similarly, in any
particular year, the monsoon onset may be more delayed in some villages
(cross-sectional variation). As villages in the data are spread across differ-
ent geo-climatic regions (shown in Figure A1), there is significant variation
in the onset of monsoon between villages in a particular year relative to the
local average. As shown in Figure A3, villages in Karnataka, Gujarat, Maha-
rashtra and Jharkhand experienced substantial deviations in monsoon onset.
For instance, in 2014, monsoon onset in Shirapur and Kanzara villages in
Maharashtra was delayed by 58 days and 32 days in comparison to monsoon
that arrived ahead by 10 and 15 days in Makhilaya and Karamdichingariya
villages in Gujarat, all relative to their local average.
In conjunction with rainfall, the ICRISAT data has considerable spatial
and temporal variation in PDS subsidy value. In a particular month, BPL
households in certain states were exposed to a more generous PDS subsidy
than the average BPL household in our sample (cross-sectional variation).
For instance, in 2014, PDS subsidy value for BPL households in Jharkhand
was about 2.3 times greater than in Gujarat. Similarly for BPL households
in certain states, PDS value increased after 2013 (temporal variation). For
instance, PDS subsidy value in Karnataka increased by about 75% in June
2013. The spatial and temporal in PDS subsidy value are clearly depicted
in Figure 1. After 2013, PDS subsidy value increased in Karnataka, Maha-
rashtra, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh; whereas it did not change in Gujarat,
Jharkhand and Orissa. In addition, the increase in PDS subsidy value was
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greater in Karnataka as compared to Madhya Pradesh or Andhra Pradesh.
For the sake of interpretation, let the time period before and after 2013 be
referred to as pre and post-NFSA and suppose the villages can be grouped
into two sets - with and without PDS expansion. Figure A4 shows the dis-
tribution of the monsoon onset deviations from local average, across the four
identified cells - Pre and Post NFSA, and With and without Expansion. The
histogram shows that the distribution of monsoon onset deviation is similar
across pre and post NFSA years for both set of villages (with and without
PDS expansion) and hence forms the rationale for our identification strategy.
A.2.1 Triple difference design
The triple difference approach compares, among villages with similar rainfall,
villages that were exposed to a more generous PDS program with villages that
were exposed to a less generous PDS program. Consider two pairs of villages
V1-V2 and V3-V4 in two time periods T1 and T2 and one of the villages in
each pair, say V2 and V4, is exposed to a generous PDS expansion in T2.
Suppose the village pairs face different rainfall shocks, say V1-V2 face an early
monsoon and V3-V4 face a late monsoon in both time periods. A standard
difference-in-difference comparison of before and after PDS expansion within
each pair would give the impact of PDS expansion during an early monsoon
onset (for pair V1-V2) and during a late monsoon onset (for V3-V4). The
difference between these difference-in-differences estimates would give the
triple-difference estimate.
For example, Figure A5 shows three examples of two village pairs. In each
example, one of the village pair faced a late monsoon onset whereas another
pair faced an early monsoon in 2014. Furthermore, within each pair, one
of the villages was exposed to a more generous PDS expansion whereas the
other village was either exposed to a less generous PDS expansion (Example
3) or no PDS expansion (Examples 1 and 2). For instance, in example 1,
the pair - Babrol village in Gujarat and Bhagakole in Bihar - experienced
delayed monsoons in 2012 and 2014 and an early monsoon in 2013. How-
ever, in 2014, Bhagakole was exposed to a more generous PDS expansion
under NFSA, but there was no PDS expansion in Babrol. The difference-
in-difference estimate between these two villages may be interpreted as the
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effect of PDS expansion during a late monsoon. Similarly, the other pair
- Makhilaya village in Gujarat and Aurepalle in Andhra Pradesh - experi-
enced early monsoons in 2013 and 2014. However, in 2014, Aurepalle was
exposed to a more generous PDS program, but there was no expansion in
Makhilaya. Accordingly, the difference-in-difference estimate between the
latter village pair may be interpreted as the effect of PDS expansion during
an early monsoon. The difference between the two village pairs would give
the triple difference estimate.
Indeed, a second source of variation is derived from villages with similar
PDS expansion and a differential monsoon onset distribution. In this case,
the triple difference approach compares, among villages with similar PDS
subsidy value, those that experienced a more delayed monsoon with those
that experienced a less delayed monsoon. For instance in Example 2 in Figure
A5, the village pair - Kanzara and Kinkhed in Maharashtra - were exposed
to the same PDS subsidy expansion in 2014; but Kanzara faced a delayed
monsoon in 2014 and Kinkhed faced a relatively early monsoon in 2013 and
2014. And the other pair - Chatha in Gujarat and Ainlatunga in Orissa -
did not experience any expansion in the PDS subsidy in 2014; but Chatha
faced a delayed monsoon and Ainlatunga faced an early monsoon in 2014.
In summary, the interaction between PDS subsidy value and monsoon on-
set accounts for both the variation in monsoon onset, conditional on PDS
subsidy value and the variation in PDS subsidy value, conditional on mon-
soon onset. A simple triple difference model treats the two sources of varia-
tion symmetrically and the interaction term would be the weighted average
of both the effects.
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Figure A.2: Monsoon onset deviation, within and between villages, from
2010-2015
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Figure A.4: Histogram of monsoon onset deviation from local average,

























GJ: Babrol (No expansion & Late RF)
BH: Bhagakole (PDS expansion & Late RF)
GJ: Makhilaya (No expansion & Early RF)




GJ: Chatha (No expansion & Late RF)
MH: Kanzara (PDS expansion & Late RF)
OR: Ainlatunga (No expansion & Early RF)




BH: Arap (Smaller expansion & Late RF)
KA: Kapanimbargi (Larger expansion & Late RF)
OR: Chandrasekharpur (No expansion & Early RF)
AP: JCAgraharam (PDS expansion & Early RF)
Example 3
Villages with similar rainfall distribtion; Differential exposure of PDS expansion
Rainfall variation - Identifying examples
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Proportion of PDS grain from Total grain consumption
Figure B.2: Proportion of PDS grain out of Total grain consumption, By
State
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Table B.1: PDS Policy Matrix
PRE-NFSA (Before 2013) POST-NFSA (After 2013)
Item Quantity Price Quantity Price Quantity Price
Andhra Pradesh†
Oct-14 Apr-15
AAY Rice 35kg Rs 2/kg - - - -
BPL Rice 4kg/member Rs 2/kg 6kg/member - 5kg/member -




AAY Rice 21kg Rs 3/kg - -
Wheat 14kg Rs 2/kg - -
BPL Rice 15kg Rs 7/kg 3kg/member Rs 3/kg
Wheat 10kg Rs 5/kg 2kg/member Rs 2/kg
Gujarat
AAY Rice 16kg Rs 3/kg
Wheat 19kg Rs 2/kg
No changes
BPL Rice 5 kg Rs 3/kg
Wheat 13 kg Rs 2/kg
Jharkhand
AAY Rice 35kg Re 1/kg
BPL Rice 35kg Re 1/kg No changes
Wheat No wheat
Karnataka
Anna Bhagya Yojana Jul-13 Anna Bhagya Oct-13
AAY Rice 29kg Rs 3/kg - Rs 1/kg - Rs 1/kg
Wheat 6kg Rs 2/kg - Rs 2/kg - Rs 1/kg
BPL Rice 4kg/member Rs 3/kg 27 kg Rs 1/kg 27 kg Rs 1/kg
Wheat 1 kg/member Rs 3/kg 3 kg Rs 3/kg 3 kg Rs 1/kg
(Max 25kg/HH) (30kg/HH) (30kg/HH)
Maharashtra
NFSA Feb-2014
AAY Rice 15kg or 10kg Rs 3/kg - -
Wheat 20kg or 25 kg Rs 2/kg - -
BPL Rice 15kg Rs 6/kg 2kg/member Rs 3/kg
Wheat 20kg Rs 5/kg 3kg/member Rs 2/kg
(5kg/member)
APL Rice 5kg Rs 9.6/kg - -
Wheat 10kg Rs 7.2/kg - -
Madha Pradesh
Jul-13 Apr-14
Mukhyamantri Annapurna Scheme NFSA
AAY Rice 5kg Rs 3/kg - Rs 2/kg - -
Wheat 30kg Rs 2/kg - Rs 1/kg -
BPL Rice 1 to 5kg Rs 4.5/kg 5kg Rs 2/kg 1kg/member Rs 1/kg
Wheat 15-20kg Rs 3/kg 20kg Rs 1/kg 4kg/member Rs 1/kg
(Max of 20 kg/HH) (5kg/member)
Orissa
Feb-13
AAY Rice 35kg Rs 2/kg - Rs 1/kg
BPL Rice 25kg Rs 2/kg - Rs 1/kg
Wheat No wheat for BPL
APL Wheat 10kg Rs 7/kg - -
(sometimes)
†Andhra Pradesh decreased Rice price to Re. 1/kg in Nov-11
‡ Madhya Pradesh reduced Rice price to Re 1/kg in Feb-14.
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Table B.2: Impact of PDS Subsidy on staple cereal consumption
(N=36,894)
Quantity Value
(in grams) (in 2010 Rs)

























Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each
coefficient estimate is from a separate regression with PDS subsidy value
as the regressor and different food catogories as outcome variables.
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Table B.3: MPC energy and nutrient intake with respect to PDS subsidy
value and expenditure (N=36,894)
Panel A Panel B
MPC with PDS Subsidy MPC with Expenditure
Energy Protein Fat Energy Protein Fat
(Kcal) (milli gms) (milli gms) (Kcal) (milli gms) (milli gms)
Staple cereal consumption
Rice and Wheat from PDS 2.920*** 69.087*** 6.038*** 0.007 0.057 0.011
(0.232) (6.393) (0.479) (0.007) (0.174) (0.017)
Rice and Wheat except PDS -0.483 -13.419 -1.425 0.089*** 2.477*** 0.229***
(0.437) (11.335) (1.147) (0.015) (0.467) (0.043)
Other food types
Pulses 0.227*** 15.173*** 0.278 0.017*** 1.134*** 0.104***
(0.042) (3.076) (1.586) (0.003) (0.181) (0.034)
Coarse cereals 0.245 7.794 1.211 0.015*** 0.484*** 0.143***
(0.201) (6.268) (1.756) (0.005) (0.144) (0.042)
Eggs 0.005 0.379 0.379 0.000*** 0.038*** 0.038***
(0.005) (0.400) (0.400) (0.000) (0.011) (0.011)
Milk and Milk products 0.201* 7.829* 14.275* 0.017*** 0.671*** 1.202***
(0.106) (3.946) (7.708) (0.003) (0.112) (0.205)
Oils 0.341** -0.051 38.137** 0.036*** 0.000 4.042***
(0.152) (0.031) (16.853) (0.005) (0.000) (0.590)
Sugar 0.183** 0.046** - 0.016*** 3.994*** 3.994***
(0.084) (0.021) (0.003) (0.757) (0.757)
Vegetables 0.222** 6.364* 1.629* 0.015*** 0.487*** 0.085***
(0.090) (3.222) (0.904) (0.003) (0.107) (0.020)
Fruits 0.129*** 1.299*** -0.006 0.003*** 0.057*** 0.013***
(0.037) (0.388) (0.216) (0.001) (0.011) (0.004)
Meat 0.010 2.813 -0.630 0.003*** 0.625*** 0.081***
(0.012) (2.167) (0.578) (0.001) (0.095) (0.012)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from a separate
regression with PDS subsidy value as the regressor and different food catogories as outcome variables.
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Total Food 0.212*** 6.043*** 6.030***
(0.031) (0.909) (0.790)
Staple food (Rice and wheat) 0.093*** 2.526*** 0.270***
(0.013) (0.401) (0.053)
Non-staple food 0.170*** 4.863*** 7.259***
(0.026) (0.744) (0.997)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01.
Each coefficient estimate is from a separate regression with PDS
subsidy value as the regressor and different food catogories as
outcome variables.
124
Table B.5: Elasticity of calories, proteins and fats with respect to PDS
subsidy value and total expenditure value (N=36,894)
Panel A Panel B
Elasticity with PDS subsidy Elasticity with Total Expenditure
Energy Protein Fat Energy Protein Fat Observations
(Kcal) (gms) (gms) (Kcal) (gms) (gms)
Staple cereal consumption
Rice and Wheat from PDS 0.640*** 0.635*** 0.619*** 0.042* 0.045* 0.050* 31205
(0.070) (0.071) (0.076) (0.022) (0.023) (0.027)
Rice and Wheat except PDS 0.019 0.037 0.056 0.252*** 0.254*** 0.261*** 31310
(0.126) (0.118) (0.113) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Other food types
Pulses 0.278*** 0.280*** 0.197** 0.262*** 0.262*** 0.268*** 36368
(0.050) (0.053) (0.085) (0.028) (0.028) (0.042)
Coarse cereals 0.217*** 0.238*** 0.299*** 0.166*** 0.165*** 0.159*** 19700
(0.076) (0.075) (0.096) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030)
Eggs 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.372*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 0.129*** 19122
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Milk and Milk products 0.269** 0.277** 0.267** 0.249*** 0.242*** 0.250*** 28424
(0.102) (0.101) (0.103) (0.044) (0.043) (0.045)
Oils 0.245*** - 0.246*** 0.248*** 0.406*** 0.247*** 36542
(0.082) (0.082) (0.028) (0.080) (0.028)
Sugar 0.238** 0.238** 0.238** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 33802
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Vegetables 0.388** 0.386** 0.468* 0.294*** 0.305*** 0.302*** 36640
(0.156) (0.177) (0.243) (0.042) (0.045) (0.048)
Fruits 0.843*** 0.632*** 0.307 0.357*** 0.316*** 0.325*** 29969
(0.235) (0.180) (0.195) (0.055) (0.043) (0.037)
Meat 0.178 0.233** -0.232 0.336*** 0.335*** 0.363*** 24208
(0.127) (0.112) (0.281) (0.040) (0.042) (0.041)
Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01. Each coefficient estimate is from a separate regression with
PDS subsidy value as the regressor and different food catogories as outcome variables.
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B.2 PDS Subsidy reaches beneficiaries
We validate whether the NFSA and state-level policy changes were actually
implemented and whether the beneficiaries received their full entitlement.
We attempt to answer these questions in two ways. First, we describe the
implementation of the program through time-series graphs of PDS entitle-
ments vs PDS consumption. As we have longitudinal data, we can trace the
PDS consumption at the household level over time. Second, we empirically
test the impact of PDS entitlements on PDS consumption in a more rigorous
manner using a fixed-effect regression, similar to equation (3.2).
Figures B1 and B2 lay side-by-side the PDS entitlements in Panel A against
the actual PDS entitlements received in Panel B. Time-series graphs for PDS
quantity for rice, wheat and grain (sum of rice and wheat) are provided in
Figures B1a, B1b and B1c respectively. Similarly, graphs for PDS price are
provided in Figures B2a, B2b and B2c respectively. Each point in Panel B
represents the mean entitlement over all the BPL households in that partic-
ular state and month.
A comparison of the graphs in Panels A and B in figures B1 and B2 suggests
that PDS consumption quantity and PDS price received seem to follow PDS
entitlements; more so for PDS price. The most significant jump in PDS
consumption is in Karnataka in June 2013 with the introduction of Anna
Bhaghya Scheme. PDS rice consumption almost doubled and PDS rice price
received dropped to Re.1/kg in the same month as the enactment of Anna
Bhagya Scheme, as shown in figure B1a and B2a respectively. In Madha
Pradesh, under the “Mukhyamantri Annapurna Scheme”, PDS wheat price
drop to Re 1/kg in June 2013 and PDS rice price received drop to Re 1/kg in
Feb 2014. Similarly, in Bihar and Maharashtra with the implementation of
NFSA, the PDS price for rice and wheat received drop to the level of NFSA
price entitlements, as shown in figures B2a and B2b. NFSA in Bihar was
enacted in March 2014, but in the data the changes in PDS consumption
show up only after June 2014. After the adoption of NFSA in Bihar, PDS
consumption of rice and wheat significantly increase, as shown in figure B1c.
Even for states without any changes in the PDS program, PDS consumption
and PDS price received closely follows entitlement. PDS rice consumption
hovers around the statutory entitlement of 35kg and 30kgs in Jharkhand and
Orissa respectively, as shown in Figure 5a. Similarly, PDS rice price drifts
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around Re 1 in Jharkhand, Orissa and Andhra Pradesh, as shown Figure
B2a. In summary, the graphs show that PDS take-up is high and that the
intended beneficiaries receive a significant proportion of their entitlements.
But, as the graphs in Panel B are only an approximation, we further examine
the take-up of PDS subsidy using a more rigorous fixed effects regression.
PDS consumption is regressed on PDS quantity entitlements, separately
for rice, wheat and grain (rice and wheat). PDS price received, is analyzed
similarly. Table 2 presents the results of the fixed effects regressions. The
coefficient estimates on the entitlements, interpreted as the proportion of
PDS quantity and price entitlement received1, are reported in Panel A and
Panel B respectively. For PDS rice, about 59% of the quantity entitlement
and 79% of the price entitlement is received by the intended beneficiaries;
for PDS wheat, about 46% of the quantity entitlement and 98% of the price
entitlement is received; and for rice and wheat together, 55% of the quantity
entitlement and 83% of the price entitlement is received by the intended
beneficiaries.
The fixed effects regression results reveal some interesting findings. First,
PDS price received is more compliant than PDS quantity. Low pass-through
from PDS entitlement to actual consumption could be due to both demand
and supply side factors. Khera (2011a) argues that supply side constraints
are more relevant for PDS. Based on our field visits in the ICRISAT villages,
it is more likely that the low-pass through may be due to supply side factors
such as leakage in the PDS supply chain, in providing a consistent delivery
of grains to the PDS ration shops, or diversion of grains to the market; and
less likely due to demand side factors such as tastes. Second, more PDS
rice entitlement reaches households than PDS wheat. This is consistent with
previous studies that report that there is more leakage and diversion of grains
in PDS wheat Khera (2011b). The results may also reflect the improved
efficiency of PDS rice schemes in Karnataka, Jharkhand, Orissa and Andhra
Pradesh.
In summary, the graphs in figures B1 and B2 and the fixed effects results,
suggest that 55 to 83% of the PDS entitlement reaches the intended benefi-
ciary. Hence, these results validate that the state-level PDS programs and
1Previous studies have referred to the ratio of entitlement to consumption as purchase-
entitlement ratio Khera (2011b). In this case, the coefficient estimates can be interpreted
as the marginal purchase-entitlement ratios
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(c) PDS Grain Quantity=PDSRice+ PDSWheat

























































































































Mean of Rice and Wheat
PDS Grain Price
(c) PDS Grain Price= Mean of PDS Rice and PDS Wheat
Figure B.4: PDS Price Entitlement vs Consumption for BPL households
from 2012-15
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Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 ***





C.1 Estimation of Pareto-weight
From (3.12A) we have
αi
βi





βi log ηi (C.1)
For any household i = 1 and i = 2, we have
α1
β1



















βi log ηi we have
α1
β1












Hence we can express for any household j in terms of i, where j 6= i












= N log ηi −
[
Σβ log ηi −
αi
βi
(Σβ − βi) + (Σα− αi)
]
= (N − Σβ) log ηi +
αi
βi
(Σβ − βi)− (Σα− αi)
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